ci4^3.?ffik.Y\-2V>.  ^ 

TRINITY  COLLEGE 
LIBRARY  Q, 


DURHAM  =  NORTH  CAROLINA 


Rec’d  ,.v.«U.€> 


1 


NAPOLEON 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR. 

THE  ROMAN  THEOCRACY  AND 
THE  REPUBLIC,  1846-1849.  Lon¬ 
don,  Macmillan  &  Co.  1901. 

THE  NAPOLEONIC  EMPIRE  IN 
SOUTHERN  ITALY  AND  THE 
RISE  OF  THE  SECRET  SOCIE¬ 
TIES.  2  vols.  London,  Macmillan 
&  Co.  1904. 

MEMOIRS  OF  “MALAKOFF,”  Cor¬ 
respondence  and  papers  of  the  late 
William  Edward  Johnston,  edited 
by  his  son,  R.  M.  Johnston.  2  vols. 
London,  Hutchinson  &  Co.  1907. 

LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS. 
New  York,  Henry  Holt  &  Co.  1907. 

THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION,  A 
SHORT  HISTORY.  New  York, 
Henry  Holt  &  Co.  1909. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2018  with  funding  from 
Duke  University  Libraries 


https://archive.org/details/napoleon01john 


I.  II. 


NAPOLEONIC  MEDALS 


The  above  are  enlarged  reproductions  of  originals  in  the  author’s 
possession;  the  actual  diameter  is  13  mil.  These  small 
medals  were  generally  struck  in  gold,  silver,  and 
bronze,  and  were  used  for  throwing 
broadcast  among  the  people 
or  soldiers. 

I.  —  Struck  during  the  Consulate,  in  1S03,  just  before  the 
rupture  of  the  peace  with  England.  The  legend,  Arme 
pour  la  paix,  armed  for  peace,  is  suggestive. 

H.  —  The  last  medal  bearing  the  effigy  of  Napoleon  struck 
under  the  Empire;  to  commemorate  the  Champ  de  Mai , 
eighteen  days  before  Waterloo. 


Napoleon 

4 

A  SHORT 
BIOGRAPHY 


By 

R.  M.  Johnston 

M.A.,  CANTAB. 

Assistant  Professor  of  History  in  Harvard  University 


VS 

co 


4S 


Copyright,  IQ04 

By  A.  S.  Barnes  and  Company 

Published  February,  1904 
Second  Printing,  March,  1904 
Third  Printing,  October,  1905 
Fourth  Printing,  May,  1909 
Fifth  Printing,  January,  1910 


^  /  t/ 

hj  l  (o 

PREFACE 

THIS  book  is  intended  to  present  to  the 
reader  in  the  most  concise  form  pos¬ 
sible,  but  yet  with  historical  accuracy, 
an  outline  of  the  history  of  Napoleon  that  will 
convey  an  adequate  first  impression  of  his 
genius  and  policy.  Without  some  knowledge 
of  this  extraordinary  man  and  of  his  period  it 
is  impossible  to  understand  the  politics,  consti¬ 
tution,  and  general  circumstances  of  modern 
Europe.  But  the  literature  of  the  Napoleonic 
period  is  so  vast,  probably  approaching  forty 
thousand  books,  that  the  reader  who  feels  dis¬ 
posed  to  get  some  acquaintance  with  it  is 
frequently  unable  to  find  a  practicable  way 
through  the  maze.  It  may  be  said  without 
disparagement  to  their  writers  that  any  one 
of  the  three  or  four  best  general  histories  of 
Napoleon,  taken  alone,  is  inadequate  to  con¬ 
vey  a  sufficient  impression  of  the  man  and 
his  times.  But  to  Napoleonic  literature  as 
a  whole  there  is  no  key;  a  complete  bibliog¬ 
raphy  is  so  vast  an  undertaking  that  even 
the  labours  of  Baron  Lumbroso  and  Herr 

vii 


PREFACE 


viii 

Kircheisen  appear  to  offer  little  promise  of 
completion.  The  latter’s  select  bibliography 
is  the  best  available  guide  ;  but,  however  valu¬ 
able  for  the  student,  some  two  hundred  pages 
of  bare  bibliographical  entries  cannot  be  of 
great  service  to  those  not  possessing  some 
previously  acquired  knowledge.  It  is  part  of 
the  purpose  of  the  present  work  to  enable 
the  ordinary  reader  or  the  would-be  student 
safely  to  take  a  few  first  steps  in  Napoleonic 
literature,  avoiding  the  innumerable  books  of 
little  or  no  authority,  and  getting  some  sort 
of  notion  beforehand  of  what  those  here  rec¬ 
ommended  are  likely  to  give  him.1 

As  to  the  narrative  itself  the  desire  to  attain 
conciseness  combined  with  true  proportion  pre¬ 
sents  difficulties  and  disadvantages,  results  in 
unavoidable  gaps.  Thus  no  attempt  can  be 
made  to  narrate  the  numerous  military  opera¬ 
tions  of  Napoleon  on  the  same  scale.  Certain 
campaigns  and  battles,  —  Wagram,  Austerlitz, 
Waterloo,  for  instance,  —  have  been  treated 
more  fully  as  being  of  special  importance 
politically  or  strategically ;  others  have  been 
passed  over  with  a  bare  mention,  though  not 
without  due  consideration  for  the  clearness 

1  As  to  the  selection  of  books  see  also  the  remarks  in  the 
note  to  Chapter  I. 


PREFACE 


IX 


and  continuity  of  the  narrative.  Where  details 
and  anecdotes  have  been  brought  in  it  has 
invariably  been  for  the  purpose  of  illustrating 
broad  issues. 

'''"To  furnish  a  correct  outline  of  Napoleonic 
history  and  to  point  the  way  along  which  it 
may  be  profitably  pursued,  that,  and  nothing 
more,  is  what  this  book  aims  at  effecting. 


This  new  edition  is  revised  to  date  in  the 
bibliographies,  and  is  corrected  in  a  few  typo¬ 
graphical  and  other  slips.  Its  appearance  co¬ 
incides  with  that  of  my  French  Revolution,  of 
which  it  forms  the  continuation.  Will  the 
reader  kindly  note,  however,  that  this  is  not  a 
short  history,  as  that  is,  but  a  short  biography? 
The  one  book  continues  the  other,  but  in  a  dif¬ 
ferent  key. 


Cambridge,  Mass.,  April,  1909. 


CONTENTS 


Chapter  Page 

I.  Napoleon  before  the  Revolution  ....  i 

Birth  and  Childhood  —  Education  —  Appearance  and  Char¬ 
acter — The  Revolution. 

II.  Toulon  and  Vendemiaire . 14 


Bonaparte  and  Corsica  —  Siege  of  Toulon  —  The  Terror  — 
Vendemiaire — Marriage  of  Napoleon  and  Josephine  Beau- 
harnais  —  Army  of  Italy  —  Tactics  and  Strategy  in  1 796. 

III.  The  Campaign  of  Italy.  1796-1797  ....  27 

Montenotte — Armistice  of  Cherasco — Crossing  of  the  Po 
—  Lodi  —  Le petit  caporal — Entrance  into  Milan  —  Casti- 
glione  and  Lonato  —  Bassano  —  Areola  —  Rivoli  —  Fall  of 
Mantua. 

IV.  Campo  Formio  and  Egypt . 41 

Armistice  of  Leoben  —  Fall  of  Venice  —  Peace  of  Campo 
Formio  —  Methods  of  the  French  Armies,  and  of  Bonaparte, 
his  relations  with  the  Directoire —  The  Eastern  question  — 
Expedition  to  Egypt — Capture  of  Malta — Battle  of  the 
Nile  —  Campaigns  in  Egypt  and  Syria — Return  to  France. 

V.  The  i8th  of  Brumaire . 59 

French  Policy  and  Disasters  —  Sieyes  —  Novi  and  Zurich 
—  Landing  of  Bonaparte  —  His  Attitude  —  Episode  with 
Josephine  —  Conspiracy  —  Bonaparte  appointed  to  com¬ 
mand  Troops  in  Paris —  Fall  of  the  Directoire. 

VI.  The  19TH  of  Brumaire  and  Marengo  ...  71 

Scenes  at  St.  Cloud  —  Formation  of  the  new  Government  — 
External  Affairs  —  The  Army  of  Reserve —  Plans  of  Cam¬ 
paign  —  Passage  of  the  Alps  —  Marengo  —  Triumph  of 
Bonaparte. 


CONTENTS 


xii 

Chapter  Page 

VII.  Legislation  and  Administration  ....  88 

The  Consular  Constitution  —  Bonaparte  secures  a  Dictator¬ 
ship  —  Plebiscites  —  Legal  Reform  —  Influence  and  Work 
of  Bonaparte  —  The  Napoleonic  Bureaucracy  —  Religious 
Questions  —  Death  of  Washington  —  The  Press  —  Royalist 
Overtures. 

VIII.  The  Due  d’Enghien  and  Trafalgar  .  .  .  103 

Conspiracies  —  The  Bonaparte  family  —  Moreau  —  Im¬ 
perial  Aspirations — The  Due  d’Enghien  —  Proclamation 
of  the  Empire  — War  with  England  —  The  Trafalgar 
Campaign. 


IX.  Austerlitz . 1 19 

Ulm  —  A  Proclamation  of  Napoleon  —  Occupation  of 
Vienna  —  Austerlitz  —  Peace  of  Pressburg. 

X.  Jena  and  Friedland . 130 

War  with  Prussia  —  Jena —  Murat’s  March  to  Lubeck  — 

Eylau —  Friediand. 

XI.  Napoleonic  Policy.  1806-1S08 . 142 

Napoleon’s  Ambition  —  Fall  of  the  Germanic  Empire  — 


War  and  Finance  —  Tilsit  —  Commercial  War  on  Eng¬ 
land —  Copenhagen  —  Junot  occupies  Lisbon  —  Con¬ 
tinental  Policy  —  Spanish  Intrigue  —  Occupation  of 
Madrid  —  Joseph  Bonaparte  King  of  Spain. 

XII.  VVagram . 157 

Austrian  Jealousy  —  French  Discontent  —  Napoleon 
leaves  Spain  —  War  with  Austria— Aspern  and  Essling 
—  Dispossession  of  the  Pope —  Wagram  —  Peace. 

XIII.  The  Austrian  Marriage  and  the  Campaign 

of  Russia . 17° 

Dynastic  Question  —  Napoleon  marries  Maria  Louisa  — 
Jealousy  of  Russia  —  Causes  for  War — Preparations  — 
Campaign  of  Russia  —  Borodino  —  Moscow  —  The 
Retreat. 


CONTENTS 


xiii 

Chapter  Page 

XIV.  The  Struggle  for  Germany  and  Italy.  1813  189 

Effects  of  the  Russian  Catastrophe  —  Lutzenand  Bautzen 
—  Austrian  Intervention  —  Dresden  —  Leipzig  —  Murat 
and  Italy. 

XV.  The  Campaign  of  France . 198 

Napoleon’s  last  Defence  —  St.  Dizier— Brienne  —  La 
Rothifere  —  Montmirail  —  Laon —  Chatillon  —  Fall  of 
Paris  —  Abdication  —  The  Final  Scene  at  Fontainebleau. 

XVI.  Elba . 210 

Return  of  the  Bourbons  —  Congress  of  Vienna  —  French 
Dissatisfaction  —  Napoleon  leaves  Elba —  His  progress  to 
Paris  —  Changed  Situation — Attitude  of  the  Powers — 

Champ  de  Mai. 

XVII.  Waterloo  and  St.  Helena . 223 

Plan  of  Campaign  —  Ligny  —  March  on  Brussels  — 
Waterloo  —  Second  Abdication  —  St.  Helena  —  Death  of 


Napoleon. 

Appendix — Bonaparte  Family . 239 

Index . 241 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


Napoleonic  Medals . Frontispiece 

MAPS.  To  face  page 

Campaign  of  Italy . 28 

The  Quadrilateral . 34 

The  Swiss  base,  1800 . So 

Austerlitz . 124 

Wagram . 164 

The  French  Empire  after  Wagram . 170 

Campaign  of  Germany,  1813 . 190 

Campaign  of  France,  1814 . 198 

Position  at  nightfall,  June  17,  1815  . . 224 


NAPOLEON 


CHAPTER  I 

NAPOLEON  BEFORE  THE  REVOLUTION 

Birth  and  Childhood — -  Education  —  Appearance  and  Character 
—  The  Revolution. 

IN  the  history  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte  we 
plunge  into  the  characteristic  at  the  very 
outset,  —  the  date  of  his  birth.  'He  was 
born  either  in  1768  or  1769';  probably,  but  not 
certainly,  in  the  latter  year.  \As  late  as  in 
1796,  when  he  married,  the  date  of  his  birth 
was  given  as  February  1 768 ;  later  it  was 
fixed  at  the  15th  of  August  1769.  This  is 
not  a  matter  of  vital  importance,  yet  it  is  not 
without  interest,  for  two  reasons.  In  the  first 
place,  it  is  typical  of  Napoleon’s  methods  that 
he  should  have  placed  the  celebration  of  his 
birthday  at  the  same  date  as  that  of  the  As¬ 
sumption,  which  is  one  associated  with  rejoic¬ 
ing  and  merry-making  in  all  Latin  countries. 
Another  interesting  point  in  this  connection 
is  that  in  1768  the  island  of  Corsica,  the  home 
of  the  Bonapartes,  was  Genoese;  a  year  later 

1 


1 


NAPOLEON 


it  was  French.  If  Napoleon  was  born  in 
1768,  he  was  born  a  Genoese,  if  in  1769,  a 
Frenchman. 

However  this  may  be,  and  the  point  has 
been  the  subject  of  some  controversy,  it  is 
certain  that  all  the  circumstances  of  his  birth 
and  youth  left  him  nearly  devoid  of  what 
might  be  described  as  national  traditions  or 
feeling,  though  in  his  boyhood  he  was  in¬ 
tensely  Corsican.  The  Bonapartes  were  a 
noble  but  poor  family  of  Italian  extraction, 
settled  at  Ajaccio,  where  Charles  Bonaparte, — 
Napoleon’s  father.  —  exercised  legal  functions 
under  the  Genoese  government.  He  took  part 
in  the  civil  wars  that  preceded  Napoleon’s 
birth,  in  which  Paoli  became  prominent.  The 
Corsican  disorders  need  not  be  related  here. 
It  will  suffice  to  say  that  Charles  Bonaparte 
transferred  his  allegiance  to  France  in  1769, 
when  the  sovereignty  of  the  island  was  aban¬ 
doned  by  the  Genoese.  Yet  by  race  neither  he 
nor  his  son  was  a  Frenchman.  The  Genoese 
were  a  maritime  people.  Their  home  was 
the  Mediterranean.  Their  standards  had  been 
carried  in  triumph  at  various  periods  from  the 
Strait  of  Gibraltar  to  the  Bosphorus  and  Con¬ 
stantinople.  This  is  worthy  of  note,  for  the  boy 
brought  up  in  the  Genoese  atmosphere  and 


BEFORE  THE  REVOLUTION  3 

traditions  who  became  Emperor  of  the  French 
had  for  many  years  his  eyes  and  his  policy 
constantly  fixed  on  the  Mediterranean.  At 
every  stage  of  his  career  we  find  that  great 
inland  sea,  around  which  our  civilization  took 
its  earliest  shape,  playing  an  all-important 
part.  ^Napoleon  first  crossed  it  in  the  year 
1779  when  his  father  succeeded  in  securing 
his  appointment  to  a  free  cadetship  at  the 
military  school  of  Brienne.! 

Young  Bonaparte’s  school  days  were  not  very 
remarkable.  His  ignorance  of  the  French  lan¬ 
guage,  his  lack  of  fine  clothes  and  fine  manners, 
his  innate  pride  and  aloofness,  kept  him  solitary. 
He  did  not  shine  in  arts  and  literature,  but 
showed  conspicuous  ability  and  quickness  in 
mathematics  and  geometry.  In  one  other 
respect  he  impressed  several  of  his  teachers, 
and  that  was  with  his  strong  and  domineering  ♦ 
temperament.  In  1 784  he  was  transferred  from 
Brienne  to  the  military  academy  at  Paris,  and 
no  sooner  was  he  there  than  he  revealed  his 
force  of  character  even  more  strongly  by  draw¬ 
ing  up  a  memorandum  exposing  the  numerous 
shortcomings  of  the  establishment  as  a  military 
training  school,  and  setting  out  a  scheme  for 
its  reformation.  This  did  not  tend  to  make 
the  fifteen-year-old  Corsican  popular  with  those 


<\ 


'1  /I 


■1 


4 


NAPOLEON 


placed  over  him  ;  how  little  could  they  then 
foresee  that  he  was  fated  to  carry  out  this  and 
many  other  even  more  important  reforms  within 
a  very  few  years  !  He  spent  only  twelve  months 
in  Paris,  and  then  received  his  commission  as 
a  sublieutenant  of  artillery.  Three  years  later 
the  French  Revolution  broke  out,  and  in  ten 
years  more  the  Corsican  sublieutenant  of  artil¬ 
lery  was  the  ruler  of  France.  What  were  the 
causes  that  brought  about  this  wonderful  rise 
of  fortune?  Chiefly  two:  the  extraordinary 
character  of  the  man  ;  the  extraordinary  char¬ 
acter  of  the  circumstances  into  which  he  was 
thrown.  Had  not  those  two  srreat  factors  co- 

O 

incided  with  such  precision,  it  is  quite  safe  to 
assume  that  European  history  would  be  with¬ 
out  what  is  perhaps  its  most  wonderful  page. 
It  is  therefore  important,  before  we  go  further, 
to  consider  the  personality  of  Napoleon,  after 
which  a  brief  view  of  the  origin  of  the  French 
Revolution  must  be  taken  ;  this  will  lead  us 
to  the  events  in  which  the  Revolution  and  the 
man  who  was  destined  to  be  its  heir  were  both 
concerned. 

Napoleon  Bonaparte  was  a  short,  dark, 
swarthy  man,  of  typically  southern  appearance. 
In  his  early  years,  until  1805,  he  was  extremely 
thin ;  it  was  not  until  his  face  filled  out  that 


BEFORE  THE  REVOLUTION  5 

his  features  could  be  pronounced  handsome, 
though  his  nose  was  salient  and  mouth  well 
formed.  His  hands  and  feet,  like  those  of  his 
brothers  and  sisters,  were  beautifully  modelled. 
His  head  was  large,  full,  and  intellectual,  but 
what  produced  the  greatest  impression  on  all 
who  met  him  was  the  brilliancy  and  imperious¬ 
ness  of  his  steel-blue  eyes;  they  revealed  the 
volcanic  energy  of  the  soul  beneath.  He  was 
given  to  violent  bursts  of  temper,  the  occasional 
outbreaks  of  a  nearly  superhuman  mental  energy 
and  of  a  temperament  easily  swayed  to  passion 
by  personal  and  selfish  considerations.  He 
was  perhaps  the  greatest  egotist  the  world  has  , 
ever  seen,  with  the  result  that  he  often  applied 
his  indomitable  will  and  magnificent  qualities 
to  very  low  aims.  Judged  hastily  and  by  certain 
traits  alone,  he  might  be  thought  to  be  little 
more  than  contemptible,  —  thus,  in  the  matter 
of  veracity.  He  viewed  lying  from  a  strictly 
utilitarian  point  of  view,  and  always  said  just 
what  was  convenient,  so  that  his  history  written 
from  his  own  statements  would  be  little  better 
than  fiction.  He  played  cards  as  he  conducted 
warfare,  obtaining  every  advantage  he  could, 
legitimate  or  otherwise.  Yet  he  cannot  be 
called  a  small  man,  only  a  man  with  small 
aspects,  and  if  he  won  by  his  cheating  at  cards, 


6 


NAPOLEON 


he  always  returned  the  stakes  after  the  game 
was  over.  When  found  out  in  his  perversions 
of  truth  he  was  prepared  to  own  up.  On  one 
occasion  Metternich  stoutly  declined  to  believe 
some  information  published  in  the  Moniteur , 
and  at  last  Napoleon  laughed  and  confessed: 
“Sono  bugie  per  i  Parigini,  they  are  lies  for 
the  Parisians  /”  Alongside  of  this  trait  was  a 
wonderful  largeness  of  perception ;  and  many, 
v  in  fact,  have  said  that  it  was  Napoleon’s  breadth 
of  view  that  constituted  his  genius.  It  was  not 
so  much  that  as  the  perfect  combination  of 
breadth  of  view  with  attention  to  the  most 
minute  detail.  His.powerful  imagination  made 
■■  him  see  events  in  their  fullest  possible  exten¬ 
sion  ;  as  he  said  himself,  he  was  always  living 
two  years  ahead.  At  the  same  time  his  instinct 
for  detail  was  the  nightmare  of  every  colonel  in 
the  army,  of  every  functionary  in  the  Empire ; 
the  memoirs  of  the  period  are  full  of  anecdotes 
illustrating  this.  Philippe  de  Segur  relates 
that  he  was  sent  on  a  tour  of  inspection  in 
which  he  visited  several  fortresses,  many  camps 
and  forts,  and  numberless  earthworks  and  bat¬ 
teries.  On  his  reporting  to  the  Emperor,  he 
was  cross-examined  at  great  length,  but  went 
through  the  ordeal  with  flying  colours  until  at 
last  asked  whether  at  a  particular  spot  on  a 


BEFORE  THE  REVOLUTION  7 

small  cross-road  not  far  from  Antwerp  two 
field-pieces  were  still  in  position ! 

The  brain  of  Napoleon  was  like  a  machine,' 
so  perfect,  so  accurate  in  its  working;  but  the 
spirit  that  impelled  it  was  that  of  a  soldier  and 
a  gambler.  Logical  perception  of  chances  was 
instantaneous  with  him,  and  promptly  turned 
into  action  with  perfect  audacity  and  relentless 
activity.  It  was  among  his  soldiers  that  he 
was  happiest,  and  few  anecdotes  told  of  him 
are  more  characteristic  than  that  related  in  the 
memoirs  of  a  Polish  officer  who  served  in  the 
campaign  of  Russia.  Napoleon  had  just  joined 
headquarters  after  three  years  of  peace,  and 
was  in  the  midst  of  the  numerous  columns 
converging  on  the  points  at  which  the  Russian 
frontier  was  to  be  crossed.  In  the  middle  of 
the  night  the  officers  of  the  staff  were  awak¬ 
ened  by  an  unusual  noise.  Napoleon  was 
sleepless,  and  was  tramping  up  and  down  his 
bedroom  singing  at  the  top  of  his  voice  the 
revolutionary  marching  song,  Lc  chant  du 
depart !  He  was  happy  once  more,  he  was 
playing  the  biggest  stake  of  his  life,  with  the 
biggest  army  he  had  ever  assembled ;  it  was 
the  satisfaction  of  the  roulette  player  sitting 
down  at  his  accustomed  chair  with  a  large 
pile  of  gold  in  front  of  him.  But  there  are 


8 


NAPOLEON 


yet  other  aspects  of  the  character  of  this  the 
most  extraordinary  man  of  modern  times  that 
must  not  be  omitted  in  attempting  to  portray 
him. 

Making  exception  of  the  rhetoric  he  so  fre¬ 
quently  used  in  addressing  his  soldiers  and 
occasionally  in  his  diplomatic  relations,  his  cor¬ 
respondence  constitutes  a  wonderful  intellectual 
achievement.  In  the  thirty-two  volumes  pub¬ 
lished  officially  one  might  nearly  say  that  there 
is  not  a  superfluous  word,  not  an  embellish¬ 
ment.  Conciseness,  energy,  decision,  perception, 
stand  out  with  overpowering  force  from  every 
page ;  and  it  may  quite  properly  be  said  that 
the  correspondence  of  Napoleon  is  a  great 
literary  monument.  It  is  safe  to  predict  that 
it  will  be  read  when  the  names  of  Chateau¬ 
briand,  of  Delavigne,  and  of  Lamartine  are  well- 
nigh  forgotten. 

His  bombast  has  been  alluded  to.  However 
distasteful  to  Anglo-Saxon  ears,  it  often  enough 
produced  its  due  results :  inspired  his  soldiers, 
terrified  his  enemies.  In  nothing  was  Napoleon 
more  an  Italian  than  in  his  strong  dramatic 
sense,  and  his  public  life,  from  the  moment  he 
got  his  foot  on  the  first  rung  of  the  ladder  of 
ambition,  was  one  long  pose.  He  did  his  best 
to  create,  and  to  send  down  to  posterity,  the 


BEFORE  THE  REVOLUTION 


9 


Napoleonic  legend;  and  even  at  the  present  day, 
when  more  reasonable  views  are  beginning  to 
prevail,  there  are  many,  even  among  staid  his¬ 
torians,  who  are  prepared  to  accept  him  at  his 
own  valuation.  Before  closing  this  brief  sketch 
of  his  personality,  it  may  be  as  well  to  add  that 
a  view  that  seems  becoming  popular  in  some 
quarters  at  Hhe  present  day,  —  the  view  that 
'Napoleon  was  an  epileptic, — reposes  on  very 
slight  evidence.  It  is  possible,  just  as  many 
other  hypotheses  are,  but  on  the  other  hand  it 
is  certain,  if  this  theory  is  accepted,  that  he 
was  a  very  slight  sufferer,  and  that  no  epilep¬ 
tic  ever  showed  greater  clearness  of  intellect. 
Historically  speaking,  to  say  that  Napoleon 
was  epileptic  is  probably  untrue,  and  is  cer¬ 
tainly  irrelevant  and  misleading. 

Here,  then,  in  the  year  1789,  was  a  young, 
sublieutenant  of  artillery  from  whom  great 
things  might  be  expected.  Yet  had  not  his 
path  crossed  that  of  a  great  political  cataclysm, 
it  is  certain  that  he  would  never  have  found  the 
opportunities  that  enabled  him  to  rise  to  the 
level  of  his  genius. 

The  misgovernment  and  ineptitude  of  the 
Bourbons  had  at  last  been  visited  with  retribu¬ 
tion.  Although  France  was  fast  increasing  in 
wealth,  more  than  half  her  people  knew  the 


IO 


NAPOLEON 


pangs  of  famine,  many  had  died  of  hunger. 
Montesquieu,  Voltaire,  Rousseau,  Helvetius, 
Diderot,  d’Alembert,  had  stirred  the  reason  of 
the  thinking  class.  France  had  within  her  all 
the  makings  of  a  great  modern  nation,  as  was 
conclusively  demonstrated  by  Napoleon  ten 
years  later;  yet  she  was  degraded  by  such  bar¬ 
barities  as  the  mutilation  and  execution  of  the 
Chevalier  de  La  Barre,  or  the  attempt  to  pre^ 
vent  the  burial  of  Voltaire’s  body;  she  was 
brought  to  bankruptcy  by  the  criminal  folly 
of  the  court  and  its  ministers.  Retribution 
followed,  the  Revolution  broke  out,  and  reac¬ 
tion  swung  far  in  the  direction  of  popular 
absurdities  and  horrors.  From  1789  to  1794 
the  complete  scale  of  democratic  passions  was 
exhausted.  The  most  excellent  reforming  zeal, 
the  most  exalted  sentiments  of  patriotism  and 
disinterestedness,  caught  in  a  rising  tide,  hur¬ 
ried  into  a  whirl  of  political  disintegration, 
finally  disappeared  or  made  way  for  mob  rule, 
violence,  terrorism,  suspicion,  and  anarchy. 
While  in  the  cities  the  Revolution  gradually 
fell  into  the  hands  of  gangs  of  political  fanatics 
or  unprincipled  ruffians,  its  best  elements  found 
refuge  in  the  armies  of  the  assailed  Republic. 
Birth  was  no  longer  essential  for  becoming  an 
officer,  and  great  soldiers  like  Ney,  Massena, 


4 


BEFORE  THE  REVOLUTION  n 


or  Murat,  found  their  path  no  longer  stopped 
at  the  rank  of  sergeant ;  court  favour  no 
longer  made  generals,  and  a  Bonaparte  might 
expect  to  rise  above  all  his  fellows.  His  first 
opportunity  came  in  1793,  at  the  siege  of 
Toulon,  but  before  coming  to  that  it  will  be 
as  well  briefly  to  indicate  what  had  occurred 
previously  and  since  Bonaparte  had  entered 
the  army. 


CHRONOLOGY 


1261. 
1529. 
15  Aug.,  1769. 
April,  1779. 
Oct.,  1784. 
Aug.,  1785. 

14  July,  1789- 


Earliest  Bonaparte  at  Florence. 

Bonapartes  go  to  Corsica. 

Napoleon  Bonaparte  born. 

He  goes  to  school  at  Brienne. 

Proceeds  to  military  academy,  Paris. 
Sublieutenant  of  artillery. 

Capture  of  the  Bastille.  —  French  Revo¬ 
lution. 


NOTE 

Bibliographical:  General  Histories.  —  Among  the  nu¬ 
merous  general  histories  of  Napoleon  the  following  are  best 
to  consult:  Lanfrey,  Histoire  de  Napoleon,  Paris,  1875, 
5  vols.  (unfinished  and  hostile),  also  English  translation; 
Rose,  Life  of  Napoleon  /.,  London,  1902,  2  vols.  (English 
point  of  view)  ;  Fournier,  Napoleon  /.,  Leipzig,  1886, 
3  vols.,  also  English  translation,  New  York,  1903  (Con- 


12 


NAPOLEON 


tinental  point  of  view  and  good  bibliography).  For  illus¬ 
trations,  but  not  matter,  see  Dayot,  Napoleon  raconte  par 
1' image,  Paris,  1894;  Tarbell,  Short  Life  of  Napoleon, 
New  York,  1895  ;  Sloane,  Napoleon,  New  York,  1896  (but 
contains  many  fancy  pictures)  ;  for  coins  and  medals  see 
Delaroche,  Tresor  de  numismatique,  Paris,  1832  ;  for  bibli¬ 
ography  see  Kircheisen,  Bibliographie  Napoleon's ,  Leipzig, 
1902. 

Memoirs  of  the  Napoleonic  period  are  numerous  and 
generally  not  very  trustworthy  ;  they  convey,  however,  a 
local  colour  that  no  history  does,  and  no  real  impression  of 
the  epoch  can  be  gained  without  reading  into  them. 
As  a  first  instalment  Madame  Junot,  Marbot,  and  Sir 
Robert  Wilson  might  be  recommended  ;  the  reader  wish¬ 
ing  to  go  further  could  then  choose  among  the  following  : 
Bourrienne,  Thi£bault,  Le  Normand,  Pasquier,  Meneval, 
Segur,  B.  Jackson,  Bausset,  Cavaignac  ( Memoires  d'une 
inconnue),  Remusat,  and  Durand;  Talleyrand  is  dis¬ 
appointing,  Metternich  voluminous  and  a  little  difficult. 
Other  memoirs  will  be  mentioned  for  particular  subjects  at 
the  end  of  later  chapters. 

It  must  be  understood  that  these  notes  are  only  designed 
to  cover  a  limited  field ;  they  are  intended  to  serve  as  an 
introduction  to  Napoleonic  literature,  nothing  more.  This 
will  explain  why  no  reference  is  here  made  to  such  works 
as,  for  instance,  the  Correspondence  of  Napoleon,  the 
Memoirs  of  King  Joseph,  or  the  works  of  Roederer. 

For  the  preceding  chapter  the  following  may  be  con¬ 
sulted  :  On  the  youth  of  Napoleon  :  Chuquet,  La  jeunesse 
de  Napoleon,  Paris,  1899  ;  Jung,  Bonaparte  et  son  temps, 
Paris,  1883,  3  vols. ;  Bourrienne,  Memoires ,  Paris,  1830, 
10  vols.  On  his  father,  mother,  and  family:  Masson, 
Napoleon  et  sa  fa  mi  lie,  Paris,  1897  (also  Napoleon  inconnu ) ; 


BEFORE  THE  REVOLUTION  13 

Nasica,  Memoires  sur  I'enfance  .  .  .  de  Napoleon ,  Paris, 
1852  ;  Larrey,  Madame  Mere,  Paris,  1892,  2  vols.  For 
the  character  and  appearance  of  Napoleon  a  reference  to 
nearly  all  the  memoirs  of  the  period  would  be  necessary; 
the  most  brilliant  portrait  by  any  modern  writer,  though 
overdrawn,  is  that  of  Taine  in  Les  origines  de  la  France 
Contemporaine  ;  the  thirteenth  chapter,  Vol.  III.,  of  Bour- 
rienne’s  Memoirs  (see  above)  should  always  be  consulted 
on  this  point. 

Sorel’s  L’Europe  et  la  revolution  franqaise,  Paris, 
1904,  eight  volumes,  is  the  best  accredited  modern  work 
on  the  subject  which  it  brings  down  to  the  Congress  of 
Vienna.  The  first  volume  of  Mme.  de  Boigne’s  Memoirs, 
Morvan’s  Soldat  Imperial,  and  Fisher’s  Bonapartism, 
are  of  value  in  their  sphere. 


CHAPTER  II 


TOULON  AND  VENDEMIAIRE 


Bonaparte  and  Corsica  —  Siege  of  Toulon  —  the  Terror  — 
Venddmiaire — -Marriage  of  Napoleon  and  Josdphine  Beau- 
harnais  —  Army  of  Italy  —  Tactics  and  Strategy  in  1796. 


ROM  1789  until  1793,  during,  that  is,  the 


first  four  years  of  the  Revolution,  Bona- 


parte  was  striving  to  improve  his  pros¬ 
pects  in  connection  with  Corsican  affairs.  He 
paid  several  visits  to  the  island,  joined  the 
French  democratic  party,  but  could  not  suc¬ 
ceed  either  in  securing  the  victory  of  that 
party  at  Ajaccio,  or  in  bringing  to  a  favourable 
end  a  small  military  expedition  he  led  into 
Sardinia.  In  the  course  of  these  intrigues  and 
proceedings  we  catch  an  interesting  glimpse  of 
him  noted  by  his  school  friend  Bourrienne  dur¬ 
ing  a  short  stay  in  Paris. 

The  young  Corsican  officer,  whose  watch 
was  in  pawn  and  whose  dinners  were  generally 
provided  by  his  friends,  saw  among  other  sights 
the  march  of  a  mob  of  five  hundred  men  to  the 
Tuileries,  and  Louis  XVI.  complying  with  their 


TOULON  AND  VENDEMIAIRE  15 

orders  by  appearing  at  a  window  wearing  a  red 
Phrygian  cap.  Bonaparte  was  deeply  moved 
at  this  spectacle,  and  declared  with  indigna¬ 
tion  that  with  a  couple  of  guns  he  could  have 
dispersed  all  this  scum  of  the  faubourgs  and 
taught  them  a  lesson  they  would  never  have 
forgotten. 

The  doings  of  Bonaparte  at  this  period  have 
no  large  bearing  on  history  and  are  in  part 
somewhat  obscure.  But  after  the  final  failure 
of  the  French  party  in  Corsica  he  returned  to 
his  occupation  as  an  officer  of  artillery,  serving 
now  in  the  rank  of  captain  (1793).  In  August 
of  the  same  year  the  French  Republic,  assailed 
on  every  side,  received  a  severe  blow  by  the  in¬ 
habitants  of  Toulon  proclaiming  the  King  and 
calling  to  their  help  an  Anglo-Spanish  fleet. 

The  government  immediately  sent  troops  to 
attempt  the  recapture  of  the  fortress,  and  Bona¬ 
parte  found  himself  in  command  of  the  small 
force  of  artillery  collected.  His  skill  and  judg¬ 
ment  quickly  won  recognition,  and  he  was 
soon  promoted  to  the  functions  of  a  lieutenant- 
colonel.  His  energy  made  feasible  the  only 
plan  that  promised  success.  It  consisted  in 
capturing  one  of  the  English  •  positions,  the 
fort  de  l Eguillette,  whence  the  bay  and  ship¬ 
ping  could  be  commanded.  Bonaparte  pressed 


/ 


NAPOLEON 


1 6 

forward  the  work,  but  the  British  fire  was 
severe  and  the  guns  of  his  battery  were  si¬ 
lenced.  He  then  had  recourse  to  his  knowl¬ 
edge  of  human  nature  and  of  the  French 
soldier.  A  large  sign  was  posted:  This  is  the 
battery  of  the  men  without  fear ,  and  a  call  was 
made  for  volunteers.  This  was  well  responded 
to,  some  severe  fighting  ensued,  finally  the 
British  position  was  breached  and  stormed. 
As  Bonaparte  had  foreseen,  this  success  of  the 
French  entailed  the  immediate  evacuation  of 
Toulon  by  the  Anglo-Spanish  forces.  Thus 
Bonaparte  won  his  first  reputation,  and  before 
many  months  passed  his  services  were  recog¬ 
nised  by  promotion  to  the  rank  of  brigadier- 
general. 

It  was  at  the  period  we  have  now  reached 
that  the  Revolution  attained  its  extreme  of  vio¬ 
lence.  The  government  of  France  had  been 
seized  by  the  Jacobin  Club  and  Robespierre. 
An  enthusiastic  conformity  to  their  doctrines 
appeared  the  only  means  of  escaping  the  guil¬ 
lotine.  Bonaparte,  like  nearly  every  other  of¬ 
ficer  of  the  French  army,  made  show  of  zeal 
in  support  of  the  Terrorists,  and  was  during 
some  months  on  close  terms  with  Robespierre 
Jetme.  But  in  Thermidor  (July)  1794,  the 
Jacobin  tyranny  was  broken,  and  in  the  reac- 


TOULON  AND  VENDEMIAIRE  17 

tion  that  followed  Bonaparte  was  for  a  few 
weeks  placed  under  arrest.  After  his  release, 
having  thrown  up  his  command  in  the  south¬ 
ern  army,  he  went  to  Paris  where  he  probably 
hoped  to  find  some  opportunity  of  advancement 
in  the  turmoil  of  politics.  That  opportunity 
was  slow  in  coming,  but  he  refused  the  com¬ 
mand  of  a  brigade  of  infantry  in  the  army  of 
the  West  rather  than  leave  the  capital.  At 
last,  in  the  autumn  of  1795,  events  took  place 
that  marked  his  first  step  forward  in  the  politi¬ 
cal  world.  Since  the  fall  of  Robespierre  in 
1794  a  strong  movement  of  reaction  had  taken 
place  in  the  capital,  partly  royalist,  wholly  con¬ 
servative.  Most  of  the  Sections  of  Paris  were 
hostile  to  the  Convention,  which  aimed  at  re¬ 
taining  power  under  a  newly  framed  constitu¬ 
tion  ;  and  as  each  Section  had  its  battalion  of 
national  guards,  the  movement  soon  took  an 
insurrectional  and  menacing  aspect.  The  ex¬ 
ecutive  power  of  the  Republic  was  to  be  vested 
in  a  committee  of  five,  —  the  Directoire ,  — 
among  the  members  of  which  was  Barras, 
who,  as  a  representative  of  the  government, 
had  known  Bonaparte  at  Toulon  and  had  been 
struck  by  his  talents. 

In  the  last  days  of  September  1795,  the 
movement  of  the  Sections  became  more  pro- 


2 


1 8 


NAPOLEON 


nounced,  the  symptoms  of  an  approaching 
storm  more  clear,  and  the  Convention  charged 
Barras  with  its  defence  and  with  the  command 
of  all  the  troops  in  Paris.  But  Barras  was  a 
civilian  and  needed  military  assistance.  He 
therefore  called  to  his  aid  several  generals  then 
in  the  capital ;  among  them  was  Bonaparte, 
who  accepted,  though  not  without  hesitation ; 
his  personality,  his  decision  and  promptitude 
completely  turned  the  scale. 

At  this  point  we  may  pause  for  one  moment 
to  recall  an  anecdote  of  those  days  that  is  emi¬ 
nently  characteristic  of  the  man.  Thiebault, 
a  young  officer,  reported  at  headquarters,  and 
found  the  newly  appointed  general  seated  at 
a  table  in  conversation.  He  appeared  small, 
of  poor  physique,  with  long,  lanky  hair  and  a 
shabby  uniform.  He  was  asking  questions  of 
the  most  elementary  character  of  officers  of 
far  greater  experience  and  seniority  in  mili¬ 
tary  administration.  There  was  an  inclina¬ 
tion  among  some  of  those  present  to  smile  at 
the  ignorance  displayed  by  the  newcomer,  but 
Thiebault  admired  his  complete  absence  of 
false  pride,  the  searching  character  of  his 
inquiries,  and  the  rapidity  with  which  he 
appeared  to  assimilate  the  information  he  ac¬ 
quired.  The  officers  placed  under  his  com- 


TOULON  AND  VENDEMIAIRE  19 

mand  were  certainly  not  inclined  to  think 
lightly  of  him  for  long.  On  the  13th  ofy 
Vendemiair.e  the  revolt  came  to  a  head,  and 
the  Sections  prepared  to  march  against  the 
Assembly.  Bonaparte  seized  all  the  available 
artillery,  owing  to  the  promptitude  of  a  major 
of  cavalry,  Murat  by  name.  The  few  thousand 
troops  available  were  concentrated  about  the 
Tuileries,  and  as  soon  as  the  national  guards 
began  their  movement,  Bonaparte  opened  with 
grape  along  the  streets  leading  to  his  central 
position.  There  was  considerable  bloodshed, 
but  the  insurrection  collapsed  immediately,  as 
must  all  insurrections  treated  in  that  prompt 
and  uncompromising  way. 

Bonaparte’s  second  successful  demonstration 
of  his  knowledge  of  the  theory  and  practice  of 
artillery  received  large  recognition,  for  he  was 
shortly  afterwards  appointed  to  the  command 
of  the  army  of  the  Interior.  He  was  now  a 
rising  man  in  the  State,  and  for  this  reason 
succeeded  in  winning  the  hand  of  a  lady  of 
rank  and  beauty  to  whom  he  had  been  paying 
his  attentions  for  some  months.  Josephine 
Tascher  de  La  Pagerie  was  a  beautiful  creole 
who  had  married  the  Vicomte  de  Beauharnais, 
an  officer  in  the  French  service,  by  whom 
she  had  two  children,  Eugene  and  Hortense. 


20 


N  APOLEO N 


Beauharnais  fought  for  the  Republic,  was  un¬ 
successful,  and  went  to  the  guillotine  one  of 
the  last  victims  of  the  Reign  of  Terror.  His 
widow  became  one  of  the  beauties  of  the  new 
fashionable  society  that  centred  about  the  dis¬ 
sipated  Barras  and  his  wife.  Whether  she 
loved  Bonaparte  is  very  doubtful,  but  it  is 
clear  that  she  felt  his  magnetic  power,  and 
when  it  was  decided  that  he  was  to  have  the 
command  of  one  of  the  armies  on  the  frontier, 
she  married  him.  The  marriage  took  place 
on  the  nth  of  March  1796,  and  on  the  21st 
Bonaparte  started  for  Nice  to  assume  com¬ 
mand  of  the  army  of  Italy.  It  appears  not 
improbable  that  Josephine's  influence  with  the 
Barras  had  been  largely  instrumental  in  secur¬ 
ing  this  important  appointment. 

We  now  have  come  to  the  beginning  of 
Napoleon's  career  as  a  commander-in-chief, 
and  since  his  history  must  be  essentially  mili¬ 
tary,  since  he  remains  without  question  the 
greatest  soldier  concerning  whom  we  have  ac¬ 
curate  information,  it  will  be  well  to  examine 
at  this  point,  before  we  follow  him  into  Italy, 
what  was  actually  represented  by  a  movement 
of  troops  or  a  battle  in  his  time. 

To  speak  of  an  advance  or  retreat  of  a  right 
or  left  wing,  or  of  a  movement  resulting  in  so 


TOULON  AND  VENDEMIAIRE  21 


many  thousands  being  killed,  wounded,  or  taken 
prisoners,  conveys  but  the  vaguest  notion  of 
the  evolutions  actually  carried  out;  when  con¬ 
sidering  the  history  of  the  greatest  of  captains 
it  will  not  be  out  of  place  to  take  a  prelimi¬ 
nary  view  of  the  tactics  and  strategy  of  his  day, 
and  to  attempt  to  convey  some  more  precise 
impression  of  the  actual  occurrences  of  the 
battle-field. 

When  the  French  Revolution  broke  out, 
the  art  of  war  was  as  much  trammelled  by 
narrow  regulations  as  was  that  of  letters.  The 
methods  and  traditions  were  those  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  but  dogmatism  had  supplanted 
genius.  Rigidity  of  discipline  and  tactical 
formalism  were  the  foundation  of  the  system. 
The  soldier  was  a  brutalized  individual,  skilled 
in  multitudinous  attitudes  and  formations, 
fighting  like"  a  machine  under  the  inspira¬ 
tion  of  constant  floggings.  Two  opposing 
lines  of  infantry,  each  formed  on  a  depth  of 
two  or  three  ranks,  would  advance  nearer  and 
nearer  to  each  other  in  the  most  perfect  align¬ 
ment,  every  musket  even,  every  toe  turned  to 
the  same  angle.  When  within  firing  distance 
the  one  whose  discipline  was  the  more  rigid 
would  generally  manage  to  survive  the  two  or 
three  mechanical  volleys  that  would  be  ex- 


22 


NAPOLEON 


changed  at  a  range  of  fifty  to  one  hundred  and 
twenty  yards.  With  regiments  thus  drilled 
the  great  aim  of  every  commander  was  to 
attain  tactical  perfection,  and  the  conduct  of 
a  battle-field  became  slow  and  artificial.  War 
was  turned  into  a  scientific  game  with  arbitrary 
rules. 

France  revolutionized  war  as  she  had  every 
political  and  social  observance.  With  promo¬ 
tion  thrown  open  to  every  soldier;  with  the 
doctrine  of  Liberty ,  Equality,  Fraternity,  pro¬ 
claimed;  with  many  of  the  old  officers  leaving 
the  country,  it  became  impossible  to  maintain 
discipline,  and  in  many  of  the  early  battles  of 
the  Republic  the  French  army  suffered  in  con¬ 
sequence.  The  Convention  declared  that  cor¬ 
poral  punishment  should  not  be  inflicted  on- 
free  men;  the  sentiment  was  to  its  honour,  but 
the  army  was  soon  reduced  to  chaotic  condi¬ 
tions.  From  these  conditions  arose  a  new 
army,  bolder  and  greater  than  the  old.  It  was 
inspired  by  ardent  patriotism,  that  finest  of 
all  the  military  virtues,  and  made  up  in  dash, 
intelligence,  and  courage  what  it  lacked  in 
science.  From  these  circumstances  a  new 
system  of  tactics  was  evolved,  of  which  the 
most  characteristic  innovation  may  be  under¬ 
stood  by  the  following  convenient  illustration. 


TOULON  AND  VENDEMIAIRE  23 

A  body  of  men  marching  along  a  road  will 
naturally  form  a  column,  —  say  four  abreast. 
Suppose  such  a  column  arrives  near  a  village 
occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  attempts  to  take 
it,  —  what  is  the  simplest,  least  scientific  man¬ 
ner  in  which  this  might  be  accomplished?  In 
the  first  place  the  most  raw  of  officers  and 
inexperienced  of  troops  would  quickly  learn 
to  double  up  so  as  to  convert  a  front  of  four 
into  a  front  of  eight ;  then  a  quick  dash,  the 
bayonet,  the  pressure  of  the  rear  ranks  on  the 
first,  would  do  the  rest.  This  was,  in  its  rough¬ 
est  form,  the  usual  French  system  of  attack 
during  the  wars  of  the  Republic  and  Empire. 
The  same  column  deployed,  or  opened  up 
right  and  left,  would  give  an  extended  front  for 
firing  when  on  the  defensive.  When  attacking, 
the  distance  the  column  would  have  to  cover 
exposed  to  musketry  fire  will  be  realized  when 
it  is  stated  that  the  extreme  range  of  the  mus¬ 
ket  then  in  use  was  two  hundred  yards.  Effec¬ 
tive  volleys  were  generally  fired  at  from  one 
hundred  and  twenty  down  to  sixty  yards.- 
When  a  French  brigade  attacked  the  usual 
disposition  was  for  about  one  quarter  of  the 
infantry  to  be  dispersed  as  skirmishers  to 
draw  and  divert  the  enemy’s  fire.  Behind 
these  skirmishers,  columns  would  be  formed, 


NAPOLEON 


24 

brought  up  as  far  forward  as  the  ground  would 
permit,  and  at  the  proper  moment  launched 
at  the  enemy’s  line  at  the  charge.  The  forma¬ 
tion  of  these  columns  varied  according  to 
circumstances,  but  a  front  of  sixteen  and  depth 
of  seventy  men,  equivalent  to  two  battalions 
of  reduced  strength,  may  be  taken  as  repre¬ 
senting  a  rough  average.  The  French  infantry 
excelled  in  offensive  evolutions,  in  quickly 
seizing  a  hill,  house,  or  hedge,  and  their  celer¬ 
ity  of  movement  and  intelligence  proved  more 
than  a  match  for  the  methods  of  the  armies 
opposed  to  them.  Before  many  years  had 
passed  every  country  of  Europe,  save  Great 
Britain  alone,  abandoned  the  old  tactics  and 
copied  the  new.  Similar  changes  took  place 
in  the  handling  of  artillery  and  especially  of 
cavalry,  which  were  now  used  with  far  greater 
boldness,  especially  for  completing  the  destruc¬ 
tion  of  the  enemy  after  a  successful  engage¬ 
ment;  perfect  alignment  became  a  secondary 
consideration. 

Strategy  changed  on  the  same  lines  as 
tactics.  Slow,  methodical  movements  were 
checked  by  rapid  marching ;  the  capture  of 
a  fortress  became  an  object  of  less  impor¬ 
tance  than  the  destruction  of  an  army.  Bona¬ 
parte  fought  his  first  campaign  when  the  new 


TOULON  AND  VENDEM  I AI  RE  25 

theories  of  war  were  just  beginning  to  emerge 
from  chaos,  when  a  number  of  self-made  and 
excellent  officers  had  won  their  way  to  the 
heads  of  regiments  and  brigades;  he  grasped 
with  a  firm  hand  the  instrument  Fate  had  placed 
in  his  hands  and  wielded  it  from  the  very  first 
instant  with  the  skill  of  a  master. 


CHRONOLOGY 


Sept., 

1789,  to  Leb.,  1791.  )  Bonaparte  in  Corsica. 

Aug., 

I79G 

to  May,  1792-  ) 

May, 

1792. 

Bonaparte  fails  to  secure  success  of 
French  party  at  Ajaccio. 

21  Sept., 

U 

Proclamation  of  the  French  Republic. 

21  Jan., 

1793- 

Execution  of  Louis  XVI. 

Feb., 

a 

Bonaparte  fails  in  an  expedition  to  Sar¬ 
dinia. 

28  Aug., 

u 

Toulon  occupied  by  Anglo-Spanish 
forces. 

Nov., 

<c 

Bonaparte  lieutenant-colonel. 

17  Dec., 

tc 

Toulon  captured  by  French. 

April, 

1 794- 

Bonaparte  general,  commanding  artillery 
of  army  of  Italy. 

July, 

U 

Fall  of  Robespieri^,  —  end  of  Reign  of 
Terror. 

Aug., 

(f 

Bonaparte  under  arrest. 

4  Oct., 

1 795* 

13th  of  Vend^miaire,  revolt  of  the  Sec¬ 
tions  suppressed  by  Bonaparte. 

26 


NAPOLEON 


ii  March,  1796.  Bonaparte  marries  Josephine  Beauhar- 
nais. 

21  “  “  Leaves  Paris  to  take  command  of  army 

of  Italy. 


NOTE 

Bibliographical:  General.  —  See  note  at  page  11. 

For  the  preceding  chapter :  Bonaparte’s  early  days,  see 
note  at  page  12;  for  tactics  and  strategy,  see  Jomini,  Art  de 
la  Guerre ,  Paris,  1837  (also  English  translations)  ;  Baring 
(Lord  Cromer)  Staff  College  Essays,  1870 ;  for  the  Siege 
of  Toulon  :  Cottin,  Toulon  et  les  Anglais  e?i  17Q3,  Paris, 
1898,  8vo  ;  Du  Teil,  Napoleon  Bonaparte  et  les  generaux, 
Paris,  1897,  8vo ;  for  Bonaparte  in  the  Revolution,  see 
Bourrienne  already  quoted,  also  A  bra  nils,  Duchesse 
d’  (Madame  Junot),  Memoir es,  Paris,  1835  (English 
translations) . 

For  the  life  of  the  Bonaparte  family  in  the  south  of 
France  see  Turquan,  Les  sceurs  de  Napoleon,  Paris,  1896. 
For  Josephine  Beauharnais,  see  Le  Normand,  Memoires , 
Paris,  1827,  3  vols.  (English  translation)  ;  Lettres  de 
Napoleon  a  Josephine,  Paris,  1833,  2  vols.  (English  trans¬ 
lations)  ;  Masson,  Josephine ,  Paris,  1898. 


CHAPTER  III 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ITALY 
1796-1797 

Montenotte  —  Armistice  of  Cherasco — Crossing  of  the  Po  — 
Lodi — Le  petit  caporal — Entrance  into  Milan  —  Castig- 
lione  and  Lonato  —  Bassano  —  Areola — Rivoli  —  Fall  of 
Mantua. 

FROM  the  time  Bonaparte  took  command 
of  the  army  of  Italy  he  appeared  a 
changed  man.  He  received  even  his 
oldest  friends,  such  as  Deeres,  with  a  reserve 
that  was  intended  to  mark  the  distance  between 
them  and  his  avowed  aspiration  to  superiority. 
With  the  generals  over  whom  he  was  placed 
such  an  attitude  was  perhaps  necessary,  for 
veterans  like  Massena,  Augereau,  and  Serurier, 
were  inclined  to  be  restive  on  finding  them¬ 
selves  under  the  command  of  the  little  Corsi¬ 
can  whom  they  styled  derisively  le  general 
Vendemiaire.  This  feeling  soon  disappeared, 
for  Bonaparte,  unlike  most  great  captains, 
showed  himself  the  master  of  his  army  and  an 
accomplished  strategist  from  the  first  moment. 

27 


28 


NAPOLEON 


The  French  army  of  Italy  numbered  some 
thirty-seven  thousand  men ;  it  was  stationed 
along  the  coast  of  the  Mediterranean  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Nice  and  in  the  passes  of  the 
lower  Alps.  Across  the  mountains  were  two 
armies  :  the  Sardinian  of  about  twenty  thousand 
men  watching  the  passes  and  protecting  the 
roads  running  northeast  towards  Turin  ;  the 
Austrian  of  about  thirty-five  thousand  men  oc¬ 
cupying  Genoa  on  its  left  and  thence  stretch¬ 
ing  across  the  Ligurian  Alps  to  join  hands  with 
the  Sardinians  towards  Dego  and  Montenotte. 
The  Austro-Sardinians,  under  Beaulieu  and 
Colli,  were  thus  stretched  out  on  a  line  of  sixty 
miles  through  mountainous  country ;  not  only 
this,  but  their  lines  of  communications  were 
divergent,  that  of  the  Austrians  on  Alessandria, 
that  of  the  Sardinians  on  Turin.  Bonaparte 
framed  his  plan  of  operations  in  accordance 
with  these  facts.  He  concentrated  his  divisions, 
first  made  show  of  marching  along  the  coast 
on  Genoa,  then  turned  off  across  the  mountains 
and  struck  with  his  whole  force  at  the  point 
where  the  Austrian  right  joined  the  Sardinian 
left.  The  isolated  divisions  opposed  to  the 
French  were  beaten  in  a  series  of  engagements 
at  Montenotte,  Dego,  and  Ceva;  at  Mondovi 
the  Sardinians  were  defeated,  Bonaparte  pressed 


Campaign  of  Italy 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ITALY  29 

them  hard  on  the  road  to  Turin,  and  on  the 
28th  of  April,  after  a  fortnight’s  campaign,  the 
King  of  Sardinia  was  compelled  to  accept  terms. 
An  armistice  was  signed  at  Cherasco  highly 
favourable  to  the  French  Republic  and  leaving 
Bonaparte  free  to  operate  against  Beaulieu. 

The  second  part  of  the  French  general’s 
operations  turned  on  a  similar  strategic  con¬ 
sideration  as  the  first,  that  of  compelling  his 
enemy  to  cover  his  lines  of  communications ; 
and  as  this  is  an  essential  feature  of  the  strategy 
of  nearly  all  ages  and  countries  it  may  be  as 
well  to  make  clear  its  precise  significance  before 
proceeding  further.  The  reader  who  has  not 
studied  military  history  is  apt  to  think  of  an 
army  as  a  piece  on  a  chessboard  that  may  be 
moved  freely  in  every  direction.  But  this  is 
not  so;  an  army  is  a  society  having  special 
needs  that  have  to  be  met  daily,  and  it  can  only 
be  moved  in  such  directions  as  will  enable  these 
needs  to  be  satisfied.  Food  may  be  found  for 
a  small  body  in  the  country  operated  in  ;  but 
cities,  even  of  the  largest  size,  cannot  supply 
at  a  moment’s  notice  large  quantities  of  gun¬ 
powder,  shot,  shell,  muskets,  boots,  and  the 
thousand  and  one  things  an  army  requires. 
How  many  small  towns  could  work  out  even 
such  a  trifling  problem  as  the  reshoeing  of  the 


3° 


NAPOLEON 


horses  of  a  brigade  of  cavalry  ?  Every  army 
consequently  has  a  line  of  communications  run¬ 
ning  back  to  its  base,  along  which  pours  a 
continuous  stream  of  supplies  essential  to  its 
continued  action  in  the  field;  and  this  line  of 
communications  is  generally  agreed  to  represent 
an  army’s  weakest  point.  For  if  it  is  cut  by 
the  enemy  the  army  becomes  powerless  as  soon 
as  it  has  expended  the  supplies  actually  on  hand. 
Some  of  the  most  remarkable  operations  of  war 
have  turned  on  a  clear  comprehension  of  this 
fundamental  principle ;  we  shall  see  it  con¬ 
stantly  brought  into  play  in  the  campaigns  of 
Napoleon. 

While  Bonaparte  was  driving  the  Sardinians 
towards  Turin,  Beaulieu  had  concentrated  his 
army  to  cover  the  road  to  Alessandria.  After 
the  signature  of  the  armistice  of  Cherasco  he  re- 

O 

treated  to  the  north  bank  of  the  Po  and  pre¬ 
pared  to  oppose  the  crossing  of  the  river  and 
to  defend  Lombardy  and  Milan.  Yet  Bona¬ 
parte  achieved  the  conquest  of  that  rich  prov¬ 
ince  and  its  capital  without  firing  a  gun  and  by 
^methods  highly  characteristic  of  his  genius. 

A  road  runs  northeast  from  Alessandria  to 
Milan,  crossing  the  Po  at  Valenza,  in  Sardinian 
territory.  It  was  stipulated  in  the  armistice  of 
Cherasco  that  every  facility  should  be  afforded 


.THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ITALY  31 

the  French  army  for  crossing  the  river  at  that 
point.  Information  of  this  quickly  reached 
Beaulieu’s  headquarters,  and  he  took  up  a 
strong  position  on  the  northern  bank,  whence 
he  commanded  the  passage.  He  was  confirmed 
in  this  disposition  by  the  fact  that  the  French 
as  they  advanced  collected  all  the  boats  that 
could  be  found  up  stream  from  Valenza.  But 
Bonaparte  was  only  feinting.  While  one  of 
his  divisions  demonstrated  in  front  of  Valenza 
and  formed  a  screen  along  the  Po,  the  great 
mass  of  the  French  army  pushed  along  the 
southern  bank  to  Piacenza,  fifty  miles  east,  and 
there  crossed  over  safe  from  attack  (May  7). 

This  great  strategic  march  placed  the  French 
army  within  a  few  miles  of  the  Austrian  line  of 
communications,  which  ran  from  Milan,  through 
Lodi,  back  to  Mantua.  No  sooner  had  Beaulieu 
discovered  that  only  a  small  part  of  the  French 
were  before  him,  and  that  he  was  being  out¬ 
flanked,  than  he  hurriedly  retreated,  and  aban¬ 
doning  Milan  reached  Lodi  a  few  hours  before 
Bonaparte.  From  Lodi  he  continued  his  re¬ 
treat  to  Mantua,  leaving  a  strong  rear  guard  to 
keep  the  French  back. 

On  the  10th  of  Mav  wyas  fought  the  battle 
of  Lodi,  of  which  the  interest  is  more  per¬ 
sonal  than  military.  At  this  point  the  road  to 


32 


NAPOLEON 


Mantua  crosses  the  Adda  by  a  long  bridge. 
At  the  further  end  of  this  bridge  the  Austrians 
had  established  a  considerable  force  of  infantry 
and  artillery  to  cover  the  retreat.  Bonaparte 
determined  to  carry  the  position  by  storm  and 
a  column  of  grenadiers  was  formed  and  sent  to 
the  attack.  Mowed  down  by  the  Austrian 
guns  and  musketry,  the  column  recoiled  and 
retreated.  Then  Bonaparte,  followed  by  Au- 
gereau,  Lannes,  and  other  officers,  ran  in 
among  the  men,  restored  order,  reformed  the 
column,  and  pushing  to  the  front  led  the 
grenadiers  once  more  across  the  bridge.  The 
Austrian  fire  was  tremendous  but  Bonaparte’s 
onset  was  irresistible,  and  he  came  out  of 
the  melee  untouched.  Later  in  life  he  de¬ 
clared  it  was  on  that  day  that  the  belief 
firmly  took  hold  of  him  that  he  was  destined  to 
accomplish  great  deeds.  That  same  evening  a 
deputation  of  sergeants  of  grenadiers  waited  on 
him  in  his  tent,  and  respectfully  declared  that 
he  had  been  unanimously  elected  a  corporal  in 
their  corps ;  and  for  many  years  afterwards 
Napoleon  was  fondly  called  le  petit  caporal  by 
his  soldiers.  It  was  partly  in  this  respect  that 
he  was  a  great  leader,  that  he  knew  how  to 
play  on  the  feelings  of  his  men.  On  his  in¬ 
spections  he  would  pass  along  the  ranks  unac- 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ITALY  33 

companied  and  speak  directly  to  the  soldiers, 
who  were  always  at  liberty  to  make  known  their 
wants,  ft  On  one  such  occasion, during  the  Em¬ 
pire,  a  grizzled  veteran  reminded  him  that  one 
night  in  the  Italian  campaign  he  had  shared 
a  loaf  of  bread  with  his  general  :  instantly 
Napoleon  granted  him  the  promotion,  or  pen¬ 
sion,  or  medal  he  coveted,  and  made  his  heart 
glad.  In  his  proclamations,  that  are  frequently 
such  difficult  reading  to  the  Anglo-Saxon,  he 
played  with  perfect  precision  on  the  sentiments 
of  the  men  who  were  to  win  his  victories.  In 
his  first  proclamation  to  the  army  of  Italy  he 
told  the  soldiers  that  they  were  without  pay, 
without  clothes,  without  glory,  and  that  these 
were  all  to  be  found  in  the  rich  plains  of  Lom¬ 
bardy,  into  which  he  was  about  to  lead  them. 
He  redeemed  his  word,  for  on  the  15th  of  May 
the  army  made  its  entry  into  Milan.  The  sight 
of  the  republican  soldiers  produced  a  curious 
effect  on  the  Milanese,  so  long  accustomed  to 
the  brilliant  uniforms  and  irreproachable  drill 
of  the  Austrians.  The  French  infantry  was 
dressed  in  rags,  and  marched  with  a  long, 
slouching  step ;  many  of  the  subordinate  offi¬ 
cers,  even  captains,  were  without  boots.  The 
generals  were  far  from  the  rigid  good  breeding 
and  presence  of  the  Austrians.  But  the  drums 
3 


34 


NAPOLEON 


rolled  out  the  Ca  ira ,  the  bands  played  the 
Marseillaise,  and  from  the  draggled,  weary 
columns  there  came  a  breath  of  fierce,  swagger¬ 
ing  spirit  and  patriotism  that  went  far  to  ex¬ 
plain  their  success.  And  at  their  head  was  a 
plainly  dressed,  boyish  figure  whose  deep-set 
eyes  and  pale,  impassive  face  proclaimed  aloud 
to  those  that  gazed  on  him  that  the  spirit  and 
strength  of  the  revolutionary  army  was  directed 
by  pure  calculation  and  intellect;  all  Europe 
was  soon  to  learn  what  the  combination  of  the 
two  could  accomplish. 

After  having  rested  and  refitted  his  army 
*  at  the  expense  of  Milan,  where  a  provisional 
republican  government  was  established,  Bona¬ 
parte  marched  to  the  Mincio  where  Beaulieu 
had  taken  up  his  position.  A  passage  was 
forced  on  the  30th  of  May,  the  Austrians  re¬ 
treated  into  the  Tyrol,  and  the  French  settled 
down  to  besiege  the  great  fortress  of  Mantua, 
which  Beaulieu  had  strongly  garrisoned  and 
provisioned.  Bonaparte  now  looked  for  favour¬ 
able  positions  whence  he  could  oppose  the 
efforts  of  any  relieving  army  sent  by  Austria, 
and  took  possession  of  the  Venetian  fortresses 
of  Verona,  Legnago,  and  Peschiera.  These, 
together  with  Mantua,  form  the  most  famous 
strategical  position  of  modern  history,  the 


issan?) 


iPcschieri 


°Caldiero 
,  Areola 


Legnago 


The  Quadrilateral 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ITALY  35 

Quadrilateral,  commanding  the  north  side  of 
the  valley  of  the  Po  together  with  the  passes 
of  the  Adige. 

Between  June  1796  and  January  1797, 
Austria  made  four  attempts  to  relieve  Mantua, 
all  of  which  were  defeated.  In  August  the 
first  effort  was  made  by  Wurmser  with  forty- 
five  thousand  men,  Bonaparte  being  at  that 
time  slightly  inferior  in  numbers.  The  Aus¬ 
trians  advanced  from  the  Tyrol  in  two  bodies, 
one  under  Ouosdanowich  to  the  west  of  the 
lake  of  Garda,  the  other  under  Wurmser 
down  the  valley  of  the  Adige.  Bonaparte, 
proceeding  on  an  entirely  opposite  principle, 
concentrated  his  whole  army  between  the  two 
Austrian  divisions,  even  withdrawing  the  block¬ 
ading  corps  from  Mantua,  and  by  rapid  march¬ 
ing  succeeded  in  defeating  Quosdanowich  and 
Wurmser  one  after  the  other.  There  was 
a  week’s  fighting  and  marching  about  the 
southern  end  of  the  lake  of  Garda,  among  the 
principal  engagements  being  those  at  Castig- 
lione  and  Lonato,  and  finally  the  Austrians 
were  defeated  and  retired  to  the  Tyrol  after 
suffering  heavy  losses. 

A  month  later  (September  1796)  Wurmser 
was  ready  to  attempt  the  relief  of  Mantua 
once  more,  but  from  a  different  point.  Leav- 


36 


NAPOLEON 


ing  Davidowich  with  fifteen  thousand  men  to 
guard  the  passes  of  the  Adige,  he  proposed 
marching  from  Trent  to  Bassano-with  twenty- 
five  thousand  men,  and  thence  to  circle  around, 
approaching  Mantua  from  Legnago.  On  the 
same  day  that  Wurmser  marched  from  Trent, 
Bonaparte  started  north  from  Verona  with 
about  thirty  thousand  men,  intent  on  assum¬ 
ing  the  offensive.  He  drove  Davidowich  north 
towards  Trent,  and  on  discovering  that  the 
principal  Austrian  force  was  not  in  his  front, 
but  had  marched  to  the  east,  he  followed  it 
without  hesitation  through  the  valley  of  the 
Brenta,  joined  and  defeated  it  at  Bassano,  pur¬ 
sued  it  through  Vicenza  and  Legnago,  and 
finally  drove  its  remnants  into  Mantua  on 
the  1 2th  of  September.  Wurmser  had  lost 
nearly  half  his  numbers  in  killed,  wounded, 
and  prisoners.  This  was  one  of  the  boldest 
and  most  effective  marches  ever  performed  by 
Napoleon;  the  troops  had  covered  one  hun¬ 
dred  and  fourteen  miles  in  eight  days.  A 
speed  of  fourteen  miles  a  day  may  not  appear 
much  to  the  reader  not  versed  in  military  mat¬ 
ters,  who  does  not  appreciate  the  difficulty  of 
moving  long  columns  of  heavily  laden  men 
over  narrow  roads  inevitably  blocked  at  fre¬ 
quent  intervals;  but  the  study  of  military  his- 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ITALY  37 

tory  will  show  that  for  periods  of  more  than 
three  days’  continuous  marching  in  an  enemy’s 
country,  a  rate  of  fourteen  miles  a  day  is  very 
nearly  an  extreme.  The  American  reader  may 
note  with  particular  interest  that  this  is  pre¬ 
cisely  the  rate  at  which  Stonewall  Jackson’s 
famous  marches  during  his  Shenandoah  Valley 
campaign  work  out.  But,  of  course,  this  does 
not  negative  the  fact  that  a  small  body  of 
troops  might  in  one  day  cover  thirty  or  forty 
miles. 

Wurmser’s  second  failure  did  not  break 
down  Austrian  resolve.  A  new  army  was 
collected  and  placed  under  the  command  of 
Alvintzy.  Towards  the  end  of  October  the 
position  was  as  follows:  Alvintzy  with  thirty 
thousand  men  was  on  the  Piave  threatening 
an  advance  on  Vicenza;  Davidowich  with 
twenty  thousand  more  was  at  Roveredo;  the 
main  French  army  was  at  Verona  and  num¬ 
bered  about  thirty  thousand.  Bonaparte  now 
decided  to  reverse  the  operation  he  had  carried 
out  against  Wurmser,  to  defeat  Alvintzy  on 
the  Piave,  then  strike  back  through  the  val¬ 
ley  of  the  Brenta  at  the  flank  and  rear  of 
Davidowich;  but  this  time  his  plan  failed. 
After  some  desultory  fighting  Alvintzy  crossed 
the  Piave  and  forced  Bonaparte  to  retreat  to 


38 


NAPOLEON 


Verona.  On  the  12th  of  November  the  two 
armies  met  a  few  miles  east  of  Verona,  at  Cal- 
diero,  and  the  French  were  severely  defeated. 
Bonaparte’s  position  was  now  highly  critical, 
for  Davidowich  had  descended  the  Adige  and 
was  only  held  in  check  by  a  division  occu¬ 
pying  the  strong  position  of  Rivoli.  Only  a 
few  miles  separated  the  two  Austrian  armies, 
and  it  appeared  as  though  their  junction 
could  not  be  prevented.  But  now  that  the 
loss  of  an  hour,  or  a  single  prompt  decision, 
might  mean  all  the  difference  between  suc¬ 
cess  and  failure,  the  acute  perception  and  su¬ 
perb  audacity  of  Bonaparte  made  him  more 
than  a  match  for  the  slow  and  cautious  gen¬ 
erals  opposed  to  him.  On  the  night  of  the 
14th  the  French  army  crossed  the  Adige 
at  Verona  and  turned  eastward ;  at  Ronco 
the  river  was  recrossed,  and  thence  Bonaparte 
marched  northwards  to  debouch  on  the  flank 
and  rear  of  Alvintzy.  The  success  of  the 
whole  operation  turned  on  the  occupation  of 
the  bridge  and  village  of  Areola,  which  the 
Austrians  defended  with  great  courage  during 
the  whole  of  the  15th  and  16th.  Bonaparte 
tried  to  repeat  at  this  point  the  charge  over  the 
bridge  of  Lodi,  but  saw  nearly  all  his  personal 
staff  killed  and  wounded,  and  was  himself 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ITALY  39 

swept  by  an  Austrian  counter-stroke  into  a 
swamp  where  he  nearly  perished.  The  fight¬ 
ing  at  Areola  was  of  a  desperate  character,  but 
finally,  on  the  17th,  the  French  were  successful 
in  forcing  a  passage,  and  Alvintzy,  finding  the 
enemy  in  force  on  his  line  of  communica¬ 
tions,  decided  to  retreat. 

The  last  Austrian  attempt  to  relieve  Mantua 
was  made  two  months  later  (January  1797) 
and  under  the  same  commander.  Alvintzy 
now  concentrated  his  main  force,  about  thirty 
thousand  men,  at  Roveredo  and  marched  down 
the  valley  towards  Verona;  at  the  same  time 
two  smaller  columns  threatened  the  lower 
Adige  from  Vicenza  and  Padua.  Bonaparte 
met  Alvintzy  at  Rivoli  (January  14)  and  by 
superior  strategy  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat 
on  the  Austrians,  who  in  two  days  lost  thirteen 
thousand  men.  Thence  he  marched  rapidly 
back  to  the  lower  Adige  just  in  time  to  pre¬ 
vent  the  entry  of  Provera  with  nine  thousand 
men  into  Mantua  and  to  force  him  to  capitu¬ 
late.  These  utterly  disastrous  operations  of 
the  relieving  army  sealed  the  fate  of  the  fort¬ 
ress,  and  two  weeks  later  Wurmser  surrendered 
with  some  twenty  thousand  men  (February  2, 
1797)- 


4o 


NAPOLEON 


1796. 

(( 

u 

(6 

U 

U 

(( 

it 


31  July,  “ 

5  Aug->  “ 
4-12  Sept.,  “ 


12  Nov.,  “ 

17  “  “ 

14  Jan.,  1797. 
16  “  “ 

2  Feb.,  “ 


CHRONOLOGY 

Bonaparte’s  first  victory,  Montenotte. 
Millesimo. 

Mondovi. 

Armistice  of  Cherasco. 

Po  crossed  at  Piacenza. 

Lodi. 

French  entry  into  Milan. 

Passage  of  Mincio.  Siege  of  Mantua 
begins. 

Lonato. 

Castiglione. 

Bonaparte’s  pursuit  of  Wurmser,  — 
Verona,  Bassano,  Mantua. 

Alvintzy  successful  at  Caldiero. 

Areola. 

Rivoli. 

Provera  capitulates  at  La  Favorita. 

Fall  of  Mantua. 


NOTE 

Bibliographical:  General.  —  See  page  n.  Add  for 
military  history :  York  von  Wartenburg,  Napoleon  a/s 
Feldherr,  Berlin,  1886,  2  vols.  (also  French  and  English 
translations). 

For  preceding  chapter :  G.  Fabry,  Histoire  de  l'a?'mee 
d' Italie  (zypd-py) ,  Paris,  1900,  2  vols.;  Bouvier,  Bona¬ 
parte  en  Italie,  Paris,  1899  (only  to  the  occupation  of 
Milan).  For  other  than  military  matters  see  note  to  next 
chapter. 


CHAPTER  IV 


CAMPO  FORMIO  AND  EGYPT 

Armistice  of  Leoben  —  Fall  of  Venice — Peace  of  Campo 
Formio  —  Methods  of  the  French  Armies,  and  of  Bonaparte, 
his  relations  with  the  Directoire — The  Eastern  question 
—  Expedition  to  Egypt  —  Capture  of  Malta — Battle  of 
the  Nile  —  Campaigns  in  Egypt  and  Syria  —  Return  to 
France. 

TWO  phases  of  Bonaparte’s  campaign 
of  Italy  have  now  been  reviewed ;  the 
first,  essentially  offensive,  during  which 
the  French  swept  the  Austrians  back  from  the 
Alps  to  the  Quadrilateral  ;  the  second,  essen¬ 
tially  defensive,  during  which  they  reduced  the 
fortress  of  Mantua  and  foiled  every  effort  to 
relieve  it.  The  third  and  last  phase  was  to  be 
offensive  once  more.  A  new  Austrian  army 
had  been  formed  numbering  about  fifty  thou¬ 
sand  men,  and  had  been  placed  under  the 
command  of  the  young  Archduke  Charles 
who  had  just  begun  his  brilliant  military  ca¬ 
reer.  Bonaparte  was  slightly  stronger  in  num¬ 
bers,  and  manoeuvring  with  wonderful  strategic 
skill  first  through  the  Upper  Venetian  prov¬ 
inces,  then  through  the  Julian  Alps,  he  con¬ 
stantly  out-generalled  his  opponent,  won  a 

41 


9 


42 


NAPOLEON 


number  of  small  engagements,  and  forced  him 
steadily  backwards.  So  relentlessly  did  he 
urge  on  his  columns  that  on  the  7th  of  April 
he  had  reached  the  little  town  of  Leoben  on 
the  northern  slope  of  the  Alps,  less  than  one 
hundred  miles  from  Vienna.  Then  at  last 
Austria  acknowledged  defeat;  an  armistice  be¬ 
tween  the  two  armies  was  agreed  to,  and  the 
basis  for  negotiating  a  peace. 

Just  at  the  moment  when  the  negotiations  of 
Leoben  were  freeing  the  French  army  from 
all  anxiety  in  the  north,  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Venetian  mainland,  long  dissatisfied  with  mili¬ 
tary  rule  and  rapacity,  rose  against  the  invaders. 
At  Verona  and  elsewhere  massacres  took  place. 
Nothing  could  have  happened  more  oppor¬ 
tunely  for  Bonaparte.  The  excuse  was  a  con¬ 
venient  one  for  colouring  the  spoliation  of  the 
ancient  republic  of  Venice,  the  neutrality  of 
which  neither  France  nor  Austria  had  respected, 
the  spoils  of  which  both  had  coveted.  The 
Doge  and  Senate  were  too  weak  to  offer  any 
resistance,  and  on  the  nth  of  May  the  city 
was  occupied  by  French  troops.  The  long 
history  of  Venice  had  come  to  an  inglorious, 
nearly  unnoticed  close. 

Bonaparte  spent  that  summer  at  the  castle 
of  Montebello  near  Milan,  conducting  the 


CAM  FO  FORMIO  AND  EGYPT  43 

peace  negotiations  with  the  Austrian  commis¬ 
sioners.  With  the  attractive  but  extravagant 
Josephine  by  his  side  he  held  an  informal 
court,  to  which  many  were  attracted  by  the 
grace  and  beauty  of  Madame  Bonaparte,  but 
most  by  a  curiosity  to  see  the  extraordinary 
soldier  who  in  a  few  short  months  had  carved 
himself  a  place  alongside  of  the  greatest  cap¬ 
tains  of  all  ages. 

On  the  17th  of  October  peace  was  signed 
at  Campo  Formio.  Its  chief  provisions  were 
those  that  gave  France  the  Rhine  as  frontier, 
that  stipulated  for  the  recognition  by  Aus¬ 
tria  of  the  newly  formed  Ligurian  and  Cis¬ 
alpine  republics  (Genoa,  Lombardy,  Modena, 
and  Bologna)  and  that  transferred  to  Austria 
as  a  compensation  for  Lombardy,  Venice  and 
her  Adriatic  provinces. 

In  the  account  given  of  the  campaign  of  Italy 
the  military  operations  have  hitherto  received 
nearly  exclusive  attention.  There  are  a  few 
other  matters,  however,  that  deserve  passing 
notice.  The  French  army,  unpaid,  weak  in 
commissariat,  loosely  disciplined,  followed  by 
a  horde  of  needy  and  not  over-scrupulous 
adventurers,  made  the  people  of  Italy  pay 
dearly  for  the  introduction  among  them  of  the 
glorious  principles  of  the  Revolution.  Even 


44 


NAPOLEON 


Bonaparte,  who  from  the  point  of  view  of  mili¬ 
tary  efficiency  disliked  and  did  his  best  to  pre¬ 
vent  license,  made  the  Italian  cities  disburse 
largely  in  return  for  the  measure  of  liberty  he 
brought  them.  Enormous  contributions  of  war 
were  imposed,  and  these  took  the  form,  in  part, 
of  a  seizure  of  the  treasures  of  Italian  art  for 
the  benefit  of  the  French  national  museums* 
Bonaparte  pushed  his  odd  and  inexpensive 
collecting  mania  to  great  lengths,  denuded 
northern  Italy  of  nearly  every  masterpiece,  and 
was  accordingly  elected  a  member  of  the  In- 
stitut  de  France.  How  complacently  he  viewed 
this  queerly  won  scientific  distinction  may  be 
judged  by  the  fact  that,  for  several  years  after, 
he  frequently  wore  the  official  dress  of  his  new 
colleagues,  and  generally  began  his  proclama¬ 
tions  after  the  following  fashion :  Le  citoyen 
Bonaparte ,  Membre  de  V Ins ti tut,  Commandant- 
en-chef  etc.  Notwithstanding  the  corruption 
that  attended  the  contracts  for  the  provisioning 
of  the  French  army,  it  seems  pretty  clear  that 
the  fingers  of  the  general-in-chief  remained  clean. 
Large  profits  accrued  to  him  legitimately  in 
connection  with  prize  money,  but  that  was  all. 

The  genius  of  Bonaparte  had  been  felt  not 
by  his  army  alone.  The  magnetic  influence 


CAMPO  FORMIO  AND  EGYPT  45 

of  his  superiority  had  touched  the  Dircctoire. 
But  for  the  present  there  was  no  obvious  jeal¬ 
ousy  or  estrangement  between  that  body  and 
its  masterful  general ;  each  felt  a  need  for  the 
support  of  the  other.  When  in  the  summer 
of  1797  there  was  fear  of  a  new  reactionary 
movement  in  Paris,  Bonaparte  gave  his  un¬ 
compromising  support  to  the  government, 
offered  to  march  to  Paris  with  the  army,  and 
sent  General  Augereau  to  carry  out  the  Direc¬ 
tive's  mandates  for  suppressing  its  opponents. 
The  purging  process  then  carried  out  in  the 
ranks  of  the  Royalists  and  Conservatives  is 
known  as  the  revolution  of  Fructidor.  What 
is  perhaps  most  important  to  note  in  this  con¬ 
nection  is  the  fact  that  the  victorious  army 
had  now  become  the  mainstay  of  the  Republic. 
The  Revolution  had  swallowed  up  all  that  was 
best  fitted  to  govern  in  the  civil  population  of 
France,  all  the  elements  of  strength  and  char¬ 
acter  were  now  to  be  sought  for  in  the  army 
alone;  and  the  soldiers,  led  by  generals  like 
Jourdan,  Bernadotte,  Augereau,  Murat,  Victor, 
Ney  and  others,  comrades  who  had  carried  the 
musket  and  nsernTrom  their  ranks,  were  dem¬ 
ocrats  to  the  last  man. 

Towards  the  close  of  1797,  France  being  now 
at  peace,  General  Bonaparte  proceeded  to  Paris 


NAPOLEON 


46 

where  he  met  with  a  triumphant  reception. 
In  this  connection  it  may  be  well  to  notice  an 
important  aspect  of  his  remarkable  personality: 
he  not  only  knew  how  to  win  a  battle,  but  also 
how  to  make  the  most  of  it.  At  that  period 
newspapers  were  few  and  made  little  effort 
to  obtain  news  at  first  hand.  There  were  no 
special  correspondents  at  General  Bonaparte’s 
battles,  but  he  took  care  in  person  that  they 
should  be  duly  recorded.  His  bulletins,  written 
in  a  rhetorical  style  suited  to  the  public  and 
military  taste  of  his  day,  rarely  mentioned  the 
general-in-chief,  gave  the  credit  of  every  achieve¬ 
ment  to  the  soldiers,  but  never  failed  when 
expedient  to  distort  and  falsify  facts,  all  to  the 
greater  glory  and  profit  of  Napoleon  Bona¬ 
parte.  His  numbers  were  always  understated, 
those  of  his  opponents  exaggerated;  even  de¬ 
feats  such  as  that  of  Caldiero  were  officially 
travestied  into  victories.  Thus  a  perfectly  de¬ 
ceptive  legend  began  to  come  into  existence 
from  the  first  weeks  of  the  campaign  of  Italy, 
and  thus  it  was  studiously  continued,  even  in 
the  last  painful  days  of  the  prisoner  of  Saint 
Helena,  even  in  the  last  clauses  of  his  will. 
At  the  Directoire  s  official  reception  of  the 
general  on  his  return  to  Paris  in  1797,  this 
talent  of  his  for  impressing  the  public  mind  was 


CAMPO  FORMIO  AND  EGYPT  47 

visibly  manifested ;  for  he  carried  in  his  hand 
to  present  to  the  government  a  parchment 
scroll,  which  was  the  treaty  of  Campo  Formio, 
and  behind  him  was  displayed  a  large  tricolour 
flag  covered  with  gilt  lettering  recording  the 
sixty  victories  of  the  army  he  had  commanded, 
the  capture  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
prisoners,  of  one  hundred  and  seventy  colours, 
of  fifteen  hundred  cannon. 

The  wild  enthusiasm  displayed  by  the  spec¬ 
tators  of  this  dramatic  scene  did  not  lead 
Bonaparte,  as  it  might  have  a  weaker  or  more 
short-sighted  man,  to  bid  too  openly  for  popular 
support.  He  declined  to  show  himself  in  pub¬ 
lic,  and  even  when  he  went  to  the  theatre  gen¬ 
erally  occupied  the  darkest  corner  of  his  box. 
With  him  this  was  all  a  matter  of  calculation ; 
he  saw  no  real  political  opening  for  the  present, 
or,  as  he  put  it,  the  pear  was  not  yet  ripe,  and 
he  did  not  want  the  Parisian  public  to  take 
him  up  like  some  new  toy  and  then  quickly 
tire  of  him. 

At  first  Bonaparte’s  idea  appears  to  have 
been  that  he  might  be  brought  into  the  Di- 
rectoire ,  but  the  fact  that  he  was  only  twenty- 
eight,  and  that  the  legal  age  for  belonging  to  the 
executive  body  was  forty,  served  as  a  good  ex¬ 
cuse  for  keeping  him  out.  The  question  was, 


48 


NAPOLEON 


how  was  he,  now  that  the  Continent  was  at  peace, 
-vto  keep  himself  before  the  public  and  earn  new 
laurels  ?  The  only  hope  of  solving  this  ques¬ 
tion  lay  in  the  circumstances  of  the  maritime 
war  still  proceeding  with  England.  The  Di- 
rectoire  was  as  anxious  as  the  young  general 
that  he  should  find  some  military  employment, 
and  he  soon  left  Paris  with  a  small  staff  per¬ 
sonally  to  inspect  the  French  ports  and  camps 
facing  the  British  coast  along  the  Channel. 
This  inspection  proved  unsatisfactory,  and  Bon¬ 
aparte  decided  that  there  was  nothing  in  this 
direction  to  tempt  him.  But,  as  a  result  of  the 
last  war  between  France  and  England,  there  was 
an  attractive  theory  firmly  fixed  in  the  public 
mind,  a  theory  on  which  military  action  might 
be  based,  a  theory  still  of  considerable  moment 
in  world  politics.  In  the  war  which  was  closed 
by  the  treaty  of  Versailles  in  1783,  France  had 
won  the  honours  and  Great  Britain  had  met  with 
many  reverses.  French  fleets  had  swept  the 
Channel,  English  commerce  had  been  harried, 
the  American  colonies  had  become  the  United 
States,  France  had  made  territorial  gains;  yet 
within  a  few  months  of  the  peace  it  was  found 
that  British  prosperity  was  greater  than  ever, 
increasing  by  leaps  and  bounds,  whereas  France 
was  heading  straight  towards  bankruptcy. 


CAMPO  FORMIO  AND  EGYPT  49 

What  was  the  explanation  of  this  curious  re¬ 
sult?  It  would  be  out  of  place  here  to  dis¬ 
cuss  the  economic  aspects  of  this  question  ;  to 
state  the  opinion  then  generally  accepted  in 
France  is  all  that  is  necessary.  That  opinion 
was  that  the  prosperity  of  Great  Britain  was 
chiefly  due  to  her  possession  of  and  commerce 
with  India ;  therefore  to  deal  an  effective 
blow  at  Great  Britain  it  was  necessary  to 
strike  at  India.  Bonaparte  through  all  his 
life  accepted  this  as  sound  doctrine ;  the  only 
question  with  him  was :  How  was  India  to 
be  reached  ? 

There  were  at  that  day,  as  there  are  now, 
three  lines  of  approach  from  Europe  to  India, 
one  by  sea,  one  by  land,  the  other  of  a  mixed 
character.  The  sea  route  was  that  leading  from 
the  Atlantic  round  the  extremity  of  Africa  into 
the  Indian  Ocean  ;  the  preponderance  of  Eng¬ 
land  in  naval  strength  placed  this  line  of  ap¬ 
proach  virtually  under  her  control,  and  although 
the  possession  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  did 
eventually  become  a  matter  of  dispute,  opera¬ 
tions  on  this  line  were  never  seriously  contem¬ 
plated  by  France.  The  land  route  was  one 
that  should  lead  from  Russia  or  Asiatic  T urkey 
through  Persia  and  Afghanistan  or  Beluchistan 
to  the  valley  of  the  Indus;  in  the  year  1798  it 


50 


NAPOLEON 


was  far  removed  from  any  political  combination 
that  the  French  government  was  in  a  position 
to  attempt,  though  ten  years  later  it  entered 
the  field  of  practical  politics.  The  third  line 
of  approach,  the  most  rapid  and  convenient, 
was  that  running  through  the  Mediterranean 
to  Egypt  and  thence  either  overland  or  by  the 
Red  Sea.  Bonaparte  was  a  son  of  the  Medi¬ 
terranean,  his  imagination  had  often  evoked 
visions  of  Oriental  conquest.  He  now  eagerly 
took  up  the  idea  of  dealing  a  powerful  blow  at 
Great  Britain  on  her  line  of  approach  to  India. 
His  immediate  aim  was  to  establish  the  power 
of  France  in  Egypt;  his  ulterior  one  not  well 
defined.  He  probably  viewed  as  possible  the 
eventual  marching  of  an  army  from  Egypt  to 
the  confines  of  India. 

The  Directoire,  pleased  at  the  thought  of 
ridding  France  of  the  presence  of  one  in  whom 
they  detected  a  formidable  rival,  equipped  a 
large  fleet  and  placed  a  fine  army  of  thirty 
thousand  men  under  Bonaparte’s  orders.  With 
these  he  sailed  from  Toulon  in  May  1798.  A 
British  fleet  under  Nelson  had  been  sent  into 
the  Mediterranean  to  watch  this  great  French 
armament,  destined,  as  many  supposed,  for  the 
invasion  of  England ;  but  for  the  moment 
Bonaparte  and  his  admiral,  Brueys,  avoided 


CAMPO  FORMIO  AND  EGYPT  51 

meeting  the  enemy.  They  reached  Malta  on 
the  10th  of  June  and  the  Grand  Master  of 
the  ancient  Order  of  St.  John  was  summoned 
to  surrender  his  fortress  to  the  army  of  the 
Republic.  This  he  did;  and  the  French,  hav¬ 
ing  garrisoned  Malta,  sailed  once  more  towards 
the  east,  shaping  a  course  for  Crete.  After 
sighting  this  island,  Admiral  Brueys  turned 
south-east  and  on  the  1st  of  July  arrived  in 
sight  of  Alexandria.  Bonaparte  now  learned 
that  Nelson  with  the  British  fleet  had  been 
there  only  two  days  previously,  but  had  sailed 
away  again  to  the  north-east.  He  gave  orders 
for  immediate  disembarkation,  took  possession 
of  Alexandria,  and  started  the  next  day  on  the 
advance  to  Cairo,  the  capital  of  Egypt.  In 
the  meanwhile  Brueys  moored  his  thirteen  line- 
of-battle  ships  and  frigates  as  close  to  the  shore 
as  he  thought  possible  and  awaited  events  at 
the  anchorage  of  Aboukir. 

The  British  fleet  under  Nelson  had  left  the 
straits  of  Messina  a  few  days  after  Bonaparte 
sailed  from  Malta.  Nelson  shaped  his  course 
direct  for  Egypt,  crossed  that  of  his  opponents 
so  close  as  nearly  to  sight  them,  left  them  to 
northwards  in  the  direction  of  Crete,  and 
arrived  off  Alexandria  first.  He  then  cruised 
in  various  directions  for  information,  and  fi- 


NAPOLEON 


52 

nally  appeared  off  Aboukir  again  on  the  1st 
of  August.  On  sighting  the  French  fleet  at 
anchor  the  British  admiral  immediately  took  his 
ships  into  action,  succeeded  in  getting  part  of 
his  fleet  between  the  enemy  and  the  shore,  and 
battering  the  motionless  French  ships  from 
both  sides,  consecutively  sank  or  captured 
nearly  every  one  of  them.  The  French  fought 
with  great  courage  and  obstinacy,  and  Admiral 
Brueys  was  lost  with  the  flagship  L' Orient, 
whose  magazine  exploded.  The  daring  and  skil¬ 
ful  manoeuvre  that  had  turned  the  French  line 
and  placed  two  British  ships  opposite  each 
French  one  had  decided  the  result  of  this 
great  naval  battle. 

Bonaparte  and  his  army  were  now  cut  off 
from  the  world,  and  that  in  a  country  where 
the  stores  necessary  for  a  European  army 
could  not  be  procured.  Had  Brueys’  fleet  not 
anchored  at  Aboukir,  but  sailed  back  to  Malta, 
to  Corfu,  or  even  to  Toulon,  the  position  would 
have  been  threatening  for  England ;  as  it  was, 
Bonaparte  and  his  thirty  thousand  men  were 
in  great  jeopardy.  He  proceeded,  however, 
with  his  extraordinary  enterprise  with  an  im¬ 
perturbable  self-reliance  that  inspired  all  those 
with  whom  he  came  into  contact. 

Egypt  was  at  that  time  a  dependent  province 


CAMPO  FORMIO  AND  EGYPT  53 

of  the  Turkish  Empire  ruled  by  a  Bey  and 
a  dominant  caste  of  military  colonists  who 
formed  a  splendid  body  of  feudal  cavalry  known 
as  the  Mameluks.  They  proved,  however,  no 
match  for  the  French  army,  and  were  crushed 
by  the  steady  firing  of  the  republican  infan¬ 
try  at  the  battle  of  the  Pyramids  on  the 
2 1  st  of  July.  This  victory  gave  Bonaparte 
possession  of  Egypt  which  he  now  administered 
and  converted  into  a  source  of  supply  in  even 
more  relentless  fashion  than  he  had  treated 
Italy.  During  the  autumn  and  early  winter 
months  he  was  actively  engaged  in  matters  of 
administration  and  prepared  to  turn  Egypt  into 
a  firm  base  from  which  the  next  move  might 
be  securely  made.  What  that  next  move 
might  have  been  is  perhaps  indicated  by  the 
fact  that  he  dispatched  a  letter  to  an  Indian 
prince  then  at  war  with  Great  Britain,  Tippoo 
Sahib,  urging  him  to  new  efforts  and  promising 
him  assistance. 

But  India  and  even  Constantinople  were  far 
off,  and  it  is  best  to  view  as  tentative  this  step 
of  Bonaparte’s,  and  to  treat  as  only  vague 
purposes  the  sayings  attributed  to  him  at  this 
period  in  which  he  referred  to  the  possibilities 
of  founding  a  new  Oriental  empire,  or  of 
returning  to  France  by  way  of  Constantinople. 


54 


NAPOLEON 


What  it  is  important  not  to  forget  is  that  once 
in  Egypt  every  one  of  Bonaparte’s  movements 
was  perfectly  sound  from  a  military  point  of 
view.  Not  one  of  them  was  based  on  any 
considerations  in  the  least  approaching  the 
romantic. 

In  January  1799,  he  had  to  resume  active 
warfare.  The  Sultan  decided  to  drive  the 
French  invaders  out  of  his  dominions,  and  for 
that  purpose  prepared  two  expeditions:  one 
was  to  proceed  by  sea,  the  other  by  land 
through  Asia  Minor.  Bonaparte  determined 
not  to  await  this  double  attack,  but  to  take  the 
offensive  and  deal  with  his  opponents  one  at 
a  time.  Accordingly  in  January  he  marched 
across  the  desert  from  Egypt  into  Syria  and 
after  many  hardships  reached  Jaffa,  a  small 
port  already  occupied  by  a  Turkish  advance 
guard.  There  was  some  severe  fighting,  the 
town  was  stormed  and  captured,  and  the  French 
accepted  the  surrender  of  some  two  thousand 
prisoners.  But  the  question  at  once  arose : 
what  was  to  be  done  with  these  men  ?  The 
army  was  short  of  food,  and  an  arduous  march 
through  barren  country  lay  before  it.  If  the 
prisoners  consumed  rations,  it  would  mean 
privation,  perhaps  even  starvation  for  the  army; 
if  they  were  released  they  would  probably 


CAMPO  FORMIO  AND  EGYPT  55 

rejoin  the  Turks,  or  at  all  events  take  to  the 
hills  and  marauding.  It  was  a  difficult  problem, 
and  was  resolved  in  the  safest  but  least  merciful 
way  :  the  Turks  were  taken  out  and  shot  down. 
This  terrible  incident  has  long  been  one  of 
those  most  criticised  in  Bonaparte’s  career,  yet 
modern  military  writers  do  not  hesitate  to 
justify  it  on  the  ground  that  a  general  can 
never  sacrifice  the  vital  interests  of  his  army 
to  those  of  humanity.  This  may  be  true,  but 
it  might  also  be  pertinently  asked  :  was  not 
the  unprovoked  attack  of  France  on  Malta 
and  on  Egypt  at  least  as  great  a  subject  for 
reproach  ?  Is  it  not  far  more  important  to 
award  blame  for  the  waging  of  an  unjust  war, 
than  for  what  is  only  a  military  incident,  of 

g;essity,  occurring  in  the  course 
r  ? 

Bonaparte  marched  northwards 
the  main  Turkish  force,  and  at 
l  a  severe  check.  The  Turks, 
ptain  Sidney  Smith  of  the  British 
navy,  defended  the  town  with  the  utmost  reso¬ 
lution,  an<^  after  a  siege  of  two  months  the 
French  were  beaten  off.  It  wa^during  this 
siege  that  a  well-known  incktent  occurred: 
Sidney  Smith  sent  into  the  French  camp  a 
challenge  inviting  Bonaparte  to  meet  him  in 


L 


* 


NAPOLEON 


56 


single  combat,  to  which  he  received  the  per¬ 
tinent  reply  that  the  French  general  would 
accept  if  the  British  would  produce  a  Marl¬ 
borough  to  meet  him!  During  these  two 
months  the  French  overran  northern  Palestine 
and  fought  numerous  engagements  against  the 
Turks,  one  of  which,  that  of  Mount  Tabor, 
was  a  brilliant  and  decisive  victory.  On  the 
20th  of  May  the  retreat  began,  and  the  army, 
after  heavy  losses  and  intense  suffering,  owing 
to  lack  of  food  and  water  and  an  outbreak  of 
plague,  reached  Cairo  a  month  later.  Within 
a  few  weeks  it  was  called  on  to  make  new  exer¬ 
tions,  for  the  Turkish  fleet  made  its  appearance 
off  Aboukir  and  there  disembarked  some  ten 
thousand  troops.  Bonaparte  collected  every 
available  man,  marched  against  the^S^rks, 
found  them  badly  posted  with  their  backs  to 
the  sea,  routed,  and  in  great  part  destroyed 
them.  This  was  the  battle  of  Aboukir  (July 
26).  Shortly  afterwards  he  gave  secret  orders 
to  have  a  small  frigate  got  ready  in  the  port 
of  Alexandria,  and  on  the  23d  of  August 
1799,  accompanied  by  Berthier,  Murat,  and  a 
few  othersCFe.  left  the  army  and  sailed  for 
France.  After  a  long  journey  and  several  nar¬ 
row  escapes*’  from  British  cruisers,  he  arrived 
in  the  bay  of  Frejus  on  the  9th  of  October. 


CAMPO  FORMIO  AND  EGYPT  57 

Had  he  commanded  events  and  dates  at  the 
hand  of  Fate  he  could  not  have  chosen  better; 
for  the  pear  was  now  exactly  ripe.  One  month 
later  he  was  the  master  of  France. 


2  Feb., 


18  April, 

May-July, 

4  Sept., 

17  Oct., 

Nov., 

19  May, 

10  June, 

2  July, 

21  “ 

x  Aug., 

6  March, 
March-May, 

15  April, 

25  July> 

22  Aug., 

9  Oct., 


CHRONOLOGY 

1797.  Fall  of  Mantua. 

“  Treaty  of  peace  with  Pope  at  Tolen- 
tino. 

“  Leoben,  —  peace  preliminaries  be¬ 
tween  France  and  Austria. 

“  Bonaparte  at  Montebello. 

“  18th  Fructidor,  —  royalist  move¬ 
ment  put  down  by  Augereau. 

“  Treaty  of  Campo  Formio  between 
France  and  Austria. 

“  Bonaparte  proceeds  to  Paris. 

1798.  Expedition  to  Egypt  sails. 

“  Arrives  at  Malta. 

“  Alexandria  taken. 

“  The  Pyramids. 

“  Battle  of  the  Nile. 

1799.  Jaffa  stormed.  W 

“  Siege  of  Acre.  C 

“  Mount  Tabor.  w 

“  Aboukir.v  \\ 

“  Bonaparte  leaves  Egypt. 

“  Lands  at  Fr^jus. 


58 


NAPOLEON 


NOTE 

Bibliographical:  General  Histories.  —  See  page  it. 
For  the  Campaign  of  Italy,  see  page  40  ;  also  for  non- 
military  affairs,  Gaffarel,  Bonaparte  et  les  Republiques 
italiennes,  Paris,  1894.  For  France  and  England,  with 
the  expedition  to  Egypt :  Mahan,  Influence  of  Sea  Power, 
London,  1892;  Desbri^re,  Projets  de  debarquements  aux 
iles  Britanniques,  Paris,  1901  ;  La  Jonquiere,  Expedition 
d'Egypte,  Paris,  1901  ;  Burgoyne,  Naval  and  Military 
Operations  in  Egypt ,  London,  1885.  The  memoirs  of 
Bourrienne  and  Savary,  though  far  from  trustworthy,  are 
the  best  for  this  period. 

Napoleon’s  attitude  towards  the  question  of  Italian 
nationality  is  dealt  with  as  a  whole  in  a  later  chapter. 


CHAPTER  V 


THE  18TH  OF  BRUMAIRE 


French  Policy  and  Disasters  —  Siey&s —  Novi  and  Zurich 
—  Landing  of  Bonaparte — His  Attitude  —  Episode  with 
Josephine — Conspiracy  —  Bonaparte  appointed  to  command 
Troops  in  Paris —  Fall  of  the  Directoire. 

THE  peace  signed  at  Campo  Formio  did 
not  prove  of  long  duration,  for  at 
the  very  time  that  Bonaparte  was 
sailing  for  Egypt  the  Directoire  had  proved  its 
incapacity  by  reversing  his  Italian  policy  and 
giving  provocation  to  the  Powers.  During  the 
course  of  the  Italian  campaign  Bonaparte  had 
shown  an  accommodating  spirit  in  his  relations 
with  the  two  southern  Italian  States,  the  Papacy 
and  the  kingdom  of  Naples.  He  did  not  wish 
to  weaken  himself  by  carrying  on  military 
operations  in  such  an  ex-centric  direction,  nor 
would  he  associate  himself  too  closely  with  the 
extreme  anti-religious  policy  of  the  Directoire. 
But  while  the  Egyptian  expedition  was  prepar¬ 
ing,  and  after  its  departure,  the  French  govern¬ 
ment  successively  quarrelled  with  and  occupied 

59 


6o 


NAPOLEON 


both  Rome  and  Naples,  and  there  promoted 
the  establishment  of  republics.  The  jealousy 
of  Austria  and  Russia  was  at  once  kindled,  and 
these  two  Powers  took  up  arms.  In  the  spring 
of  1799,  the  French  were  several  times  defeated 
in  northern  Italy  by  Souvaroff,  while  the  Aus¬ 
trians  threatened  the  Rhine  and  an  AnsJo- 
Russian  army  prepared  to  operate  from  Holland. 
This  military  failure  was  not  all,  however;  for 
the  Directoire  was  as  feeble  and  unsuccessful 
at  home  as  abroad.  In  1798  France  became 
bankrupt.  In  the  spring  of  1799  the  Jacobin 
party,  representing  what  was  left  of  the  Terror¬ 
ist  element,  was  successful  in  the  elections  and 
secured  nearly  one  half  of  the  seats  in  the 
Council  of  Five  Hundred  (lower  House).  The 
government  had  neither  money,  nor  adminis¬ 
trative  system,  nor  moral  strength ;  France 
was  overrun  by  lawlessness,  taxes  were  un¬ 
paid,  gold  was  hoarded,  and  the  only  thing  that 
prevented  the  Republic  from  sinking  was  the 
^general  fear  of  a  Bourbon  restoration.  Nearly 
!  all  men  wanted  to  keep  something  of  the  Revo¬ 
lution,  but  so  many  political  panaceas  had 
already  been  exploded  that  there  appeared 
little  hope  of  agreement  or  salvation.  At  this 
crisis,  in  the  early  part  of  1 799,  an  important 
group  of  moderate  men,  anxious  to  save  the 


THE  1  8  T  H  OF  BRUMAIRE  6 1 


Republic  by  means  of  some  administrative  or 
constitutional  reform,  turned  to  that  eminent 
statesman  Sieyes,  then  French  ambassador  at 
Berlin.  Sieyes  had  been  a  prominent  debater 
from  the  earliest  days  of  the  Revolution,  and 
had  gained  the  reputation  of  being  the  greatest 
constitutional  authority  of  France.  By  a  pru¬ 
dent  course  he  had  weathered  the  storms  of 
Jacobinism,  and  now  a  convenient  expurgation 
of  the  Directoire  gave  him  a  seat  in  that  body, 
while  the  best  men  in  the  legislative  and  ad¬ 
ministrative  field  rallied  to  his  support  and 
looked  to  him  to  effect  a  constitutional  reform 
that  should  give  stability  to  the  State.  Sieyes 
thought  that  to  effect  a  change  in  the  govern¬ 
ment  the  support  of  the  army  was  essential. 
Bonaparte  was  in  Egypt,  and  the  British 
cruisers  intercepted  all  communications.  Under 
these  circumstances,  Sieyes  decided  that  Gen¬ 
eral  Joubert’s  should  be  the  arm  to  deal  the 
necessary  blow.  But  in  the  summer  of  1799 
the  military  fortunes  of  France  had  sunk  so 
low  that  it  was  thought  indispensable  that 
Joubert  should  first  retrieve  something  of  the 
lost  prestige.  He  was  accordingly  given  all 
the  troops  that  could  be  collected  and  sent  into 
Italy  to  rally  the  dispirited  remnants  of  the 
French  army  in  that  country  and  to  bring  the 


6  2 


NAPOLEON 


Austro-Russians  to  battle  ;  from  his  anticipated 
victory  he  was  to  return  to  Paris  and  help 
Sieyes  reform  the  State.  At  Novi,  on  the 
15th  of  August,  one  week  before  Bonaparte 
set  sail  from  Alexandria,  the  two  armies  met ; 
Souvaroff  was  once  more  successful,  Joubert 
was  not  only  defeated  but  killed.  This  blow 
placed  Sieyes  for  the  moment  in  a  desperate 
position;  and  not  only  Sieyes  but  France,  for 
the  German  and  Italian  frontiers  were  now 
both  uncovered.  Only  one  French  army,  that 
of  Massena  in  Switzerland,  still  held  the 
field.  For  a  few  weeks  after  Novi  the  Repub¬ 
lic  appeared  doomed,  and  then,  in  the  last  days 
of  September,  Massena  won  a  series  of  splendid 
successes  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Zurich.  A 
thrill  of  hope  ran  through  France  once  more, 
and  just  at  that  moment  Bonaparte  landed.  It 
was  an  extraordinary  coincidence  of  prevision, 
audacity,  and  chance;  he  had  just  caught  the 
turn  of  the  tide  that  carries  on  to  fortune. 

The  feeling  that  Bonaparte  was  the  only  man 
who  could  save  the  State  was  so  universal  that 
no  sooner  was  his  frigate  at  anchor  than  she 
was  boarded  by  a  mob  of  excited  people  who 
took  not  the  slightest  heed  of  quarantine  regula¬ 
tions.  The  general  and  his  companions  landed 
and  proceeded  on  their  journey  to  Paris,  every 


THE  1  8  T  H  OF  BRUMAIRE  63 

stop,  every  change  of  horses  being  the  occasion 
of  enthusiastic  demonstrations  in  honour  of  the 
conqueror  of  Italy,  of  the  victor  of  Aboukir. 
But  Bonaparte  knew  enough  of  the  necessities  of 
the  times,  of  the  temper  of  France,  not  to  pose 
as  the  ambitious  general.  Moreau,  Joubert,  . 
Massena,  Jourdan,  Hoche,had  shown  themselves 
fine  soldiers,  but  Bonaparte  alone  had  closed  a 
series  of  victories  by  forcing  a  peace.  It  was 
peace  France  now  wanted;  and  it  was  the  gen¬ 
eral  who  had  presented  the  treaty  of  Campo 
Formio  to  the  Directoire  who  was  now  declar¬ 
ing  to  those  who  eagerly  pressed  about  him, 
that  the  government  of  France  was  driving 
her  to  ruin,  but  that  he  intended  that  peace 
should  be  obtained  and  that  all  classes  of 
Frenchmen  should  enjoy  its  benefits.  As  a 
result  of  his  Italian  campaign,  he  declared, 
France  had  been  left  prosperous,  victorious,  and 
honoured;  he  now  found  her  bankrupt,  de¬ 
feated,  and  disgraced.  He  allowed  it  to  be 
understood  that  either  with  or  without  the  Di¬ 
rectoire  he  was  prepared  to  save  the  country. 

Bonaparte’s  return  to  Paris  was  marked  by 
an  important  incident  in  his  relations  with 
Josephine.  Probably  no  great  man  was  ever 
less  influenced  in  a  political  sense  by  women, 
and  for  that  reason  there  will  be  little  said  on 


64 


NAPOLEON 


that  subject  in  this  book  ;  yet  the  incident  we 
are  now  coming  to  must  receive  notice  because 
it  partly  leads  up  to  and  explains  events  of  the 
greatest  importance  that  took  place  ten  years 
later.  Josephine  Bonaparte  was  beautiful  and 
a  woman  of  her  period,  frivolous,  charming,  ex¬ 
travagant,  tender-hearted,  and  perfectly  lax  in 
her  morality.  Bonaparte  had  loved  her  in¬ 
tensely,  fervently,  as  the  letters  he  wrote  to  her 
in  the  course  of  the  Italian  campaign  sufficiently 
disclose.  But  when  in  Egypt,  intercepted  cor¬ 
respondence  and  the  tittle-tattle  of  kind  friends 
had  revealed  to  him  that  he  had  ample  cause  for 
divorce.  Josephine  hurried  from  Paris  to  meet 
her  returning  husband  on  the  Lyons  road,  so  as 
to  place  her  version  of  affairs  before  him  ere  he 
should  reach  Paris.  But  the  family  feud  be¬ 
tween  the  Bonapartes  and  the  Beauharnais  was 
already  in  full  force.  Napoleon’s  brothers, 
Joseph  and  Lucien,  who  had  now  become  im¬ 
portant  political  personages  in  Paris,  had  deter¬ 
mined  to  overthrow  Josephine  so  that  their 
influence  might  predominate  with  their  brother. 
They  also  hastened  to  meet  him  and  succeeded 
in  doing  so,  whereas  Josephine  failed.  For 
several  days  after  his  return  to  his  little  house 
in  the  rue  Chantereine ,  of  which  the  name  had 
been  changed  to  rue  de  la  Victoire ,  Bonaparte 


THE  1  8  T  H  OF  BRUM  AIRE  65 

refused  to  see  his  wife.  Finally  her  lamenta¬ 
tions  and  entreaties,  with  those  of  her  two  chil¬ 
dren,  Eugene  and  Hortense,  together  with  the 
feeling  that  an  action  for  divorce  would  be  im¬ 
politic  at  such  a  crisis,  prevailed  with  Napoleon, 
and  a  reconciliation  took  place. 

The  really  important  question  was :  how 
and  by  what  means  could  a  change  of  govern¬ 
ment  giving  power  to  Bonaparte  be  effected  ? 
There  were  several  ready  formed  parties  anx¬ 
ious  to  win  his  support,  but  on  his  first 
arrival  he  practically  declined  all  overtures, 
even  those  of  his  own  brothers,  declaring 
firmly  that  he  belonged  to  no  party,  that 
he  was  in  favour  of  no  party,  but  that  he 
was  for  all  good  Frenchmen  to  whatever  party 
they  belonged.  In  fact,  he  would  follow  no 
man,  but  wanted  all  men  to  follow  him.  The 
Directoire  was  too  divided  and  impotent  to 
take  notice  of  the  open  challenge  involved 
in  the  conduct  of  the  Corsican  general.  He 
was  in  a  sense  a  deserter  from  his  army;  he 
had  come  from  a  plague-stricken  port  and 
had  violated  the  quarantine  regulations ;  he 
openly  impugned  the  conduct  and  threatened 
the  existence  of  the  government,  yet  the  Di¬ 
rectoire  dared  not  order  his  arrest  for  his  moral 
strength  was  far  greater  than  theirs.  Public 
5 


66 


NAPOLEON 


opinion  saw  in  him  the  only  man  in  France 
of  sufficient  ability  and  of  sufficient  strength 
of  character  to  draw  the  country  from  the 
quagmire  in  which  it  was  sinking. 

Probably  Bonaparte’s  first  intention  was  to 
make  use  of  Barras  with  whom  he  had  so 
effectively  co-operated  in  crushing  the  rising 
of  Vendemiaire  1795.  Barras  was  still  a  mem¬ 
ber  of  the  Directoire ,  but  was  now  too  dis¬ 
credited  with  the  best  section  of  public  opinion 
to  be  of  any  political  utility.  Between  Sieyes 
and  Bonaparte  there  was  at  first  much  cool¬ 
ness,  but  it  was  clear  to  many  that  in  their 
co-operation  was  the  only  hope  of  effecting 
something  useful.  A  party  in  which  Talley¬ 
rand,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Cam- 
baceres,  Lucien  and  Joseph  Bonaparte  were 
active,  succeeded  in  bringing  the  two  men 
together.  From  that  moment  the  scheme  for 
effecting  a  revolution  proceeded  fast.  The 
precise  form  that  should  be  given  to  the  new 
constitution  was  for  the  present  left  undeter¬ 
mined.  What  the  conspirators  were  agreed  on 
was  that  the  executive  power  of  the  Republic 
must  be  strengthened  and  that  a  committee 
of  three  should  hold  it:  Bonaparte,  Sieyes, 
and  a  colleague  who  followed  his  lead,  Roger 
Ducos.  Few  were  let  into  the  secret,  but 


THE  1  8  T  H  OF  B  R  U  M  A  I  R  E  67 

there  was  a  vast  tacit  conspiracy  supporting 
jBonaparte  and  Sieyes  that  placed  at  their 
Deck  and  call  a  large  number  of  men  in  the 
legislative  bodies,  especially  in  the  Council 
of  Ancients.  Few  of  them  knew  exactly  what 
was  intended,  but  most  of  them  were  prepared 
to  take  up  any  lead  shown  them.  The  cue 
was  soon  given. 

Bonaparte  had  since  his  return  received 
many  applications  to  review  various  bodies 
of  troops  quartered  in  the  capital,  but  had 
deferred  answering.  On  the  night  of  the 
17th  of  Brumaire  (November  8,  1799)  he 
accepted  all  these  invitations  and  fixed  the 
following  morning  for  the  inspection,  asking 
each  commanding  officer  to  march  his  troops 
to  the  garden  of  the  Tuileries.  He  also  wrote 
personal  letters  inviting  every  officer  of  note 
in  Paris  to  call  at  his  house  in  the  rue  de 
la  Victoire  at  an  early  hour  of  the  morning. 
During  the  course  of  the  night  the  secretaries 
of  the  Council  of  Ancients,  whose  support  had 
been  secured  by  the  Bonaparte-Sieyes  faction, 
wrote  and  dispatched  messages  convening  the 
members  to  a  morning  session  on  the  18th 
of  Brumaire;  in  a  few  cases  where  opposition 
might  be  expected,  these  messages  were  either 
not  sent  or  failed  to  reach  their  destination. 


68 


NAPOLEON 


Early  in  the  morning  a  large  assemblage 
of  officers  in  full  uniform  gathered  in  the 
rue  de  la  Victoire ;  at  the  sight  of  their 
numbers  all  realized  that  the  long-expected 
hour  had  come,  though  how  the  change  in 
government  was  to  be  effected,  none  knew. 
All,  however,  save  General  Bernadotte  whose 
sympathies  were  with  the  Jacobin  party,  fol¬ 
lowed  Bonaparte,  who  led  them  in  a  body  to 
the  Tuileries  where  the  Council  of  Ancients 
was  already  in  session.  That  assembly,  on 
the  motion  of  one  of  the  conspirators  and 
in  perfect  accord  with  the  terms  of  the  exist¬ 
ing  constitution,  declared  Paris  to  be  in  a 
condition  threatening  to  the  security  of  the 
State,  decreed  that  both  the  upper  and  lower 
House  should  suspend  their  sessions  and  ad¬ 
journ  to  St.  Cloud  on  the  19th,  and  that 
General  Bonaparte  should  assume  command 
of  all  the  troops  quartered  in  and  near 
Paris.  The  general  was  now  introduced,  and 
harangued  the  legislators,  declaring  that  he 
would  support  them  and  save  the  Republic. 
He  then  proceeded  to  the  gardens  where  the 
troops  were  assembled  and  passed  them  in 
review,  being  at  all  points  greeted  with  tre¬ 
mendous  enthusiasm. 

While  a  packed  meeting  of  the  Council  of 


THE  1  8  T  H  OF  BRUMAIRE  69 

Ancients  was  thus  placing  the  power  of  the 
sword  in  Bonaparte’s  hands,  the  Directoire 
was  rapidly  disintegrating.  As  had  been  pre¬ 
concerted  Sieyes  and  Roger  Ducos  made  their 
appearance  before  the  Council  of  Ancients 
and  declared  that  they  resigned  their  func¬ 
tions.  Barras  hesitated,  but  on  pressure  of 
some  private  nature  being  put  on  him  by 
Talleyrand,  he  decided  to  make  a  virtue  of 
necessity  and  signed  his  resignation.  This 
left  only  two  out  of  the  five  Directors  in 
office,  Moulins  and  Gohier;  their  influence 
was  slight  and  did  not  affect  the  crisis. 

But  there  was  a  third  body  in  the  State,  one 
in  which  the  Jacobins  were  strong  and  from 
which  trouble  might  not  unreasonably  be  antici¬ 
pated,  the  Council  of  Five  Hundred.  In  the 
enthusiasm  created  by  the  return  of  Bonaparte 
from  Egypt  that  assembly  had  elected  his 
brother  Lucien  president,  and  Lucien  was  now 
to  play  an  almost  decisive  part.  The  Five 
Hundred  were  to  assemble  at  noon  that  day 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  business.  No  sooner 
had  they  done  so  than  Lucien,  declining  to 
listen  to  any  motion,  declared  the  session  ad¬ 
journed  till  the  following  day  at  St.  Cloud, 
according  to  the  terms  of  the  perfectly  consti¬ 
tutional  decree  issued  by  the  Ancients.  To 


70 


NAPOLEON 


this  ruling  the  members  perforce  submitted, 
and  thus  every  item  of  the  day’s  programme 
had  passed  off  without  a  hitch.  All  Paris 
appeared  to  rejoice  at  the  events  that  had 
occurred,  and,  unique  fact  in  the  history  of 
revolutions,  the  government  stocks  rose  in  the 
course  of  the  day  from  ii|  to  I2f. 

But  the  revolution  was  only  half  accom¬ 
plished,  and  the  19th  of  Brumaire  proved  as 
stormy  as  the  18th  had  been  peaceful. 


CHRONOLOGY 


1798. 

<( 

a 

25  March,  1799. 
15  Aug., 

22  “  “ 

25  Sept.,  “ 

9  Oct.,  “ 

9  Nov.,  “ 


Bankruptcy  of  the  Directoire. 
Invasion  of  Rome  and  Naples. 
Russia  and  Austria  resume  war. 
Jourdan  defeated  at  Stockach. 
Joubert  defeated  and  killed  at  Novi. 
Bonaparte  leaves  Egypt. 

Mass£na’s  victory  at  Zurich. 
Bonaparte  lands  at  Frdjus. 

1 8th  Brumaire. 


NOTE 


Bibliographical:  General.  —  See  page  11. 

For  Brumaire  there  is  nothing  of  the  same  rank  as 
Vandal’s  Avenement  de  Bonaparte ,  Paris,  1902,  perhaps 
the  finest  work  yet  written  on  Napoleonic  history. 


CHAPTER  VI 


Li-  i 


X. 


THE  19TH  OF  BRUMAIRE  AND  MARENGO 


Scenes  at  St.  Cloud — Formation  of  the  new  Government  — 
External  Affairs  —  The  Army  of  Reserve  —  Plans  of  Cam¬ 
paign —  Passage  of  the  Alps — Marengo — Triumph  of 
Bonaparte. 

IN  the  early  hours  of  the  19th  of  Brumaire 
troops  were  marching  out  from  Paris  to 
St.  Cloud,  some  five  miles  distant,  to  take 
charge  of  the  palace  where  the  legislative 
bodies  were  to  meet.  This  palace,  destroyed 
by  the  German  bombardment  in  1870,  was 
on  a  hillside  close  by  the  river  Seine,  and 
its  buildings,  courts,  and  terraces  were  com¬ 
pletely  encircled  by  massive  iron  grilles.  Fol¬ 
lowing  the  troops  came  a  constant  stream  of 
carriages  and  pedestrians,  of  legislators  and 
spectators,  so  that  by  eleven  or  twelve  o’clock 
the  little  village  of  St.  Cloud  was  crowded  with 
a  representative  audience  come  to  witness  the 
politico-dramatic  performance  announced  to 
take  place.  Many  pressed  up  to  the  grilles, 
watching  the  privileged  few  within  and  exchang- 

71 


7  2 


NAPOLEON 


ing  comments  with  the  sentries  pacing  beyond. 
These  sentries  really  represented  the  essential 
factor  in  the  situation,  and  therefore  it  will  be 
well  to  note  a  few  particulars  concerning  the 
troops.  Of  the  thirty-five  hundred  men  pres¬ 
ent  most  were  devoted  to  Bonaparte.  The 
cavalry  consisted  of  several  squadrons  of  dra¬ 
goons  commanded  by  Colonel  Sebastiani;  he 
was  a  Corsican  and  had  placed  himself  unre¬ 
servedly  at  his  compatriot’s  disposal.  The 
infantry  consisted  nearly  entirely  of  several 
battalions  that  had  followed  Bonaparte  in  the 
campaign  of  Italy.  They  not  only  felt  a  per¬ 
sonal  devotion  for  their  old  general,  but  a  de¬ 
testation  for  what  they  called  a  government  of 
lawyers  from  which  they  had  never  received 
proper  treatment.  The  soldiers  displayed  their 
dilapidated  uniforms  to  the  spectators  and  com¬ 
plained  that  for  six  months  the  Directoire  had 
left  them  starving  and  without  pay.  In  one 
company  a  single  pipe  of  tobacco  was  gravely 
passed  from  man  to  man,  so  that  each  might 
puff  in  turn  and  enjoy  his  proper  share  of  this 
somewhat  Spartan  luxury.  There  could  be  no 
doubt  as  to  what  answer  these  soldiers  would 
give  if  the  question  between  Bonaparte  and  the 
government  was  placed  clearly  before  them. 
But  there  was  another  body  of  some  four  hun- 


19TH  OF  BRUMAIRE  6?  MARENGO  73 

dred  men  whose  sentiments  appeared  more 
doubtful ;  these  were  the  guards  of  the  Coun¬ 
cils.  These  men,  picked  to  defend  the  Councils 
against  Parisian  disorder,  were  stout  repub¬ 
licans,  well  paid  and  not  disaffected;  it  was 
uncertain  how  they  would  act,  though  their 
superior  officers  had  been  won  over  by  the 
Sieyes-Bonaparte  faction. 

It  had  been  arranged  that  the  Council  of 
Ancients  should  meet  in  a  hall  in  the  body 
of  the  Palace,  the  Council  of  Five  Hundred  in 
a  covered  orangery  outside.  It  was  from  the 
Jacobins  in  the  latter  body  that  resistance  was 
feared,  for  they  had  during  the  previous  after¬ 
noon  and  evening  been  actively  debating  means 
of  resistance  to  what  they  denounced  as  an 
attempt  to  overturn  the  Republic  in  favour  of 
a  dictature.  Jourdan  and  Bernadotte,  who 
each  had  some  following  in  the  army,  were  not 
disinclined  to  support  the  extremists,  but  noth¬ 
ing  more  was  settled  than  that  the  Five  Hun¬ 
dred  would  oppose  a  strenuous  resistance  to 
any  constitutional  amendment. 

Was  constitutional  amendment,  however,  the 
course  that  Bonaparte  and  Sieyes  intended  to 
adopt?  No  one  could  tell.  The  fact  was  that 
the  conspirators,  who  had  planned  every  detail 
of  the  first  day  with  such  minute  care,  had  left 


74 


NAPOLEON 


the  second  to  take  care  of  itself;  there  was 
absolutely  no  plan  of  action. 

When  Bonaparte  and  his  supporters  arrived 
at  St.  Cloud  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  they 
found  preparations  for  the  meeting  of  the 
two  assemblies  incomplete.  It  was  past  noon 
before  the  orangery  was  ready  for  use,  and 
by  that  time  impatience  and  nervousness  had 
set  in.  At  last  Lucien  Bonaparte  took  his 
seat  in  the  presidential  chair  and  the  proceed¬ 
ings  of  the  lower  House  opened.  Many 
motions  and  resolutions  were  handed  in,  but 
one  only  met  with  the  general  approval  of 
Jacobins,  Bonapartists,  and  all  sections:  this 
was  that  the  members  should  individually 
renew  their  oath  to  maintain  the  constitution. 
This  was  eminently  characteristic  of  the  assem¬ 
bly,  a  resort  to  talking  when  it  was  essential 
to  act.  At  two  o’clock  the  solemn  farce  began, 
at  four  it  was  still  proceeding. 

In  the  meanwhile  the  Ancients  had  also  got 
to  business ;  but  unfortunately  none  of  the 
members  appeared  to  know  precisely  what 
course  to  take.  Finally,  getting  no  lead  from 
Bonaparte  or  Sieyes,  a  proposal  was  put  for¬ 
ward  that  the  three  vacancies  in  the  Directoire 
should  be  filled  up.  Till  this  moment  Bona¬ 
parte  had  been  little  seen.  From  a  room  in  the 


19TH  OF  BRUMAIRE  &  MARENGO  75 

palace  he  had  watched  events,  confidently 
awaiting  their  development  in  a  favourable 
direction ;  but  the  more  he  waited,  the  less 
satisfactory  did  the  appearance  of  affairs  be¬ 
come,  and  now,  trusting  to  his  soldier’s  instinct, 
he  determined  to  proceed  to  the  point  of 
danger.  Accompanied  by  his  chief  of  staff, 
Berthier,  and  by  his  secretary,  Bourrienne,  he 
presented  himself  at  the  entrance  of  the  Council 
of  Ancients  and,  unbidden,  entered  the  hall, 
making  his  way  to  the  foot  of  the  president’s 
tribune.  He  then  hastily  and  nervously  deliv¬ 
ered  a  speech,  the  worst  of  his  life.  Unused 
to  the  atmosphere  of  a  deliberative  assembly, 
unprepared  with  any  definite  propositions,  he 
excitedly  stumbled  from  blunder  to  blunder. 
The  Ancients  were  not  disinclined  to  support 
him,  but  when  he  explained  that  the  Republic 
was  in  danger  from  a  great  conspiracy,  there 
were  immediate  demands  that  he  should  specify 
what  his  accusations  meant.  He  grew  em¬ 
barrassed  and  talked  louder ;  the  legislators 
pressed  questions  on  him  and  became  heated; 
finally  Bonaparte  began  telling  of  what  he 
had  and  what  he  could  accomplish  by  the 
might  of  the  sword.  By  this  time  Berthier 
and  Bourrienne  were  pulling  at  his  coat  tails, 
and  in  the  midst  of  much  excitement  they 


NAPOLEON 


7  6 

finally  half  dragged,  half  persuaded  him  away. 
This  was  a  bad  beginning,  but  worse  was  to 
follow. 

Bonaparte  was  now  roused,  and,  not  waiting 
to  cool,  proceeded  from  the  Ancients  to  the 
Five  Hundred  in  the  orangery  below.  There 
was  a  crowd  at  the  door  through  which  he 
slipped  nearly  unrecognized  and  began  elbow¬ 
ing  his  way  down  a  gangway  blocked  with 
members  towards  the  presidential  tribune.  A 
moment  later  a  voice  shouted,  “Down  with  the 
Dictator!  Down  with  the  Tyrant !  ”  and  a  rush 
was  made  for  the  spot  where  the  little  Corsican 
was  still  struggling  to  make  his  way.  An  inde¬ 
scribable  uproar  followed.  The  cry  of  “  Outlaw 
him! ’’that  five  years  before  had  sounded  the 
knell  of  Robespierre,  now  rose  loudest  of  all ; 
and,  surrounded  as  he  was  by  the  furious  depu¬ 
ties,  Bonaparte  appeared  lost.  But  Murat  with 
other  officers  and  a  few  grenadiers  were  forcing 
their  way  through  to  save  their  general.  In 
a  moment  more  he  was  dragged  safely  away, 
half  suffocated,  his  coat  torn,  his  face  scratched 
and  bleeding.  He  retired  to  his  room  for  a 
short  while,  then  descended  to  the  courtyard 
and  mounted  his  horse;  he  was  more  at  home 
in  the  saddle  glancing  down  a  row  of  bayonets 
than  in  the  midst  of  legislative  assemblies. 


19TH  OF  BRUMAIRE  &  MARENGO  77 

The  incursion  of  Bonaparte  into  the  Council 
of  Five  Hundred  resulted  in  the  putting  for¬ 
ward  of  a  formal  motion  of  outlawry,  and  it 
was  well  for  him  that  his  brother  happened 
to  be  president  of  the  assembly.  Lucien 
showed  as  much  resource  and  coolness  in  this 
crisis  as  Napoleon  had  impetuosity  and  rash¬ 
ness.  He  first  declined  to  accept  the  motion, 
then  finding  he  could  not  resist  it,  claimed  his 
right  to  speak,  and  leaving  the  presidential 
chair,  ascended  the  tribune.  Notwithstanding 
the  Jacobin  efforts  to  howl  him  down  he  held 
his  ground  for  some  time,  and  succeeded  in 
whispering  a  message  to  a  friend  to  the  effect 
that  the  conspirators  must  act  at  once  or  all 
would  be  lost.  This  message  resulted  in  the 
appearance  of  half  a  dozen  grenadiers  in  the 
hall,  who  proceeded  to  the  tribune,  surrounded 
Lucien,  and  escorted  him  out  into  the  court¬ 
yard.  No  sooner  was  he  in  the  open  than 
he  called  for  a  horse,  and  jumping  into  the 
saddle  pushed  up  to  the  ranks  of  the  guards  of 
the  Council.  He  addressed  them  in  ringing 
tones,  declaring  that  a  faction  of  assassins  had 
dominated  the  assembly;  that  his  life  and  that 
of  his  brother  were  no  longer  safe;  that  he, 
the  president,  represented  the  assembly,  and 
called  on  them  to  restore  order;  and  that  if 


78 


NAPOLEON 


his  brother  intended  or  ever  attempted  any¬ 
thing  against  republican  institutions  he  would 
stab  him  with  his  own  hands.  At  the  con¬ 
clusion  there  was  much  loud  shouting  of 
Vive  Bonapcu'te !  The  guard  of  the  Coun¬ 
cils  appeared  shaken,  the  soldiers  of  the  line 
had  long  been  stamping  with  impatience.  At 
this  moment  some  one,  perhaps  Murat,  gave 
an  order,  and  a  drum  began  to  roll  out  the 
charge;  Murat  promptly  made  for  the  door 
of  the  Council  chamber,  followed  by  Leclerc 
and  the  infantry.  This  move  was  decisive. 
At  the  sight  of  the  troops  the  legislators  hur¬ 
ried  to  leave  the  hall,  most  of  them  by  the 
windows,  and  Murat,  ordering  bayonets  to  be 
fixed,  cleared  the  room.  The  revolution  was 
accomplished. 

In  the  late  hours  of  that  evening  small 
groups  of  the  Five  Hundred  and  of  the 
Ancients  representing  the  victorious  faction 
met  in  the  now  deserted  halls  of  the  palace  of 
St.  Cloud,  and  gave  an  appearance  of  legality 
to  the  decrees  sent  for  their  approval  by  Bona¬ 
parte  and  Sieyes.  On  the  following  morning 
proclamations  appeared  announcing  a  new 
government  under  three  Consuls,  Bonaparte, 
Sieyes,  and  Roger  Ducos,  and  declaring  a 
policy  of  the  reunion  of  all  parties  and  of  peace. 


19TH  OF  BRUMAIRE  MARENGO  79 

It  is  curious  to  reflect,  when  viewing  Bona¬ 
parte’s  career  as  a  whole,  that  it  was  on  a 
policy  of  peace  that  he  attained  power.  Yet 
it  was  so ;  that  was  undoubtedly  the  great 
desire  of  the  French  people  in  1799,  and  it 
was  the  perfectly  well-founded  opinion  of  the 
country  that  if  any  man  could  give  it  peace, 
internal  and  external,  it  was  Bonaparte. 

Yet  the  military  situation  of  France  was  so 
weak  in  regard  to  the  three  great  Powers  with 
which  she  was  at  war  that  few  believed  in  the 
possibility  of  foreign  peace  save  through  victory. 
Bonaparte,  however,  was  no  sooner  in  office 
than  he  made  pacific  propositions  to  the  allies, 
and  so  far  succeeded  that  he  detached  the 
Czar  Paul  from  the  alliance.  Great  Britain 
declined  all  overtures,  being  then  in  hopes  of 
soon  reducing  the  French  garrisons  in  Malta 
and  Egypt;  but  this  she  did  in  terms  that 
showed  peace  to  be  possible  in  the  near 
future.  With  Austria,  however,  it  was  clear 
that  a  campaign  must  be  fought.  That  cam¬ 
paign  will  now  be  related  and  a  considera¬ 
tion  of  the  internal  policy  of  Bonaparte  after 
Brumaire  must  be  for  the  moment  postponed. 

In  the  spring  of  1S00  the  military  position 
was  as  follows.  The  remnant  of  the  French 
army  of  Italy  was  covering  Genoa  under  the 


8o 


NAPOLEON 


command  of  Massena;  a  much  superior  Aus¬ 
trian  army  under  Melas  eventually  drove  it 
into  that  city  and  threatened  an  invasion  in 
the  direction  of  Toulon  and  Marseilles.  In 
southern  Germany  Kray  with  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  men  menaced  the  Rhine. 
Moreau  with  an  army  nearly  equal  stood  on 
the  defensive  at  Basle.  As  against  these  two 
Austrian  armies  the  French  had  a  great  ad¬ 
vantage  of  position  owing  to  their  holding  the 
projecting  bastion  of  Switzerland  ;  in  strategic 
language  they  had  a  double  base  from  which  to 
manoeuvre,  either  to  the  north  or  to  the  south. 
The  meaning  of  this  will  appear  from  the  plans 
formed  by  Bonaparte.  His  first  proposal  was 
this:  that  all  the  available  reserves  should  be 
marched  into  Switzerland  to  strengthen  Mo¬ 
reau;  that  that  general  should  transfer  his  / 
army  from  Basle  to  Schaffhausen  whence  he 
could  march,  so  as  to  place  himself  on  the  Aus¬ 
trian  lines  of  communications;  that  Bonaparte 
should  accompany  the  army  to  supervise  the 
operations.  Moreau  rejected  this  scheme ;  he 
preferred  a  plain  frontal  advance  to  the  more 
daring  and  destructive  one  proposed,  and  he 
objected  to  Bonaparte’s  virtual  assumption  of 
supreme  command.  Precisely  at  this  juncture 
came  the  news  that  Melas  had  driven  Massena 


The  Swiss  base,  1800 


19TH  OF  BRUMAIRE  fc?  MARENGO  81 


into  Genoa,  and  Bonaparte  promptly  deter¬ 
mined  to  alter  his  plans.  Instead  of  basing 
himself  on  Switzerland  to  attack  Kray’s  lines 
of  communications,  he  would  turn  south  and 
deal  a  similar  blow  at  Melas.  His  prepara¬ 
tions  for  this  were  eminently  characteristic  of 
his  genius.  His  first  move  was  to  deceive  the 
enemy  as  to  his  strength  and  intentions.  The 
newspapers  accordingly  announced  the  forma¬ 
tion  of  a  camp  at  Dijon,  where  a  formidable 
army  of  reserve  was  to  be  assembled.  The 
First  Consul,  as  he  was  now  officially  known, 
went  down  to  inspect  the  troops  and  so,  of 
course,  did  the  spies  of  all  the  Powers.  They 
found  nothing  more  than  a  few  weak  battalions 
made  up  of  boys  and  cripples  and  presenting 
a  most  ragged  appearance.  In  a  few  weeks 
Bonaparte’s  army  of  reserve  was  the  laughing 
stock  of  the  courts  of  Europe;  but  not  for 
long.  The  camp  at  Dijon  was  only  a  blind. 
With  Berthier  at  the  Ministry  of  War  the  most 
strenuous  efforts  were  being  made  to  squeeze 
out  of  the  nearly  exhausted  resources  of  France 
one  more  effective  army.  There  were  other 
camps  besides  that  of  Dijon,  where  strong 
battalions  were  being  got  into  shape.  In  April 
it  was  reported  that  reinforcements  were  to  be 
marched  to  Nice  where  Suchet  with  a  small 
6 


82 


NAPOLEON 


force  was  facing  Melas.  In  May  it  became 
known  that  Bonaparte  was  leaving  Paris  for  a 
tour  of  inspection  that  was  to  last  just  two 
weeks. 

By  an  article  of  the  new  constitution  it  was 
provided  that  the  First  Consul  should  not  exer¬ 
cise  any  military  command.  Such  a  clause 
was  not  likely  to  hold  good  with  a  man  like 
Bonaparte  at  the  head  of  the  State.  Yet  the 
^situation  was  precarious.  The  government 
was  very  new,  and  a  military  failure  might 
spell  ruin.  In  this  difficult  position,  anxious 
to  direct  operations,  to  keep  up  the  military 
deception,  to  make  Paris  believe  his  absence 
momentary, — -Bonaparte  took  the  following 
steps.  He  appointed  Berthier  general-in-chief 
of  the  army  of  reserve,  but  arranged  per¬ 
sonally  to  supervise  the  operations  of  that 
general ;  he  gave  out  that  he  was  only  leaving 
the  capital  for  a  fortnight,  and  that  his  diplo¬ 
matic  receptions  would  not  be  interrupted. 
He  left  Paris  on  the  6th  of  May,  and  from 
that  moment  his  plan  ripened  with  startling 
rapidity.  From  the  centre  and  east  of  France 
long  columns  had  been  for  many  days  con¬ 
versing  on  Geneva  and  southern  Switzerland. 
On  the  14th  the  first  column  of  a  large 
army  began  ascending  the  pass  of  the  Great 


19TH  OF  BRUMAIRE  &  MARENGO  83 

St.  Bernard;  a  week  later  the  army  of  re¬ 
serve,  strengthened  by  a  corps  taken  from 
Moreau,  had  struggled  through  the  snow  and 
ice  of  the  Alps  by  various  passes  between 
the  Mont  Cenis  and  the  St.  Gotthard,  and 
was  rapidly  marching  down  into  Piedmont 
and  Lombardy,  straight  towards  Melas’  lines 
of  communications. 

The  operations  of  the  next  three  weeks  may 
be  summed  up  in  a  few  words.  It  was  some 
days  before  Melas  realized  that  a  French  army 
of  considerable  size  had  descended  from  the 
Alpine  passes  into  Italy;  by  this  time  his  line 
of  retreat  towards  the  Quadrilateral  was  cut. 
He  then  appears  to  have  done  all  that  was 
possible  under  such  circumstances.  He  con¬ 
centrated  his  columns  with  a  view  to  march¬ 
ing  on  the  enemy,  pressing  on  the  siege  of 
Genoa  in  the  meanwhile.  On  the  4th  of  June 
Massena  and  his  starved  garrison  surrendered 
after  a  memorable  defence.  In  the  week  that 
followed  Melas  marched  towards  Alessandria, 
and  on  the  14th  there  was  fought  near  that 
fortress  the  battle  of  Marengo  that  decided  the 
result  of  the  campaign. 

Bonaparte  having  occupied  Milan  and  pushed 
Murat  with  the  cavalry  as  far  as  Piacenza, 
crossed  the  Po,  advanced  to  Stradella,  and 


84 


NAPOLEON 


thence  spread  out  his  corps  right  and  left  so 
as  to  intercept  the  Austrian  retreat  at  every 
point.  Strategically  he  had  already  won  a 
nearly  decisive  advantage ;  for  being  between 
the  Austrian  army  and  its  base  he  had  but  to 
succeed  in  holding  the  defensive  to  win.  Yet 
his  anxiety  to  extend  north  and  south  led  him 
into  error,  left  him  too  weak  centrally,  and 
nearly  resulted  in  disaster.  The  French  main 
column  marching  south-west  from  Stradella 
came  into  contact  with  the  Austrians  march¬ 
ing  north-east  on  the  13th,  but  failed  to  rec¬ 
ognise  the  fact  that  the  enemy  was  in  force ; 
Melas  probably  had  some  thirty-five  thousand 
men  present,  Bonaparte  not  more  than  twenty 
thousand.  On  the  following  morning  the 
Austrians  advanced  resolutely,  deploying  right 
and  left  of  the  main  road.  Bonaparte  hastily 
sent  orders  to  his  outlying  columns  to  march 
to  his  support,  and  withstood  the  attack  as  best 
he  could. 

Heavy  fighting  followed,  gradually  turning 
in  favour  of  the  Austrians.  By  three  o’clock 
in  the  afternoon  the  French  had  been  driven 
some  five  or  six  miles,  their  left  was  completely 
routed,  their  right  was  in  great  confusion  and 
in  the  centre  alone  was  there  still  some  sem¬ 
blance  of  effective  resistance.  To  Melas  the 


19TH  OF  BRUM  AIRE  &f  MARENGO  85 

battle  now  appeared  won ;  leaving  the  pursuit 
to  his  chief  of  staff  he  turned  back  to  Alessan¬ 
dria,  where  he  wrote  dispatches  to  his  govern¬ 
ment  describing  his  victory  over  the  French. 

On  the  departure  of  Melas  the  mass  of  the 
Austrian  infantry  was  ordered  to  continue  its 
advance  along  the  road  to  Stradella  in  one 
heavy  column,  battalion  after  battalion.  This 
over-confident  and  faulty  disposition  proved 
fatal.  At  four  o’clock  General  Desaix,  who,, 
had  marched  since  the  morning  on  the  sound 
of  the  firing,  brought  up  his  division  to  the  aid 
of  the  First  Consul.  A  battery  was  placed 
across  the  road  and  suddenly  unmasked ;  the 
head  of  the  Austrian  column  was  broken; 
several  of  Desaix’  fresh  battalions  were  rushed 
forward  with  the  bayonet,  and  at  the  same 
moment  Kellermann  charged  down  in  flank 
with  five  or  six  hundred  dragoons.  In  a  few 
moments  the  dense  Austrian  ranks  were  in 
confusion  and  at  the  mercy  of  the  horsemen. 
There  was  no  time  and  no  space  in  which 
to  deploy.  Bonaparte  pushed  his  advantage 
home.  The  straggling  French  were  rallied  and 
brought  back  to  the  attack ;  the  fresh  troops  of 
Desaix  carried  everything  before  them,  and 
avenged  the  fate  of  their  general  who  fell  early 
in  the  fight.  In  half  an  hour’s  time  the  victory 


86 


NAPOLEON 


of  the  Austrians  had  been  turned  into  a  disas¬ 
trous  rout  in  which  they  lost  thousands  of 
prisoners  and  all  the  positions  they  had  cap¬ 
tured  earlier  in  the  day. 

On  the  following  morning  Melas  offered 
to  negotiate.  A  convention  was  agreed  to 
whereby  the  Austrian  army  was  permitted  to 
continue  its  retreat,  in  return  for  which  Lom¬ 
bardy  and  all  the  western  parts  of  Italy  were 
ceded  to  the  French. 

It  is  not  altogether  correct  to  think  of  Ma¬ 
rengo  as  a  lucky  victory.  In  one  sense  it  was 
so ;  but  even  had  Melas  won  the  field,  Bona¬ 
parte  had  already  secured  so  great  a  strategic 
advantage  that  he  would  probably  have  won 
the  campaign.  Had  he  retreated  to  the  in¬ 
trenched  position  of  Stradella  and  been  rejoined 
there  by  the  corps  of  Desaix  and  Serurier,  it 
does  not  appear  likely  that  Melas  could  have 
succeeded  in  dislodging  him.  Failing  in  that 
he  was  cut  off  from  his  base  and  would  have 
had  to  pay  the  consequences. 

Bonaparte’s  return  from  Marengo  to  Paris 
was  the  greatest,  the  truest  triumph  of  his  life. 
The  enthusiasm  everywhere  evoked  was  based 
on  the  idea  that  the  struggle  he  had  waged  so 
successfully  was  necessary  to  the  existence  of 
France  and  was  the  herald  of  an  honourable 


19TH  OF  BRUM  AIRE  6?  MARENGO  87 

peace.  So  it  proved.  A  few  months  later 
Moreau  defeated  the  Archduke  John  with  great 
loss  at  Hohenlinden,  and  Austria  gave  up  the 
struggle.  Peace  was  signed  at  Luneville  on 
the  9th  of  February  1801,  and  left  France 
and  Austria  in  about  the  same  position  as  the 
treaty  of  Campo  Formio  four  years  before. 


CHRONOLOGY 


10  Nov.,  1799. 
15  Dec.,  “ 

6  May,  1800. 
14—20  “  “ 

4  June,  “ 

14  “  “ 

3  Dec.,  “ 

9  Feb.,  1801. 


19th  Brumaire. 

New  Constitution  proclaimed. 
Bonaparte  leaves  Paris  for  army. 
Crossing  of  the  Alps. 

MassOia  surrenders  Genoa. 
Marengo. 

Hohenlinden. 

Peace  of  Lundville. 


NOTE 

Bibliographical:  General.  —  See  note  page  11. 

For  Brumaire  see  last  chapter.  For  Marengo,  Huffer, 
Quellen  fur  Geschuhte  dcs  Zeitalters  .  .  .  Leipzig,  1900, 
Vol.  II.;  De  Cugnac,  Campagnes  de  I'armee  de  reserve, 

Paris,  1901. 


CHAPTER  VII 


LEGISLATION  AND  ADMINISTRATION 

The  Consular  Constitution  —  Bonaparte  secures  a  Dictator¬ 
ship —  Plebiscites — Legal  Reform — Influence  and  Work 
of  Bonaparte  —  The  Napoleonic  Bureaucracy  —  Religious 
Questions  —  Death  of  Washington  —  The  Press  —  Royalist 
Overtures. 

IT  will  be  better  briefly  to  depart  from  a 
chronological  order  and  to  consider  as  a 
whole  the  institutions  that  owed  their 
origin  to  Napoleon  ;  they  came  into  existence 
for  the  most  part  shortly  after  his  accession  to 
power,  and  may  be  conveniently  thought  of  as 
originating  in  the  period  1800-1805.  There 
are  three  chief  questions  to  be  considered  in 
;  this  respect :  first,  constitutional ;  second,  legal 
and  administrative  ;  third,  religious. 

The  new  constitution  of  France,  evolved 
from  the  revolution  of  Brumaire,  had  as  its 
fundamental  fact  the  personality  of  Bonaparte. 
For  the  sentiment  that  had  made  Brumaire 
possible,  the  sentiment  represented  by  Sieyes 
and  the  moderate  politicians,  was  that  the  exe¬ 
cutive  power  must  be  strengthened  or  the  Re- 

88 


LEGISLATION,  ADMINISTRATION  89 

public  would  perish.  But  theories  are  not  the 
business  of  a  strong  executive  officer  ;  charac¬ 
ter,  personality,  and  facts  must  be  the  predom¬ 
inant  note,  —  and  this  was  what  France  found 
in  Bonaparte.  The  very  first  meeting  of  the 
new  government  showed  clearly  what  had  hap¬ 
pened.  On  the  day  following  the  overturning 
of  the  Council  of  Five  Hundred,  the  three 
provisional  Consuls  assembled  at  the  Luxem¬ 
bourg.  Sieyes  on  entering  the  room  asked  the 
question:  “Who  is  to  preside?”  But  Bona¬ 
parte  had  already  sat  down  at  the  head  of  the 
table,  and  Roger  Ducos  replied:  “  Do  you  not 
see  that  the  general  presides  ?  ”  The  question 
was  never  raised  again. 

The  new  constitution  was  prepared  by  the 
provisional  Consuls  working  with  a  large  com¬ 
mittee  representing  the  faction  of  the  Ancients 
and  Five  Hundred  that  had  supported  the  new 
government.  It  was  principally  made  up  of 
men  who,  whatever  they  had  been  in  the  early 
republican  days,  were  now  in  favour  of  modera¬ 
tion  and  a  strong  executive  ;  with  many,  if  not 
with  most,  the  fact  that  the  new  government 
might  have  occasion  to  utilize  and  to  remuner¬ 
ate  their  talents  had  the  greatest  weight.  The 
committee  and  Consuls  now  set  to  work  to 
frame  a  new  constitution.  Their  first  care 


9o 


NAPOLEON 


was  to  create  four  great  bodies :  first,  the  Coun¬ 
cil  of  State  whose  functions  were  to  advise  the 
executive  in  the  preparation  of  legislation; 
second,  the  Tribunate,  which  was  to  discuss  all 
laws,  but  without  voting  on  them  ;  third,  the 
Legislative  Body,  which,  by  a  converse  process, 
was  to  vote  on  all  laws  but  without  discussing 
them  ;  fourth,  the  Senate,  whose  principal  duty 
was  to  decide  on  constitutional  questions  raised 
by  the  Tribunate.  This  may  be  characterized 
in  a  few  words,  as  the  diffusion  of  the  political 
forces  of  the  country,  and  as  the  provision  of  a 
large  number  of  salaried  positions  in  which  the 
men  of  the  Revolution  might  be  conveniently 
deposited.  The  really  useful  body  of  the  four 
was  the  Council  of  State  in  which  were  placed 
all  the  workers  with  practical  knowledge  of 
questions  of  finance,  law,  or  administration. 

But,  however  great  the  lassitude  of  France, 
it  was  impossible  to  put  forward  any  constitu¬ 
tion  that  did  not  make  some  show  of  being 
based  on  democratic  principles.  It  was  there¬ 
fore  provided  that  there  should  be  elections  ; 
but  these  were  of  a  very  indirect  and  illusory 
character.  Their  result  was  merely  to  place 
before  the  executive  a  list,  arrived  at  by  several 
progressive  steps,  from  which  members  of  the 
Senate  were  appointed;  the  senators  in  turn 


LEGISLATION,  ADMINISTRATION  91 

named  the  members  of  the  Tribunate  and  Leg¬ 
islative  Body.  In  practice  this  gave  the  head 
of  the  State  a  fairly  effective  control  over  all 
these  bodies. 

The  most  thorny  subject  of  discussion  in  the 
framing  of  the  constitution  was  left  for  the 
last :  what  was  to  be  the  nature  and  extent  of 
the  executive  power  ? 

On  this  subject  Sieyes  had  some  ready-made 
theories  to  propose;  but  they  were  of  an  un¬ 
practical  nature  and  were  rapidly  demolished 
by  Bonaparte.  This  marked  the  point  at  which 
his  influence  gained  a  complete  predominance 
and  that  of  Sieyes  began  to  sink.  During  the 
lengthy  discussions  that  had  taken  place  Bona¬ 
parte  had  shown  that  his  was  the  master  mind, 
and  Sieyes  soon  after  dropped  out  of  the  gov¬ 
ernment,  receiving  handsome  compensation  in 
emoluments  and  honours.  It  was  finally  de¬ 
cided  that  there  should  be  a  first,  second,  and 
third  Consul,  appointed  for  ten  years ;  that 
these  officials  should  have  a  general  control 
over  foreign  affairs,  the  army,  navy,  and  police ; 
that  Bonaparte  should  be  First  Consul,  and 
should  appoint  the  other  two.  Last  of  all  came 
the  question :  what  should  be  the  powers  of  the 
consuls  as  between  one  another?  Here  really 
lay  the  knot  of  the  new  constitution,  and  most 


92 


NAPOLEON 


declined  the  attempt  to  untie  it.  One  solution 
would  give  France  a  modified  Directoire,  the 
other  a  master.  At  this  point,  when  all  hesi¬ 
tated,  Bonaparte’s  prompt  intervention  proved 
decisive,  and  all  bowed  to  his  imperious  will. 
He  dictated  a  clause  whereby  no  act  of  the 
executive  was  to  be  undertaken  without  the 
First  Consul  consulting  his  colleagues,  but  they 
were  given  no  vote,  all  decisions  resting  solely 
with  him.  This  clause  made  Bonaparte  in 
effect  a  dictator,  and  among  those  who  realized 
the  fact  were  doubtless  more  than  one  who 
believed  that  this  was,  after  all,  the  best  thing 
for  France  and  for  themselves. 

Bonaparte  appointed  as  his  colleagues  Cam- 
baceres,  an  eminent  jurist,  who  as  a  member 
of  the  Convention  had  voted  for  the  death 
of  Louis  XVI.,  and  Lebrun,  a  conservative  of 
great  financial  knowledge,  respected  for  his 
integrity  and  moderation.  Among  the  first 
ministers  were  men  of  all  shades  of  opinion, 
notable  among  whom  were  Talleyrand-Peri- 
gord,  ex-abbe  and  member  of  the  Convention,  a 
subtle  intriguer  and  experienced  diplomatist ; 
Gaudin,  a  functionary  in  the  department  of 
finance,  whose  ability  in  that  sphere  was  of 
the  greatest;  Fouche  the  ex-Terrorist,  famous 
for  the  massacres  of  Lyons,  always  ready  to  sup- 


LEGISLATION,  ADMINISTRATION  93 

port  whatever  government  might  be  in  power, 
a  master  craftsman  in  every  device  and  deceit 
of  secret  police  work. 

As  soon  as  the  new  constitution  was  formu¬ 
lated  it  was  submitted  to  the  popular  acceptance 
by  a  plebiscite  or  referendum,  the  result  of 
which  was  satisfactory  to  the  government.  The 
plebiscite  has  played  a  large  part  in  French 
politics  since  that  date,  and  it  is  as  well  to  state 
that  it  is  in  a  strict  sense  not  a  true  test  of  the 
political  opinion  of  a  country  when  the  ques¬ 
tion  at  issue  is  one  involving  a  change  of 
government.  In  such  a  case  it  is  usual  to 
frame  the  question  submitted  to  the  people  in 
such  a  form  that  a  negative  vote  implies  a  desire 
for  turning  out  the  government  de  facto.  It  is 
self  evident  that  the  citizens  must  always  be 
few  whose  disapproval  of  such  a  government 
will  carry  them  to  the  point  of  recording  a  vote 
which,  if  successful,  could  only  mean  revolution 
or  civil  war. 

So  much  for  the  constitution  evolved  from 
the  revolution  of  Brumaire.  Let  us  now  con¬ 
sider  the  great  legal  and  administrative  work 
undertaken  by  the  newly  made  First  Consul. 

Napoleon  has  been  called  the  new,  or  the 
modern  Justinian ;  he  was,  in  fact,  a  great  codi-  * 
fier  of  the  law.  Like  his  Roman  predecessor 


94 


NAPOLEON 


he  intrusted  to  his  ablest  jurist  the  care  of 
reducing  the  chaos  of  French  laws  to  order. 
The  upheaval  and  confusion  caused  by  the 
Revolution  facilitated  the  task  of  Cambaceres 
and  his  assistants.  The  ordonnances  of  Louis 
XIV.,  the  subsequent  laws  of  the  Monarchy, 
the  mass  of  legislative  enactments  of  the  Re¬ 
public,  were  recast  in  one  piece  and  fitted  into 
a  somewhat  theoretical  framework  derived  from 
the  principles  of  the  Roman  law.  Bonaparte’s 
technical  knowledge  did  not  fit  him  to  take  a 
very  active  part  in  these  labours,  yet  the  credit 
for  the  framing  of  the  Code  Napoleon  is  prop¬ 
erly  his,  for  it  was  his  unceasing  stimulation 
that  got  the  work  done.  He  would  occasion¬ 
ally  keep  his  Councillors  of  State  working  all 
through  the  night  till  dawn,  he  would  decide 
the  points  on  which  the  jurists  disagreed,  and 
even  the  most  narrow  specialist  rarely  left  the 
council  board  without  feeling  that  the  marvel¬ 
lous  pressure  and  power  of  elucidation  of  the 
great  intellect  that  had  presided  had  deepened 
his  own  knowledge  of  his  particular  subject. 
The  Council  of  State  was  eminently  a  body 
for  work,  and  its  master  drove  it  as  hard  as  he 
did  himself. 

The  civil  code,  afterwards  called  Code  Napo¬ 
leon ,  was  published  in  1804;  it  was  followed 


LEGISLATION,  ADMINISTRATION  95 

by  commercial  and  criminal  codes,  but  it  does 
not  come  within  the  scope  of  this  book  to 
attempt  a  description  of  their  provisions.  It 
will  suffice  to  say  that  the  legal  system  of 
Napoleon  forms  at  the  present  day  the  basis  • 
of  much  of  the  legislation  of  the  world ;  its 
influence  is  strong  from  Prussia  to  Sicily,  from 
St.  Petersburg  to  Madrid,  and  even  in  such 
distant  parts  of  the  globe  as  Java,  South  Africa, 
and  Louisiana.  If  it  is  possible  to  give  an  im¬ 
pression  of  the  Code  Napoleon  in  a  few  words, 
one  might  describe  it  as  representing  the  mass 
of  the  laws  and  customs  of  old  P" ranee,  purged 
by  the  Revolution  and  poured  by  the  genius  of 
Napoleon  into  a  Latin  mould,  paternal,  authori- 
tive,  clear,  but  inelastic. 

The  Code  was  akin  in  spirit  to  the  adminis¬ 
trative  fabric  that  was  erected  alongside  of  it. 
The  State  was  converted  into  one  great  bureau¬ 
cratic  machine;  every  phase  of  the  life  of  each 
citizen  was  classified,  supervised,  and  directed. 
What  the  French  people  want,  declared  Bona¬ 
parte,  is  equality,  not  liberty;  and  his  system 
was  accordingly  framed  to  provide  all  with 
equal  justice,  equal  privileges,  equal  opportunity 
of  advancement.  But  if  the  State  was  prepared 
to  grant  justice  and  preferment,  it  also  took 
care  to  secure  the  services  of  all  the  intellect  of 


NAPOLEON 


96 

the  country  and  to  repress  all  attempts  at 
individual  action.  Even  education  and  religion 

O 

were  brigaded  and  administered  in  military 
fashion.  Membres  de  l' Institute  illustrious  sa¬ 
vants  or  artists,  —  Cuvier,  Laplace,  or  David,  — 
were  officials  salaried,  uniformed,  and  supervised 
by  the  State. 

France  had  been  divided  into  departments 
by  the  Republic ;  each  of  these  divisions  had  as 
chief  administrator  a  prefect,  depending  on  the 
Minister  of  the  Interior.  The  principal  duties 
of  this  functionary  were  to  administer  matters 
of  revenue  and  police.  Under  him  came  the 
mayors  of  townships,  and  lower  still  came  sub¬ 
ordinate  officials,  all  under  the  control  of  the 
government,  down  to  the  game-keepers  or  sell¬ 
ers  of  tobacco  and  salt.  The  administrative  or 
bureaucratic  machine  was  powerfully  supported 
by  an  extensive  system  of  secret  police.  The 
ramifications  of  this  department  were  so  exten¬ 
sive  that  Fouche  is  reported  actually  to  have 
secured  reports  from  Josephine  herself  as  to 
the  daily  doings  of  the  household  of  the  First 
Consul. 

With  such  a  system  there  was  a  chance  for 
every  citizen,  provided  only  he  would  accept 
the  political  situation  and  support  the  govern¬ 
ment ;  but  it  was  entirely  a  downwards  system, 


LEGISLATION,  ADMINISTRATION  97 

proceeding  from  the  governor,  not  from  the 
governed,  and  in  no  wise  resembling  free  in¬ 
stitutions.  Feudalism  and  privileges  had  been 
swept  away  by  the  Revolution,  but  personal 
government  had  been  reinstated  by  Bonaparte, 
—  and  personal  government  of  a  far  more 
efficient  and  stable  form  than  that  of  the 
Bourbons,  because  wonderfully  adapted  to  the 
practical  requirements  of  a  European  nation  in 
the  nineteenth  century.  Bonaparte  had  created 
what  was  the  most  powerful  and  effective  in¬ 
strument  for  governing  a  country  and  for  cen¬ 
tralizing  and  directing  its  strength  yet  seen  in 
Europe;  none  could  fail  to  see  the  good  points 
of  his  system.  The  opponents  of  France  after 
suffering  from  the  effects  of  the  machine  Napo¬ 
leon  had  constructed,  copied  it ;  and  now  bu¬ 
reaucratic  government  with  a  greater  or  less 
admixture  of  democratic  tendencies  or  appear¬ 
ances,  with  an  executive  directing  power  strong 
in  some  countries,  weak  in  others,  is  the  one 
form  to  be  met  with  in  every  part  of  the 
continent  of  Europe.  But  what  else  could  be 
expected  from  Napoleon  ?  The  revolution  of 
Brumaire  was  not  the  work  of  a  man  whose 
first  thought  was  the  good  of  his  country, 
and  the  two  great  currents  of  sentiment  that 
brought  it  about  were  nothing  better  than 
7 


NAPOLEON 


98 

self-preservation  on  the  part  of  the  Sieyes  fac¬ 
tion  and  ambition  on  that  of  Bonaparte. 

The  religious  question  yet  remains  to  be 
dealt  with.  In  this  as  in  all  things  Bonaparte 
took  a  purely  practical  point  of  view.  He  con¬ 
sidered  Christianity,  with  Mohammedanism  and 
all  other  religions,  respectable  and  useful.  For 
many  years  he  had  apparently  no  religious  be¬ 
lief,  but  during  boyhood  and  towards  the  close 
of  his  life  he  observed  the  forms  of  the  Catholic 
faith.  Whatever  his  inmost  belief,  as  a  states¬ 
man  his  attitude  towards  Rome  may  be  said  to 
have  been  purely  political.  During  the  cam¬ 
paign  of  Italy,  in  1796-97,  the  Directoire  had 
repeatedly  pressed  him  to  action  against  Rome, 
but  he  had  shown  enough  reluctance  in  carry¬ 
ing  out  these  orders  to  make  clear  to  the  astute 
Papal  diplomatists  that  the  young  Republican 
general  might  one  day  be  their  friend.  No 
sooner  was  he  in  power  than  he  issued  orders 
for  removing  the  trammels  placed  on  the 
Catholic  worship.  The  ringing  of  the  church 
bells  throughout  France  a  few  days  after  the 
1 8th  of  Brumaire  created  a  religious  ferment 
that  astonished  the  government  and  the  coun¬ 
try,  but  that  did  no  harm  to  the  First  Consul’s 
popularity.  He  recognised  even  more  clearly 
than  before  the  deep  attachment  of  the  people 


LEGISLATION,  ADMINISTRATION  99 

to  their  religion  and  determined  to  go  further. 
Notwithstanding  the  murmurs  of  the  army, 
in  which  atheism  had  been  promoted  to  the 
rank  of  a  creed,  negotiations  were  opened  with 
Rome,  and  in  1801  a  treaty  was  signed  re¬ 
establishing  Catholicism  in  a  privileged  posi¬ 
tion.  By  the  Concordat,  as  this  treaty  is 
known,  Bonaparte  obtained  control  of  the 
nomination  and  salaries  of  all  high  ecclesiasti¬ 
cal  dignitaries,  thus  securing  over  them  a 
hold  nearly  equal  to  that  which  he  had  over 
his  civil  and  military  functionaries.  A  solemn 
service  held  to  celebrate  this  event  at  Notre 
Dame  led  to  unseemly  scenes  in  which  some 
of  the  generals,  among  them  Lannes  and 
Augereau,  gave  full  vent  to  their  disapproba¬ 
tion  of  the  course  taken  by  the  First  Consul. 
The  feelings  of  the  staunch  republicans  were 
further  ruffled  by  the  introduction  of  prayers 
for  the  head  of  the  State. 

Bonaparte  was  clear-sighted  in  his  religious 
policy,  and  took  this  great  step  forward  with 
calm  decision.  Like  every  other  act  of  the 
consulate,  it  turned  partly  on  considerations 
relating  to  the  strengthening  of  his  personal 
authority.  In  the  early  days,  however,  when 
his  supporters  were  still  republican  soldiers  or 
republican  politicians  and  not  yet  Bonapartists, 


IOO 


NAPOLEON 


it  was  impossible  for  him  to  profess  any  but 
republican  opinions  and  intentions.  A  few 
weeks  after  his  accession  to  power  a  very  sol¬ 
emn  farce  was  played  on  the  occasion  of  the 
death  of  George  Washington  (December  14, 
1799).  A  funeral  ceremony  was  held  in  honour 
of  the  American  patriot,  and  the  speeches 
delivered  on  that  occasion  more  than  inferred 
that  France  could  now  gaze  on  a  Washington 
of  her  own.  Yet  when  we  are  inclined  to 
view  with  amused  indignation  the  obvious 
fraud  and  hollowness  of  such  professions,  ought 
we  not  to  marvel  equally  at  the  fact  that  the 
politicians  of  America  have  generally  shown 
more  respect  for  the  methods  and  aims  of 
Bonaparte  than  they  have  for  the  lofty  states¬ 
manship  and  patriotism  of  Washington. 
i  Acting  on  the  principle  he  had  constantly 
invoked  since  his  return  from  Egypt,  Bonaparte 
once  in  power,  stopped  the  excessive  political 
persecution  that  had  so  long  been  thought 
necessary.  Many  political  prisoners  were 
speedily  released,  and  France  was  thrown  open 
to  thousands  of  exiles.  While  with  one  hand 
he  thus  acted  with  great  apparent  liberality, 
with  the  other  he  skilfully  seized  and  muzzled 
the  press,  which  he  retained  completely  in  his 
power  during  the  next  fourteen  years.  To 


LEGISLATION,  ADMINISTRATION  ioi 


what  extent  this  control  was  carried  may  be 
judged  by  the  fact  that  the  Aloniteur  never  at 
any  time  made  the  slightest  reference  to  the 
greatest  naval  battle  of  modern  times,  one  in 
which  France  was  not  successful,  that  of 
Trafalgar ! 

The  new  government  was  a  success  from 
the  first,  and  after  Marengo  its  popularity  was 
immense.  Every  month  the  position  of  France 
seemed  to  improve  visibly,  and  Bonaparte  soon 
thought  he  might  advance  a  step  towards  the 
throne.  The  Comte  de  Provence,  elder  of  the 
surviving  brothers  of  Louis  XVI.,  approached 
him  with  a  view  to  a  Bourbon  restoration. 
This  overture  Bonaparte  politely  declined, 
and  shortly  afterwards  a  pamphlet  appeared 
entitled :  “  Parallel  between  Cromwell ,  Caesar , 
Monk ,  and  Bonaparte ,”  in  which  the  imperial 
ambitions  of  the  First  Consul  were  clearly 
revealed.  The  impression  produced  was  not 
favourable.  France  was  not  yet  ready,  and 
both  the  ardent  republicans  and  the  ardent 
royalists  realized  that  Bonaparte  was  their 
most  dangerous  enemy  and  prepared  to  destroy 
him. 


102 


NAPOLEON 


NOTE 

Bibliographical  :  General.  —  See  page  1 1 . 

For  preceding  chapter,  Taine’s  Origines  de  la  France 
contcinporaine  is  the  capital  work,  though  the  twisting  of  the 
argument  to  lit  the  writer’s  negative  thesis  must  be  guarded 
against ;  see  also  Monnet,  Histoire  de  l' administration, 
Paris,  1885  ;  Perouse,  Napoleon  1 er  et  les  lois  Civiles, 
Paris,  1 866  ;  D’Haussonville,  L'Eglise  romaine  et  le 
premier  Empire,  Paris,  1870;  Debidour,  L'Eglise  et 
/’ Etat  en  France,  Paris,  1898  ;  Welschinger,  La  censure 
sous  le  premier  Empire,  Paris,  1882  ;  Nervo,  Finances 
franqaises,  Paris,  1863.  Among  Memoirs  those  of  Pasquier, 
Gaudin,  Thibaudeau,  Mollien,  and  Bourrienne  may  be 
consulted.  Fournier  (see  page  n)  has  a  good  study  of 
Napoleonic  legislation  ;  Fisher,  Napoleonic  Statesmanship, 
Germany,  Oxford,  1903,  may  be  consulted  for  the  applica¬ 
tion  of  the  system  in  Germany. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


THE  DUC  D’ENGHIEN  AND  TRAFALGAR 

Conspiracies  —  The  Bonaparte  family  —  Moreau  —  Imperial 
Aspirations  —  The  Due  d’Enghien  —  Proclamation  of  the 
Empire  —  War  with  England  —  The  Trafalgar  Campaign. 

A  LONGSIDE  of  the  extraordinary  build- 
ing  up  of  the  Napoleonic  legislative  and 
■*“  administrative  edifice,  the  consulate 
was  one  long  and  secret  struggle  against  the 
agitation  and  plots  of  the  ultra-Jacobins  on 
the  one  hand  and  of  the  ultra-Royalists  on  the 
other.  Not  long  after  Marengo  a  desperate 
attempt  on  the  First  Consul’s  life  was  made. 
A  barrel  of  gunpowder  was  loaded  on  a  hand¬ 
cart  that  was  placed  in  a  convenient  position 
at  a  spot  in  the  rue  Ste.  Nicaise  by  which  the 
First  Consul’s  carriage  must  be  driven  on  its 
way  to  the  opera.  That  night  Bonaparte  was 
unpunctual,  and  the  coachman,  who  is  said  to 
have  been  intoxicated,  lashed  his  horses  furi¬ 
ously  through  the  intricate  network  of  streets 
at  the  back  of  the  Tuileries  to  make  up  for  the 
lost  time.  The  explosion  took  place  just  an 

103 


104 


NAPOLEON 


instant  too  late,  and  though  many  lives  were 
lost  and  much  damage  was  done,  the  First  Con¬ 
sul  went  unscathed.  At  the  opera  there  was  a 
scene  of  the  greatest  excitement  during  which 
only  two  persons  maintained  a  calm  and  dig¬ 
nified  exterior,  Napoleon  and  his  sister  Caroline. 
The  personal  friends  of  the  First  Consul,  such 
men  as  Duroc  and  Junot,  were  quite  unnerved, 
Hortense  Beauharnais  was  crying,  Josephine 
was  hysterical,  the  spectators  were  eagerly 
demonstrating  their  joy  at  the  escape  of  the 
head  of  the  State,  and  Caroline  alone  with  her 
brother  sat  in  the  front  of  the  box  watching:  the 
scene  with  a  cool  gaze.  Of  all  Napoleon’s 
brothers  and  sisters  she  probably  resembled 
him  most  in  uniting  passionate  ambition  to 
cool  calculation  and  boundless  courage.  Of 
the  brothers  the  strongest  in  character  was 
Lucien,  whose  decisive  action  on  the  1 8th  and 
19th  of  Brumaire  has  already  been  noted.  Con¬ 
spicuous  during  the  early  days  of  the  Consulate, 
he  soon  quarrelled  with  his  powerful  brother 
on  a  matrimonial  question  and  eventually  sepa¬ 
rated  himself  from  him  and  lost  all  political 
influence.  The  eldest,  Joseph,  was  the  most 
subservient  and  useful.  Stronger  in  intellect 
than  in  character,  he  was  always  conspicuous 
as  a  subordinate,  and  was  eventually  rewarded 


DUC  D’ENGHIEN  &?  TRAFALGAR  105 

with  two  insecure  thrones.  Louis,  a  man  of 
intelligence  but  uncertain  disposition,  married 
Napoleon’s  step-daughter  Hortense,  who  in¬ 
herited  much  of  her  mother’s  charm  and  tem¬ 
perament.  What  with  matrimonial  difficulties 
with  Hortense  and  political  ones  with  Napoleon, 
Louis  found  his  career  not  an  easy  one.  He 
was  never  an  important  figure,  but  a  son  of 
Hortense  was  destined  to  restore  the  Empire 
as  Napoleon  III.  The  youngest  of  the  brothers, 
Jerome,  was  the  least  weighty,  though  even  he 
was  to  become  a  king;  his  grandson,  Prince 
Napoleon  Victor,  is  at  the  present  day  the 
Bonapartist  Pretender.  Thus  of  the  five  sons 
of  Charles  Bonaparte  one  was  to  be  an  emperor 
and  three,  kings;  his  daughters  rose  almost 
equally  high.  Elisa  married  a  Corsican  who 
was  later  created  Prince  Baciocchi  and  was 
given  an  Italian  principality;  Pauline,  the  most 
beautiful  member  of  a  striking  family,  married 
first,  General  Leclerc,  and  after  his  death  in 
the  expedition  of  San  Domingo,  Prince  Bor- 
ghese.  Caroline,  the  youngest,  married  Joachim 
Murat,  and  eventually  became  Queen  of  Naples; 
her  ambition  finally  drove  her  to  betray  her 
brother  in  his  greatest  hour  of  need.  Jose¬ 
phine’s  son,  Eugene,  is  the  only  member  of 
the  First  Consul’s  family  not  yet  mentioned. 


io6 


NAPOLEON 


At  the  commencement  of  the  consulate  he  was 
a  mere  boy;  before  the  end  of  the  Empire  he 
had  made  his  mark  and  shown  such  qualities, 
political  and  military,  that  it  will  be  no  exagger¬ 
ation  to  say  that  it  would  have  proved  fortu¬ 
nate  for  France  had  the  imperial  throne  come 
to  him  as  a  consequence  of  the  fall  of  his 
step-father. 

But  this  enumeration  of  the  Bonapartes  and 
Beauharnais  is  a  digression;  it  is  now. necessary 
to  return  to  the  struggle  of  the  consular  gov¬ 
ernment  for  existence.  Plot  succeeded  plot ; 
the  enemies  of  Bonaparte  became  more  and 
more  desperate  as  each  month  increased  his 
power  and  brought  him  nearer  to  what  was 
now  his  undisguised  goal,  the  throne.  The 
crisis  culminated  in  the  early  weeks  of  1804 
when  a  number  of  sensational  arrests  startled 
Paris.  Several  Royalist  conspirators,  with  the 
secret  assistance  of  the  British  government, 
had  made  their  way  into  the  capital  with  the 
intention  of  making  some  attempt  against 
the  First  Consul.  They  were  mostly  men  of 
desperate  fortunes  who  had  taken  part  in  the 
insurrectionary  movements  in  Vendee  and 
Brittany;  their  leaders  were  Cadoudal  and  the 
ex-republican  general  Pichegr-tr.  Cadoudal  was 
only  taken  after  a  fierce  resistance ;  Pichegru 


DUC  D’ENGHIEN  fc?  TRAFALGAR  107 

was  found  strangled  in  his  prison  shortly 
after  his  capture.  But  the  most  important 
and  sensational  arrest  of  all  was  that  of  Gen¬ 
eral  Moreau,  who  appears  to  have  had  no 
real  connection  with  the  conspiracy.  Moreau, 
the  victor  of  Hohenlinden,  was  as  beloved  by 
the  army  of  Germany  as  Bonaparte  was  by  the 
army  of  Italy.  Moreau,  the  staunch  repub¬ 
lican,  was  the  hope  of  many  who  saw  in  Bona¬ 
parte  the  coming  Caesar.  Moreau,  who  had 
always  retreated  from  politics,  might  be  used 
to  pull  down  a  fellow  general  who  had  for¬ 
gotten  his  soldier’s  duty.  He  was  accused 
of  complicity  in  the  royalist  plot,  arrested  and 
tried.  Although  nothing  substantial  could  be 
proved  against  him,  he  was  driven  into  exile 
and  left  France  for  America.  Cadoudal  was 
less  fortunate  and  he,  together  with  several  of 
his  accomplices,  was  sentenced  to  death.  But 
the  matter  did  not  end  here. 

The  extremely  dangerous  conspiracy  of  Ca¬ 
doudal,  followfrrg-  as  it  had  many  others,  and 
coinciding  with  the  moment  at  which  Bona- 
parte  had  at  last  decided  to  seize  the  crown, 
appears  to  have  thrown  him  into  a  state  of 
nervous  excitement.  Was  he  to  reach  the 
object  of  his  ambition  or  were  his  enemies  to 
pull  him  down  at  the  last  moment?  He  seems 


108  NAPOLEON 

to  have  thought,  and  Macchiavelli  would  have 
approved,  that  under  such  circumstances  he 
could  keep  his  enemies  down  only  by  a  stroke 
of  terror.  He  aimed  a  blow  at  the  repub¬ 
licans  by  arresting  Moreau,  he  dealt  one  to 
the  Bourbons  by  virtually  assassinating  the 
Due  d’Enghien. 

This  young  prince  of  the  Conde  branch  of 
the  House  of  Bourbon  was  near  the  French 
frontier  staying  in  a  country  house  in  the 
duchy  of  Baden.  He  had  held  a  command  in 
the  army  with  which  the  French  emigres  had 
fought  the  Republic,  and  his  presence  on  the 
border  was  held  to  signify  that  on  the  success 
of  Cadoudal  he  was  to  enter  France  and  take 
command  of  the  royalist  movement.  On  the 
1 5th  of  March  a  party  of  gendarmes  commanded 
by  Savary,  a  confidential  agent  of  Bonaparte, 
violated  the  frontier  of  Baden,  and  taking  the 
duke  from  his  bed  placed  him  in  a  carriage 
and  hurried  him  to  Paris.  He  arrived  there 
on  the  night  of  the  19th,  was  conveyed  to  the 
fort  of  Vincennes,  tried  by  a  subservient  court- 
martial  in  the  course  of  the  same  night,  sen¬ 
tenced  to  death  on  no  evidence,  and  shot  at 
dawn.  This  crime,  the  most  obvious  blot  on 
Napoleon’s  name,  produced  a  wave  of  indigna¬ 
tion  that  swept  all  Europe  including  France. 


/ 


DUC  D’ENGHIEN  fc?  TRAFALGAR  109 

Not  one  of  the  First  Consul’s  supporters  ap¬ 
proved  the  act,  most  of  them  regretted  or  re¬ 
pudiated  it.  Chateaubriand  resigned  from  the 
diplomatic  service;  Talleyrand  sententiously 
declared  that  the  execution  of  the  Due  d’En- 
ghien  was  worse  than  a  crime,  it  was  a  blunder. 
Yet  as  a  stroke  of  terror,  however  unsuited 
to  the  political  conditions  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  it  was  not  altogether  unsuccessful. 
From  that  time  on  France  acknowledged  her 
master  without  question,  and  the  stain  of  blood 
of  the  20th  of  March  1804,  did  not  prevent  the 
proclamation  of  the  Empire  on  the  18th  of 
May  following. 

In  1802  a  plebiscite  had  converted  Bona¬ 
parte’s  consulate  for  ten  years  into  a  consulate 
for  life.  In  1804  there  was  little  more  to  do 
than  to  make  the  dignity  hereditary  and  to 
change  its  title.  That  of  king  would  not  have 
been  tolerated  by  France;  even  that  of  em¬ 
peror,  which  Bonaparte  chose,  was  associated 
with  the  continuance  of  France  as  a  Republic, 
and  for  many  months  after  the  proclamation  of 
the  Emperor  Napoleon,  France  still  retained 
the  political  style  she  had  assumed  on  the  1st 
of  Vendemiaire  of  the  year  1,  the  2 2d  of  Sep¬ 
tember  1792.  The  coronation  of  the  new 
Emperor  took  place  at  the  Cathedral  of  Notre 


I  IO 


NAPOLEON 


Dame  on  the  2d  of  December  following  his 
proclamation.  The  ceremony  was  invested 
with  the  greatest  pomp,  and  the  Pope  was  per¬ 
suaded  into  travelling  to  Paris  to  perform  it. 
It  was  many  years  since  the  annals  of  the 
Papacy  had  registered  a  similar  event,  and  in 
the  minds  of  all  people  of  the  Latin  race  it 
gave  the  new  monarch  a  consecration  that 
placed  him  on  a  not  much  lower  level  than 
that  of  the  proudest  Houses  of  Europe  whose 
power  reposed  on  the  basis  of  divine  right.  In 
the  following  May  (1805)  Napoleon  proceeded 
to  Milan,  the  capital  of  what  had  hitherto  been 
known  as  the  Cisalpine  Republic.  There  he 
proclaimed  the  kingdom  of  Italy,  an  ambitious 
and  suggestive  name  for  such  a  small  State  as 
Lombardy  and  her  dependencies ;  he  crowned 
himself  with  the  Iron  Crown  of  the  Lombards, 
and  announced  that  the  viceroyalty  would  be 
entrusted  to  Prince  Eugene,  who  would  be  his 
heir  to  the  Italian  throne.  During  these  cere¬ 
monies  the  republic  of  Genoa  sent  a  deputa¬ 
tion  asking  for  incorporation  with  France.  This 
was,  of  course,  an  instigated  act ;  it  gave  more 
obvious  proof  than  any  previous  one  that  am¬ 
bitious  aggressiveness  might  be  expected  as  the 
keynote  of  the  policy  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon; 
it  offended  Austria’s  pride  and  before  long  drew 


DUC  D’ENGHIEN  &  TRAFALGAR  hi 


that  Power  into  a  new  contest  with  France, 
the  third  since  the  days  of  the  Republic. 

We  must  now  re-enter  the  atmosphere  of 
war  that  constitutes  the  background  of  Napo¬ 
leon’s  career.  In  1805  began  the  first  of  the 
three  great  cycles  of  the  wars  of  the  Empire. 
But  to  understand  the  events  of  the  continental 
war  of  1805  we  must  first  take  up  the  relations 
of  France  and  England  at  the  point  at  which 
we  left  them. 

Austria  signed  peace  with  France  at  Lune- 
ville  after  Marengo,  in  1801,  leaving  Great 
Britain  alone  at  war.  That  Power  having 
driven  the  remains  of  Bonaparte’s  army  from 
Egypt,  and  having  also  captured  Malta,  now 
entered  into  negotiation.  Peace  was  eventually 
concluded  at  Amiens  on  the  27th  of  March 
1802.  The  negotiations  were  difficult,  but  tMfe 
only  essential  question  was  really  that  of  the 
Mediterranean  and  Malta.  Great  Britain  finally 
agreed  to  withdraw  from  the  island  in  favour  of 
some  neutral  Power.  But  the  position  of  Malta, 
midway  between  the  western  and  eastern  ex¬ 
tremities  of  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  now 
unveiled  ambition  of  Bonaparte  to  acquire  a 
colonial  empire,  and  to  resume  sooner  or  later 
his  movement  towards  the  east,  made  the 
British  cabinet  defer  evacuation.  French 


1 11 


NAPOLEON 


troops  occupied  part  of  the  kingdom  of  Naples 
with  the  port  of  Taranto,  and  the  French  gov¬ 
ernment  declined  to  remove  them  so  lonsf  as 
the  British  remained  at  Malta.  The  peace  be¬ 
tween  the  two  countries  was  in  fact  little  more 
than  a  truce,  as  was  well  shown  by  a  medal 
struck  by  Denon  in  which  Bonaparte’s  head 
is  covered  with  a  helmet  and  surmounted  by 
the  threatening  legend  :  Arme pour  la  paix , — 
armed  for  peace.  After  much  diplomatic  dis¬ 
putation,  during  which  the  First  Consul  was 
strengthening  his  hold  on  Italy  and  Switzer¬ 
land  and  preparing  plans  for  trans-oceanic  ex¬ 
tension,  Great  Britain  broke  off  negotiations 
on  the  question  of  Malta,  and  withdrew  her 
ambassador  from  Paris  on  the  12th  of  May 
1803. 

This  renewal  of  hostilities  between  France 
and  Great  Britain  made  Bonaparte  adjourn  his 
colonial  ambitions ;  it  influenced  among  other 
things  his  relations  with  America.  The  ag¬ 
gressive  policy  of  the  Directoire  had  led  to  a 
rupture  between  France  and  the  United  States 
in  1798;  this  had  been  patched  up  by  Bona¬ 
parte  in  1801.  But  a  little  later  he  set  his 
eyes  on  Louisiana  and  would  have  probably 
attempted  its  occupation  with  the  assent  of  its 
Spanish  owners  in  the  face  of  clearly  expressed 


DUC  D’ENGHIEN  &?  TRAFALGAR  113 

American  opposition,  had  not  the  inevitable¬ 
ness  of  war  with  England  led  him  to  reconsider 
his  decision.  The  people  of  the  United  States 
viewed  the  transfer  of  Louisiana  from  Spain  to 
France  with  the  utmost  dislike.  It  would  have 
given  France  the  western  bank  of  the  Missis¬ 
sippi  from  the  Gulf  to  the  Canadian  lakes,  bar¬ 
ring  all  possibility  of  expansion  to  the  west.  So 
it  proved  fortunate  for  the  good  relations  of 
France  and  the  United  States  that  the  former 
now  plunged  into  war  with  Great  Britain  once 
more.  By  so  doing  she  lost  all  power  of  action 
beyond  the  seas  and  was  better  prepared  to 
abandon  her  new  colonial  scheme.  A  rapid 
negotiation  resulted  in  the  transfer  of  Louisiana 
to  the  United  States  for  a  sum  of  sixty  mil¬ 
lion  francs  ($1 1,250, ooo).1 

In  1803  the  position  of  Bonaparte  in  regard 
to  a  war  with  Great  Britain  was  very  different 
from  what  it  had  been  in  1798.  Then  the  re¬ 
sources  of  France  were  limited,  the  ambition 
of  the  young  general  urged  him  to  hazardous 
courses;  now  the  resources  of  the  country  were 
vastly  increased,  and  the  First  Consul  was  no 
longer  ready  to  leave  France  and  seek  for  glory 

1  Louisiana  included  not  only  what  is  now  the  State  of  that 
name,  but  the  whole  of  the  western  half  of  the  basin  of  the 
Mississippi. 

8 


NAPOLEON 


114 

at  the  further  end  of  the  Mediterranean.  For 
every  reason  the  opposite  mode  of  attack  to 
that  of  1798  was  chosen,  and  Bonaparte  decided 
on  the  invasion  of  _  England.  This  great  naval 
and  military  operation  could  not  be  carried  out 
at  a  moment’s  notice,  but  necessitated  prepara¬ 
tions  spreading  over  many  months.  From 
Dieppe  to  Antwerp  the  coast  was  armed  with 
batteries  covering  numerous  camps  in  which 
troops  began  to  accumulate.  Every  port,  great 
and  small,  was  fortified,  improved,  and  filled 
with  pontoons  and  gunboats.  Hundreds  of 
gun  vessels  and  numerous  light  cruisers  were 
collected  to  engage  the  British  ships  that 
scoured  the  Channel. 

But  it  was  useless  to  venture  troops  in  light 
transports  to  cross  the  Channel  while  the 
British  fleet  held  command  of  the  sea;  nor 
did  Napoleon  seriously  contemplate  doing  so. 
He  planned  a  gigantic  naval  campaign  that 
was  to  give  him  control  of  the  Channel.  His 
plan  changed  in  details  almost  from  day  to 
day,  but  in  broad  outline,  as  it  came  nearest 
execution,  it  was  as  follows. 

There  were  at  that  time  several  French 
squadrons  of  which  the  two  largest  were 
stationed  at  Brest  and  Toulon.  Between  these 
two  ports,  following  the  coastline  of  France 


DUG  D’ENGHIEN  fc?  TRAFALGAR  115 

and  of  Spain  her  ally,  were  several  others,  such 
as  Rochefort,  Ferrol,  Cadiz,  and  Cartagena, 
where  smaller  divisions  were  stationed.  But 
the  Brest  fleet  was  closely  blockaded  by  Lord 
Cornwallis,  and  that  at  Toulon  was  watched 
by  Lord  Nelson.  At  every  point,  as  the  fleets 
were  distributed,  the  British  were  practically 
assured  of  success.  To  neutralize  this  advan¬ 
tage,  to  delude  the  British  admirals,  to  con¬ 
centrate  the  greatest  possible  force  on  the 
decisive  point,  Napoleon  worked  out  a  scheme 
of  which  we  will  now  follow  the  unfolding. 
Admiral  Villeneuve,  commanding  the  Toulon 
fleet,  in  obedience  to  instructions,  took  advan¬ 
tage  of  a  favouring  slant  of  wind  to  make  his 
escape  from  that  port  in  the  spring  of  1805. 
He  sailed  through  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar,  and 
thence  nearly  due  west.  Nelson  was  quickly 
on  his  track  and  followed  out  into  the  Atlantic. 
The  British  admiral  soon  learned  that  his 
adversary  was  sailing  west,  and  concluding  that 
his  business  was  in  the  West  Indian  Islands, 
determined  to  cross  the  Atlantic  in  pursuit. 

But  Villeneuve’s  real  objective  was  not  the 
West  Indies;  his  long  journey  of  three  thou¬ 
sand  miles  was  only  intended  to  deceive  and 
distract  the  eye  from  the  real  point  of  danger. 
Had  Nelson’s  instinct  been  as  keen  as  Napo- 


NAPOLEON 


1 1 6 

leon’s  plan  was  large,  he  would  have  sailed 
from  Gibraltar  not  for  the  West  Indies,  but 
for  the  mouth  of  the  Channel,  for  there  was 
the  vital  point.  As  it  was  he  sailed  west,  and 
having  reached  the  West  Indies  discovered 
that  Villeneuve,  after  a  stay  of  a  few  days  only, 
had  put  to  sea  again,  this  time  steering  east. 
Once  more  Nelson  pursued,  but  once  more  he 
failed  to  see  the  bearing  of  Villeneuve’s  extraor¬ 
dinary  movement  and  did  not  shape  his  course 
for  the  Channel,  but  sailed  back  towards  the 
Mediterranean.  The  intention  of  Napoleon 
was  that  the  fleet  should  make  land  at  Ferrol, 
free  the  small  squadron  there,  and  thence  sail  to 
Rochefort  and  Brest.  At  that  point  he  hoped 
that  the  superiority  of  his  combined  fleets 
would  enable  them  to  owerpower  Cornwallis 
and  sweep  up  the  Channel.  It  would  have 
taken  a  stronger  man  than  Villeneuve  to  carry 
out  this  great  plan  successfully.  He  fought 
an  indecisive  action  with  a  smaller  English 
fleet  under  Calder  off  Ferrol,  on  the  2 2d  of 
July,  and  then  decided  he  could  not  reach 
Brest,  eventually  retiring  to  Cadiz. 

Other  events  had  meanwhile  put  an  end  to 
Napoleon’s  project  of  an  invasion  of  England, 
but  before  relating  those  events,  the  fate  of 
Villeneuve’s  fleet  must  be  briefly  told.  The 


l 


DUC  D’ENGHIEN  £sf  TRAFALGAR  1 17 

Emperor  was  indignant  at  what  he  considered 
his  admiral’s  pusillanimity.  Villeneuve,  to  fore¬ 
stall  his  removal  from  command,  determined 
to  take  his  fleet  out  of  Cadiz  and  fight  at  any 
cost.  On  the  21st  of  October  1805,  he  met 
Nelson  off  Cape  Trafalgar,  and  was  utterly 
defeated  by  the  superior  skill  of  his  opponent. 
The  Franco-Spanish  fleet  was  nearly  entirely 
destroyed,  but  England’s  greatest  admiral  paid 
for  victory  with  his  life. 


CHRONOLOGY 


Sept., 

1800. 

British  capture  Malta. 

Aug., 

1801. 

British  capture  Egypt. 

1  Oct., 

U 

Peace  preliminaries,  France  and  Great 
Britain. 

Jan., 

1802. 

Bonaparte  President  of  Cisalpine  Re¬ 
public. 

27  May, 

(( 

Treaty  of  Amiens. 

1  Aug., 

u 

Bonaparte  consul  for  life. 

12  May, 

1803. 

Renewal  of  war  with  England. 

20  March, 

1804. 

Due  d’Enghien  shot. 

18  May, 

(< 

Proclamation  of  Empire. 

2  Dec., 

(C 

Coronation  of  Napoleon. 

21  Oct., 

1805. 

Trafalgar. 

NOTE 


Bibliographical  :  General.  —  See  page  1 1 . 

For  the  expedition  to  San  Domingo  see  H.  Adams, 
Historical  Essays,  New  York,  1891.  For  relations  of 


1 1 8 


NAPOLEON 


France  and  Great  Britain  see  Browning,  England  and 
Napoleon  in  1803,  London,  1887  ;  Desbri^re,  Projets  et 
tentatives  de  debarquement,  Paris,  1902  ;  Jurien  de  la 
Graviere,  Guerres  maritimes,  Paris,  1864;  Mahan,  In¬ 
fluence  of  Sea  Power,  London,  1892  ;  for  conspiracies 
against  Napoleon,  see  Guillon,  Complots  Militaires,  Paris, 
1894 ;  on  the  last  subject  and  on  the  intrigues  and  life  of 
the  consular  court  in  general  the  following  memoirs  may 
also  be  consulted :  Bourrienne,  Duchesse  d’Abrantes, 
Le  Normand;  also  several  works  by  Tlrquan,  though 
these  are  not  altogether  recommendable.  The  CEuvrcs 
of  Roederer  and  Correspondence  of  Joseph  Bonaparte 
are  of  the  highest  importance  but  too  voluminous  for  the 
ordinary  reader.  Rose  is  of  special  value  on  the  relations 
between  France  and  England. 

See  also  Broadley  and  Wheeler,  The  Invasion  of 
England,  London,  1908  (contemporary  illustrations)  ; 
Coquelle,  Napoleon  et  VAngleterre,  Paris,  1905. 


CHAPTER  IX 


AUSTERLITZ 

Ulm  —  A  Proclamation  of  Napoleon  — -  Occupation  of  Vienna 
—  Austerlitz — Peace  of  Pressburg. 

THE  threat  of  invasion  had  created  the 
most  profound  alarm  in  England,  and 
British  diplomacy  had  exerted  itself 
to  the  utmost  to  provoke  a  continental  war 
that  should  draw  Napoleon’s  great  army  away 
from  its  camps  on  the  coasts  of  the  Channel. 
In  this  it  was  successful,  for  in  the  autumn 
of  1805,  Austria  and  Russia,  having  previously 
entered  into  a  treaty  with  Great  Britain,  began 
moving  their  armies  towards  the  French  fron¬ 
tiers.  War  had  long  been  foreseen.  The  grow¬ 
ing  strength  of  France,  the  brutally  asserted 
ambition  of  the  new  made  Emperor,  the  losses 
and  humiliations  suffered  by  Austria  in  two 
previous  wars,  all  tended  to  bring  about  this  re¬ 
sult.  Napoleon  had  long  been  preparing  for 
it.  He  abandoned  without  hesitation  his  camps 
along  the  ocean  and  began  transferring  the 
army  thence  to  the  heart  of  Germany.  The 


120 


NAPOLEON 


march  began  on  the  27th  of  August;  it  was  of 
some  five  hundred  miles  ;  on  the  14th  of  Octo¬ 
ber  Munich,  the  capital  of  Bavaria,  was  occu¬ 
pied  ;  a  week  later  the  first  Austrian  army  had 
been  virtually  destroyed. 

General  Mack,  the  Austrian  commander,  had 
invaded  Bavaria  in  September  and  thence  ad¬ 
vanced  towards  the  Rhine,  eventually  occupy¬ 
ing  a  position  at  Ulm  facing  the  Black  Forest. 
He  expected  that  the  French  would  advance 
from  some  point  between  Basle  and  Mayence 
and  appear  in  this  direction.  Napoleon  did 
everything  possible  to  lull  Mack  into  security. 
He  proceeded  in  person  to  Paris,  handed  over 
the  command  of  the  army  to  Murat,  and  osten¬ 
tatiously  sent  him  to  Strasbourg.  He  moved 
large  detachments  of  dragoons  and  light  cavalry 
into  the  duchy  of  Baden  and  into  the  Black 
Forest,  simulating  a  screen  behind  which  the 
army  was  concentrating.  Later,  when  it  be¬ 
came  necessary  for  him  to  leave  for  the  front, 
public  attention  was  again  called  to  Strasbourg 
by  the  imperial  baggage  taking  this  route  and  by 
the  Emperor’s  also  following  it.  While  these 
demonstrations  were  keeping  Mack  motionless 
at  Ulm  anxiously  watching  the  debouches  of 
the  Black  Forest,  the  seven  French  army  corps, 
starting  from  a  base  that  stretched  from  Bou- 


AUSTERLITZ 


I  2  I 


logne  to  Hanover,  were  sweeping  to  the  north¬ 
west  of  Mack  through  Mayence,  Coblentz,  and 
Cassel,  circling  around  his  right  wing,  and 
finally  sweeping  down  from  the  north  on  to  the 
valley  of  the  Danube  in  his  rear.  It  was  a 
repetition  of  the  strategy  of  Marengo,  and  the 
Austrians  were  half  beaten  before  a  shot  was 
fired. 

The  fighting  that  followed  was  desultory. 
Isolated  Austrian  divisions  tried  to  force  their 
way  through  and  escape,  but  were  in  nearly 
every  case  overpowered,  defeated,  or  captured. 
Mack  himself,  with  twenty  thousand  men,  sur¬ 
rendered  at  Ulm  on  the  20th  of  October.  The 
events  of  the  campaign  were  summed  up  with 
some  exaggeration  in  one  of  Napoleon’s  bul¬ 
letins.  It  will  serve  to  illustrate  his  history 
and  character  to  give  the  text  of  one  of  these 
documents ;  the  one  that  follows  is  that  which 
records  the  downfall  of  Mack. 

Soldiers  of  the  Grande  Armtfe  : 

In  fifteen  days  we  have  finished  a  campaign.  Our 
intentions  have  been  carried  out:  we  have  driven  the 
troops  of  the  House  of  Austria  from  Bavaria  and  re¬ 
established  our  ally  on  his  throne. 

This  army,  that  had  so  ostentatiously  and  impru¬ 
dently  placed  itself  on  our  borders,  is  now  destroyed. 

But  what  cares  England  for  that !  Her  object  is 


122 


NAPOLEON 


gained :  we  are  no  longer  at  Boulogne  and  her  sub¬ 
sidies  will  be  neither  diminished  nor  increased. 

Of  the  hundred  thousand  men  who  made  up  this 
army,  sixty  thousand  are  prisoners :  they  will  fill  the 
places  of  our  conscripts  in  the  labours  of  the  field. 

Two  hundred  guns,  the  whole  train,  ninety  colours, 
all  their  generals  are  ours.  Only  fifteen  thousand 
men  have  escaped. 

Soldiers!  I  had  prepared  you  for  a  great  battle; 
but,  thanks  to  the  bad  manoeuvres  of  the  enemy,  I  have 
reached  equal  results  without  taking  any  risk ;  and,  — 
unprecedented  event  in  the  history  of  nations,  —  this 
result  has  been  gained  at  an  expense  of  less  than  fif¬ 
teen  hundred  men  out  of  action. 

Soldiers !  this  success  is  due  to  your  unlimited 
confidence  in  your  Emperor,  to  your  patience  in  sup¬ 
porting  all  kinds  of  fatigue  and  privations,  to  your 
splendid  valour. 

But  we  cannot  rest  yet.  You  are  impatient  for  a 
second  campaign. 

The  Russian  army,  drawn  by  the  gold  of  England 
from  the  furthest  limits  of  the  earth,  must  suffer  the 
same  fate. 

In  this  contest  the  honour  of  the  French  infantry  is 
more  especially  at  stake ;  for  the  second  time  the 
question  must  be  decided,  as  already  once  before  in 
Switzerland  and  in  Holland,  whether  the  French  in¬ 
fantry  is  the  first  or  the  second  in  Europe. 

Among  them  are  no  generals  from  whom  I  have 
any  glory  to  win.  My  whole  anxiety  shall  be  to  ob¬ 
tain  the  victory  with  the  least  effusion  of  blood  pos¬ 
sible:  my  soldiers  are  my  children. 


Napoleon. 


AUSTERLITZ 


123 


Whatever  may  be  thought  of  Napoleon’s 
rhetoric  by  the  reader,  there  is  one  point  that 
must  be  kept  steadily  in  mind :  that  it  produced 
the  results  he  expected.  It  was  designed  to 
inspire  the  morale  of  his  troops,  and  it  suc¬ 
ceeded  in  doing  so.  All  ranks  were  full  of 
confidence  in  the  genius  of  their  great  captain, 
and  the  large  proportion  of  veterans  from  the 
wars  of  the  Republic  steadied  the  dash  of  the 
troops  with  a  leaven  of  solidity  and  skilled 
leadership.  The  victorious  army  with  which 
Napoleon  now  found  himself  in  Bavaria  has 
been  generally  conceded  to  have  been  the  finest 
he  ever  commanded. 

He  now  had  the  following  military  problem 
to  face.  Some  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
or  more  due  east,  down  the  valley  of  the 
Danube,  lay  Vienna.  Between  him  and  the 
capital,  and  to  the  northeast  in  Bohemia,  were 
various  Austrian  and  Russian  corps,  large  in 
the  aggregate  but  not  yet  concentrated.  To 
the  southeast  the  Archduke  Charles  was  re¬ 
tiring  towards  the  Austrian  capital  from  Italy, 
followed  by  Marshal  Massena  with  a  large 
army.  A  less  bold  general  than  Napoleon 
would  probably  have  given  his  enemies  enough 
time  to  concentrate  in  front  of  Vienna,  but 
the  Emperor  waited  not  one  day  and  urged 


124 


NAPOLEON 


his  columns  rapidly  down  the  valley  of  the 
Danube.  There  was  no  serious  resistance 
offered,  and  on  the  31st  of  October  the  French 
cavalry  under  Murat  reached  the  Austrian 
capital.  Only  eleven  days  had  passed  since 
the  capitulation  of  Ulm  three  hundred  miles 
away.1  From  Vienna  the  French  marched 
northwards  towards  Moravia, where  the  Emperor 
Francis  and  the  Czar  Alexander  had  now  as¬ 
sembled  a  large  army.  Napoleon  hoped  for 
a  decisive  battle,  and  his  opponents  gratified 
his  desire  by  advancing  to  meet  him. 

The  position  of  Napoleon,  in  spite  of  his 
great  success  at  Ulm,  was  in  reality  very  criti¬ 
cal.  The  internal  affairs  of  France  were  dis¬ 
quieting  chiefly  owing  to  a  grave  financial 
crisis,  but  what  was  perhaps  more  important, 
the  military  situation  was  far  from  sound.  The 
French  army  was  now  four  hundred  miles  or 
more  from  its  base  and  much  weakened  by 
detachments.  The  line  of  communications 
ran  through  southern  Germany,  of  which  the 
States  professed  amicable  sentiments;  but  to 
the  north  Prussia  was  avowedly  on  .the  point 
of  declaring  war  and  had  concentrated  a  large 
army  under  Marshal  Mollendorf.  It  was  evi- 

1  A  large  part  of  the  French  army  was  at  Munich  and  be¬ 
yond  when  Ulm  capitulated. 


Austerlitz 


AUSTERLITZ 


I25 


dently  the  policy  of  Russia  and  Austria  to 
keep  Napoleon’s  army  employed  in  Moravia 
without  cominq-  to  battle  until  the  action  of 
Prussia  could  take  effect  on  his  line  of  com¬ 
munications.  But  the  impetuosity  of  the  young 
Czar  and  of  his  advisers  threw  counsels  of 
prudence  to  the  winds  and  led  him  into  the 
very  course  Napoleon  hoped  he  would  adopt. 

For  several  days  the  Emperor  slowly  retired 
before  the  advancing  allies,  having  selected  a 
position  near  Austerlitz  from  which  he  ex¬ 
pected  to  derive  great  advantage.  The  French 
army  took  station  there  on  the  night  of  the 
ist  of  December,  Kutusofif  with  the  two  allied 
Emperors  disposing  his  troops  on  the  rising 
ground  opposite.  Napoleon’s  left  was  solidly 
established  on  a  hill  named  the  Santon  that 
had  been  well  intrenched.  His  centre  was 
strongly  placed  on  ground  that  was  not  likely 
to  tempt  the  enemy  to  a  decisive  attack;  but 
the  right  was  far  otherwise  situated.  It  was 
drawn  up  on  flat  and  unfavourable  ground  and 
appeared  to  the  Russians  weak  in  numbers 
and  exposed.  The  command  of  this  wing  was 
given  to  the  dogged  Davoust,  whose  orders 
were  to  hold  on  to  his  position  as  long  as 
possible,  while  at  another  point  the  Emperor 
was  deciding  the  fortune  of  the  day.  Davoust’s 


1 26 


NAPOLEON 


wing  was  in  reality  far  better  placed  than  it 
appeared  to  be,  and  he  had  strong  defensive 
positions  on  which  to  fall  back  protected  by 
water  and  swampy  ground.  Having  thus 
placed  his  right  wing  as  a  bait  to  the  enemy, 
Napoleon  crowded  the  corps  of  Soult,  of  Berna- 
dotte,  of  Oudinot,  and  the  Imperial  Guard  out 
of  sight  behind  some  buildings  and  rising: 
ground  in  his  centre;  with  these  troops  he 
proposed  dealing  the  decisive  stroke. 

Kutusoff  arrived  in  front  of  the  French 
position  on  the  1st  of  December.  He  had  an 
army  of  some  eighty-five  thousand  men  and 
estimated  his  enemy  at  about  fifty  thousand; 
in  this  he  was  wrong,  for  Napoleon  had  brought 
in  several  detachments  by  forced  marches  and 
had  raised  his  numbers  to  about  sixty-five  thou¬ 
sand.  The  Russian  general-in-chief  decided 
to  attack  the  weak  French  wing  and  thus  to 
possess  himself  of  the  road  to  Vienna  that  lay 
behind  it;  he  made  his  intention  clear  on  the 
afternoon  before  the  battle  by  moving  troops 
from  the  strong  plateau  of  Pratzen  in  his  cen¬ 
tre  down  towards  the  hollow  occupied  by 
Davoust.  From  the  moment  Napoleon  ob¬ 
served  these  movements  he  looked  on  the 
coming  battle  as  already  won. 

On  the  night  before  the  battle  occurred  an 


AUSTERLITZ 


127 


incident  that  shows  with  what  feelings  the 
first  army  of  the  Empire  viewed  its  leader. 
Napoleon  proceeded  on  foot  to  visit  the  out¬ 
posts  and  observe  the  enemy.  His  short 
figure,  grey  coat,  and  little  cocked  hat,  were 
recognised  by  some  grenadiers,  who  raised 
shouts  of  Vive  1' Empereur !  reminding  him 
that  the  2d  of  December  was  the  anniversary 
of  the  coronation.  From  man  to  man  the 
enthusiasm  spread,  and  soon  all  the  long  lines 
of  the  bivouac  were  up  and  an  improvised 
illumination  of  twisted  straw  whisps  burst 
out;  it  astonished  the  Russian  camps  as  much 
as  it  gratified  the  heart  of  Napoleon. 

At  the  earliest  dawn  the  two  armies  were  in 
their  positions  for  battle,  and  just  as  the  first 
shots  were  fired  the  sun  burst  through  the 
heavy  winter  mist.  Soon  the  two  lines  were 
engaged,  the  Austro-Russians  pressing  hotly 
on  the  French  right.  Davoust  disputed  the 
ground  fiercely,  but  was  slowly  forced  back, 
a  great  part  of  the  enemy  descending  from  the 
heights  at  Pratzen  and  extending  into  the  low 
land  out  beyond  the  French  centre.  At  last 
Napoleon  gave  the  signal,  staff  officers  dashed 
off  in  every  direction,  and  from  behind  the 
ridge  that  concealed  them  the  dense  columns 
of  Bernadotte  and  Soult  marched  forward  on 


128 


NAPOLEON 


the  Russian  centre  and  climbed  the  heights; 
Oudinot  with  the  grenadiers  and  part  of  the 
Imperial  Guard  followed  in  support.  Kutusoff 
was  unprepared  for  such  an  attack,  his  centre 
was  strong  by  nature  but  was  now  denuded  of 
troops,  and  the  Pratzen  was  soon  in  the  hands 
of  the  French.  To  regain  this  position  was 
essential,  for,  with  Napoleon  there,  the  allies 
were  completely  cut  in  two.  The  only  avail¬ 
able  reserve  was  the  Russian  Imperial  Guard, 
and  this  was  sent  in.  Fierce  fighting  followed, 
but  the  French  were  not  to  be  dislodged,  and 
the  severed  right  of  Kutusoff  rolled  back  de- 
feated.  In  the  meanwhile  Davoust  was  still 
hotly  engaged  with  the  other  wing,  but  help 
was  coming.  From  the  heights  of  Pratzen 
long  lines  of  French  guns  were  now  playing 
on  the  rear  of  the  Russian  left,  while  Davoust 
still  kept  up  the  fight  in  front.  Thus  cut  off 
and  surrounded  there  was  nothing  left  but 
retreat.  The  flat  ground,  cut  with  streams  and 
ponds,  was  bad  for  this  purpose,  and  many 
of  the  fugitives  who  attempted  to  cross  the 
frozen  lake  of  Sastchan  broke  through  the 
ice.  Probably  several  thousand  were  thus 
drowned.1 

The  battle  cost  the  allies  a  loss  of  thirty-five 
thousand  men  and  two  hundred  guns,  while  the 

1  Recent  investigation  shows  that  this  was  not  so. 


AUSTERLITZ 


129 


French  reserves  were  not  even  brought  into 
action  and  their  loss  was  probably  not  more  than 
five  thousand  men.  Two  days  later  the  Em¬ 
peror  Francis  met  Napoleon  at  the  outposts, 
and  agreed  to  an  armistice  as  a  preliminary  of 
peace. 


CHRONOLOGY 


27  Aug.,  1805. 
14  Oct.,  “ 

20  u  (i 


31  “  “ 

2  Dec.,  “ 
26  “  “ 


Gra?ute  Armcc  leaves  Channel  camps. 
Munich  occupied. 

Surrender  of  Mack  at  Ulm. 

Vienna  occupied. 

Austerlitz. 

Peace  of  Pressburg. 


NOTE 

Bibliographical  :  General.  —  See  page  1 1 . 

In  the  foregoing  and  the  succeeding  chapter  the  military 
operations  of  Napoleon  are  taken  consecutively  from  Ulm 
to  Friedland.  Political  matters  are  left  over  for  general 
consideration  with  the  treaty  of  Tilsit.  For  Ulm  and 
Austerlitz,  see  Schonhals,  Der  Krieg,  '05,  Vienna,  1874; 
Stutterheim,  Bataille  d' Austerlitz,  Hamburg,  1805  (and 
numerous  other  editions). 


9 


CHAPTER  X 


JENA  AND  FRIEDLAND 


War  with  Prussia  —  Jena  —  Murat’s  March  to  Lubeck  —  Eylau 
—  Friedland. 


O  present  a  clear  impression  it  will  be 


better  to  follow  the  first  great  cycle  of 


wars  to  its  conclusion,  postponing  till 


its  termination  a  consideration  of  the  political 
events  and  changes  that  accompanied  it. 

A  peace  between  France  and  Austria  quickly 
followed  Austerlitz,  and  after  the  treaty,  signed 
at  Pressburg  on  the  26th  of  December,  the 
French  troops  gradually  evacuated  Austrian 
territory.  But  instead  of  being  brought  back 
to  the  English  Channel  the  corps  of  the  Grande 
Armee  remained  for  the  most  part  quartered 
in  the  South  German  States  that  were  on 
friendly  terms  with  Napoleon.  The  reason  of 
this  was  that  the  downfall  of  Austria  had  settled 
nothing;  Russia  was  still  threatening;  war  with 
Prussia  had  long  appeared  probable.  Hanover, 
which  Napoleon  had  seized  immediately  after  his 
rupture  with  England,  was  dangled  as  a  bait  be¬ 
fore  King  Frederick  William’s  eyes,  while  the 


JENA  AND  FRIEDLAND  13 1 


Emperor  pressed  on  him  an  anti-British  commer¬ 
cial  policy.  Diplomatic  bickering  proceeded 
through  the  summer  of  1806,  and  on  the  1st 
of  October  the  Prussian  Ambassador  at  Paris 
presented  a  series  of  demands,  including  one 
for  the  withdrawal  of  the  French  troops  from 
southern  Germany,  that  brought  matters  to  a 
crisis.  The  demands  of  Prussia  were  rejected 
by  Napoleon,  who  was  already  in  the  midst  of 
his  troops. 

Once  more,  as  at  Ulm,  the  Emperor  repeated 
the  strategic  manoeuvre  of  Marengo.  To  under¬ 
stand  what  took  place  a  glance  at  the  map  is 
necessary.  From  the  French  frontier  to  the 
capital  of  Prussia  ran  perhaps  the  most  impor¬ 
tant  road  in  all  Germany,  one  that  was  to  figure 
conspicuously  in  the  history  of  Napoleon;  it 
led  northeast  from  Mayence  on  the  Rhine, 
through  Erfurt  and  Leipzig  to  Berlin.  Mid¬ 
way  between  the  two  latter  places  it  crossed 
at  right  angles  the  river  Elbe,  which  was  de¬ 
fended  by  several  large  fortresses.  This  road 
described  what  was  practically  a  straight  line 
between  Paris  and  Berlin  and  appeared  to 
be  the  necessary  scene  of  the  campaign  now 
about  to  open. 

But  the  Prussian  generals  had  not  yet  learned 
the  methods  of  Napoleon.  Their  army,  of 


132 


NAPOLEON 


which  the  highest  ranks  were  filled  by  veterans 
trained  under  the  eye  of  the  great  Frederick, 
was  confident  in  its  machine-like  precision,  was 
inspired  to  martial  ardour  by  the  influence  of 
the  patriotic  Queen  Louisa  and  the  Princes  of 
the  royal  House.  Young  officers  had  whetted 
their  swords  on  the  stone  steps  of  the  French 
embassy  in  Berlin,  and  the  whole  army  was 
animated  by  hatred  of  France  and  a  blind  con¬ 
fidence  in  its  superiority.  But  the  aged  Duke 
of  Brunswick,  who  was  in  command,  fell  into 
error.  The  Prussian  divisions  were  marched 
beyond  the  Elbe  and  thence  slowly  advanced 
in  a  great  semicircle  stretching  out  on  either 
side  of  the  Mayence  road.  On  the  5th  of 
October  headquarters  were  at  Erfurt,  and  the 
one  hundred  and  ten  thousand  men  of  the 
Prussian  army  presented  a  front  of  about  ninety 
miles  between  Cassel  and  Rudolstadt,  watching 
the  Thuringian  forest  for  a  first  glimpse  of 
the  enemy. 

Meanwhile  what  had  Napoleon  been  doing? 
Aiming,  as  always,  at  dealing  a  decisive  blow, 
he  rapidly  moved  the  corps  that  were  protecting 
the  French  frontier,  not  along  the  Mayence- 
Berlin  line,  but  to  the  eastward  through  Wur- 
temberg  and  Bavaria,  where  they  joined  the 
troops  already  stationed  close  to  the  Austrian 


y 


JENA  AND  FRIEDLAND  133 

border.  The  army,  numbering  about  one  hun¬ 
dred  and  ninety  thousand  men,  was  strongly  con¬ 
centrated  about  Bamberg,  and  thence  marched 
north  and  slightly  east  towards  the  corner  of 
Bavaria,  Saxony,  and  Bohemia.  On  the  5th 
of  October  the  front  of  the  French  army,  cover¬ 
ing  not  more  than  thirty-five  miles,  was  between 
Coburg  and  Hof,  and  Napoleon,  who  already 
shrewdly  suspected  the  approximate  position 
of  the  Prussians,  declared  that  if  he  could  march 
unimpeded  a  few  days  more,  he  would  be  in 
Berlin  first. 

The  French  pressed  on  by  long  days’ 
marches,  and  a  week  later  the  outposts  of  the 
two  armies  were  in  touch  not  far  from  Saal- 
feld ;  the  French  extreme  left  had  come  into 
contact  with  the  extreme  left  of  the  Prussians ; 
the  French  were  rapidly  marching  north,  the 
Prussians  slowly  south-west.  Napoleon’s  object 
was  now  to  swing  about  towards  his  left  so  as 
to  get  across  the  great  road  in  the  rear  of  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick.  This  manoeuvre  was  suc¬ 
cessfully  carried  out,  the  French  corps  getting 
into  a  line  roughly  indicated  by  Saalfeld,  Jena, 
and  Naumburg,  the  main  strength  constantly 
tending  northwards  and  towards  the  Elbe. 

When  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  discovered 
that  the  French  army  had  completely  turned 


l3  4 


NAPOLEON 


his  left  flank  and  was  rapidly  moving  towards 
his  line  of  communications,  he  issued  orders 
for  a  general  movement  eastwards  in  hones  of 
being  able  to  retreat  towards  the  line  of  the 
Elbe  through  Jena  and  Naumburg;  but  he 
was  just  a  few  hours  too  late  and  was  com¬ 
pelled  to  fight  with  his  enemy  between  him 
and  his  line  of  retreat.  On  the  14th  of  Octo¬ 
ber  were  fought  two  battles  within  a  few  miles, 
at  Jena  and  at  Auerstadt.  At  Auerstadt 
Davoust  with  inferior  numbers  held  his  posi¬ 
tion  all  day  and  prevented  the  passage  of  the 
King  of  Prussia  and  the  Duke  of  Brunswick. 
At  Jena  with  superior  numbers  Napoleon 
utterly  crushed  Hohenlohe.  The  Prussian 
infantry  fought  well  until  beaten,  then  the 
French  cavalry  rode  them  down  with  ease. 
The  pursuit  of  the  defeated  army  by  Murat 
was  of  an  extraordinary  character;  he  all  but 
literally  galloped  from  Jena  to  Lubeck,  on  the 
Baltic  Sea,  in  three  weeks.  With  the  corps 
of  Lannes,  Soult,  and  Bernadotte,  together  with 
a  large  division  of  cavalry,  he  swept  up  the 
remains  of  the  Prussian  army,  and  captured  all 
the  fortresses  he  passed.  Blucher  with  twenty 
thousand  men  was  the  last  to  hold  out,  sur¬ 
rendering,  after  Murat  had  stormed  Lubeck, 
on  the  7th  of  November.  In  the  meanwhile 

\ 


JENA  AND  FRIEDLAND  135 

Napoleon  with  the  other  half  of  the  army  had 
pressed  on  to  Berlin,  which  he  occupied  on 
the  27th  of  October. 

This  was  the  most  decisive  and  brilliant  in 
its  results  of  all  the  campaigns  of  Napoleon; 
but  the  uncertainty  of  war,  the  fickleness  of 
fortune,  were  demonstrated  by  the  course  of 
that  which  was  immediately  to  follow. 

Russia  was  now  as  anxious  to  support  Prus¬ 
sia  against  France  as  she  had  been  to  support 
Austria.  But  once  more  the  allies  had  gone 
in  singly  and  paid  the  consequences.  By  the 
time  that  Napoleon  had  destroyed  the  army 
of  Prussia  and  occupied  her  capital  with  the 
greater  part  of  her  territory,  the  Russian  corps 
were  barely  across  the  frontier.  Napoleon 
decided  not  to  await  them  but  to  march,  even 
to  Poland  if  necessary,  and  there  dispose  of 
these  last  enemies. 

During  two  months  following  Jena,  French 
columns  were  marching  steadily  north  and 
east  from  prosperous  and  rich  central  Germany 
towards  the  desolate  plains  of  eastern  Prussia 
and  Poland.  Napoleon,  so  as  to  utilize  the 
political  sentiments  of  the  Poles  now  in  hopes 
of  recovering  their  lost  independence,  deter¬ 
mined  to  base  himself  on  the  line  of  the  Vistula 
and  to  place  his  headquarters  at  Warsaw. 


NAPOLEON 


136 

The  Russian  commander,  Bennigsen,  anxious 
to  support  the  Prussians,  moved  into  the  coast 
provinces,  covering  Konigsberg  and  operating 
towards  Dantzig.  These  two  fortresses  with 
a  small  body  of  troops  now  represented  all  that 
remained  of  the  Prussian  power. 

On  the  25th  of  December  a  partial  engage¬ 
ment  between  the  two  armies  took  place  at 
Pultusk  in  which  the  losses  were  heavy  and 
the  results  indecisive.  Then  Napoleon  and 
Bennigsen  both  went  into  winter  quarters  until 
early  in  February  1807,  when  the  latter  de¬ 
termined  to  make  an  attempt  to  crush  Berna- 
dotte’s  corps  before  it  could  be  assisted  by  the 
others.  In  this  he  failed ;  Napoleon,  rapidly 
concentrating,  hoped  in  turn  to  deal  a  heavy 
blow  at  his  antagonist.  But  the  success  of 
great  military  operations  often  depends  on  the 
most  trifling  details.  A  staff  officer  conveying 
dispatches  to  Marshal  Bernadotte  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Cossacks,  and  Bennigsen  thus 
became  informed  of  Napoleon’s  plans.  He 
promptly  moved  his  army  to  safer  positions  and 
finally  stood  his  ground  and  offered  battle  near 
the  little  village  of  Eylau.  There  on  the  8th 
of  February  was  fought  one  of  the  most  bloody 
battles  of  the  Empire.  A  raging  snow  storm 
impeded  the  first  movements  of  the  French ; 


JENA  AND  FRIEDLAND  137 

Marshal  Augereau’s  corps  lost  its  direction,  ad¬ 
vanced  to  the  attack  diagonally,  and  was  sur¬ 
rounded  and  annihilated  by  the  Russians.  A 
great  gap  was  opened  in  the  French  line  at 
Eylau,  and  Bennigsen  sent  forward  his  infantry 
to  pierce  it.  Napoleon  and  his  staff  appeared  in 
the  greatest  danger,  but  a  few  battalions  of  the 
Guard  held  their  ground  with  grim  desperation, 
and  the  Emperor,  calm  and  unmoved,  declined 
to  change  his  position.  It  was  necessary  to 
relieve  the  pressure  on  the  French  centre  at  any 
cost  and  thus  gain  time  to ‘bring  fresh  troops 
up,  so  Murat  was  ordered  to  collect  all  the 
available  cavalry  and  advance  on  the  Russian 
centre.  Seventy  squadrons  of  dragoons  and 
cuirassiers,  lancers  and  chasseurs,  about  ten 
thousand  men,  then  followed  that  most  brilliant 
of  cavalry  leaders  through  the  whirls  of  snow 
straight  for  the  Russian  line.  This  remarkable 
charge  of  cavalry  was  carried  a  distance  of 
nearly  three  thousand  yards  before  it  was  spent ; 
it  swept  everything  in  its  front,  pierced  com¬ 
pletely  through  the  Russian  centre,  and  gave 
Napoleon  the  relief  he  so  urgently  needed. 
From  then  on  to  dusk  the  battle  was  fought 
with  dogged  obstinacy  on  both  sides,  the  French 
making  but  little  progress.  At  night  each 
army  and  each  commander  was  beaten,  thirty 


138 


NAPOLEON 


thousand  dead  men,  four  thousand  dead  horses 
lay  between  them. 

Napoleon  and  Bennigsen  both  made  prepara¬ 
tions  for  retreat,  but  the  former  guessed  his  op¬ 
ponent’s  intentions  in  time,  countermanded  his 
first  orders,  occupied  the  Russian  positions 
next  morning,  and  claimed  Eylau  as  a  victory. 
But  the  French  army  and  all  Europe  realized 
that  the  victory  was  purely  technical,  and  that 
Bennigsen  had  come  very  near  defeating  the 
invincible  conqueror.  Was  the  spell  broken  ? 
All  through  Germany,  in  Austria,  and  in  the 
remotest  parts  of  Italy,  the  opponents  of  Na¬ 
poleon  drew  breath  and  declared  his  fall  was 
near.  He,  meanwhile,  retired  to  winter  quar¬ 
ters  once  more,  and  called  up  from  every  cor¬ 
ner  of  the  Empire  fresh  contingents  of  men 
to  stop  the  enormous  gaps  made  in  his  ranks; 
one  of  Napoleon’s  favourite  theories  was  that 
numbers  constituted  the  essential  factor  of 
success. 

It  was  not  till  June  that  the  armies  could  be 
once  more  got  into  motion  in  a  country  where 
the  spring  comes  so  late  as  in  Prussian  Poland. 
The  new  campaign  opened  badly  for  the  French, 
as  Bennigsen  held  his  ground  successfully  in  a 
partial  engagement  at  Heilsberg.  Manoeuvring 
followed,  and  at  last  an  opportunity  arose  of 


JENA  AND  FRIEDLAND  139 

which  Napoleon  took  full  advantage.  Bennig- 
sen  marched  down  the  right  bank  of  the  Alle 
towards  Konigsberg,  which  one  half  of  the 
French  army,  under  Murat,  was  threatening. 
At  Friedland  he  sent  a  detachment  to  the 
further  bank  to  occupy  that  town.  A  French 
corps,  that  of  Fannes,  deployed  against  the 
town  and  engaged  the  Russians.  Bennigsen 
sent  over  more  troops  in  support,  and  seeing 
no  sign  of  French  reinforcements  came  to  the 
hasty  conclusion  that  he  had  only  Fannes’ 
corps  to  deal  with.  He  accordingly  decided  to 
cross  the  river  in  strength  and  crush  this  iso¬ 
lated  opponent.  But  behind  Lannes,  in  the 
wooded  semicircle  of  hills  that  nearly  surround 
Friedland,  the  Emperor,  Oudinot,  Ney,  Victor, 
Mortier,  and  the  Guard  were  hurrying  on. 
Napoleon  watched  the  Russian  movements  un¬ 
til  he  judged  that  Bennigsen  had  gone  too  far 
to  withdraw,  and  then  the  whole  army  advanced 
to  Lannes’  support.  The  Russians  were  out¬ 
numbered  nearly  two  to  one  and  were  in  a 
wretched  position  to  fight,  massed  in  a  con¬ 
tracted  space  where  the  converging  fire  of  the 
French  artillery  could  not  fail  to  cause  havoc, 
and  with  a  river  behind  them.  Bennigsen  was 
utterly  defeated  with  heavy  loss,  and  retreated 
with  his  shattered  army  to  the  Russian  from 


140 


NAPOLEON 


tier.  Napoleon  pursued  and  a  few  days  later 
reached  the  little  river  Niemen,  boundary  of 
Prussia  and  Russia.  At  this  point  he  received 
overtures  for  peace  from  the  Czar  Alexander, 
which  he  accepted,  and  it  was  agreed  that  the 
two  Emperors  should  meet  in  a  raft  moored  in 
midstream  close  to  the  town  of  Tilsit.  This 
famous  interview,  which  will  be  dealt  with  in 
the  following  chapter,  marks  the  close  of  the 
first  great  cycle  of  the  wars  of  the  Empire, 
that  which  was  marked  by  nearly  unclouded 


success. 

26  Dec.,  1805. 

CHRONOLOGY 

Treaty  of  Pressburg. 

Feb.,  1806. 

Invasion  of  Naples  by  Mass^na. 

March,  “ 

Joseph  Bonaparte  King  of  Naples. 

July, 

British  victory  at  Maida. 

12“  “ 

Confederation  of  the  Rhine  formed. 

x  Oct.,  “ 

War  between  Prussia  and  France. 

14  “ 

Jena  and  Auerstadt. 

27  “  “ 

Napoleon  occupies  Berlin. 

7  Nov.  “ 

Murat  storms  Lubeck. 

8  Feb.,  1807. 

Eylau. 

xo  June,  “ 

Heilsberg. 

14  “ 

Friedland. 

JENA  AND  FRIEDLAND  141 


NOTE 

Bibliographical  :  General.  —  See  page  1 1. 

The  invasion  of  Naples  is  not  dealt  with,  though  it  will 
be  alluded  to  later ;  see  also  Helfert,  Konigin  Karolina, 
Vienna,  1878. 

For  the  preceding  chapter  see,  Foucart,  Campagne  de 
Prusse  ft de  Pologne,  Paris,  1882-87  ;  Von  Lettow-Vorbeck, 
Der  Krieg  von  06-07,  Berlin,  1891-96  ;  Petre,  Napoleon' s 
Campaign  in  Poland,  London,  1901. 


CHAPTER  XI 


NAPOLEONIC  POLICY 
1806-1808 

Napoleon’s  Ambition — Fall  of  the  Germanic  Empire — War 
and  Finance  —  Tilsit  —  Commercial  War  on  England  — 
Copenhagen — Junot  occupies  Lisbon  —  Continental  Policy 
—  Spanish  Intrigue  —  Occupation  of  Madrid — Joseph 
Bonaparte  King  of  Spain. 

IT  is  now  time  to  consider  the  questions  of 
policy  that  underlay  the  wars  we  have  just 
followed,  and  that  soon  drove  Napoleon  to 
new  and  less  fortunate  enterprises.  And  first 
the  personal  element,  the  man,  must  engage 
attention.  His  successes,  his  ambitions,  his 
plans,  were  immoderate ;  they  were  the  result 
of  an  insensate  craving  to  satisfy  the  selfish 
appetites  of  a  gigantic  intellect.  The  good  of 
others  was  with  Napoleon  nothing  more  than 
a  means  for  attaining  some  personal  end,  and 
France  was  rather  the  instrument  than  the 
object  of  his  achievements. 

To  Cromwell  and  to  Washington,  even  in  a 
way  to  Caesar,  their  country  had  been  a  suf¬ 
ficient  world  of  action ;  but  Bonaparte’s  imagi- 

142 


NAPOLEONIC  POLICY  143 

nation  ever  soared  to  fresh  fields  of  conquest 
The  Corsican  lieutenant  of  artillery  had  made 
France  his,  and  now  stretched  his  hand  over 
Europe;  —  had  he  made  Europe  his,  nothing 
can  be  more  certain  than  that  he  would  thence 
have  risen  to  the  conquest  of  Asia  or  America. 
He  was  the  embodiment  of  man  struggling  to 
better  himself  as  conceived  by  Utilitarian  or 
Darwinian  philosophers,  and  the  field  of  am¬ 
bition  in  which  he  strove  for  existence  was 
only  bounded  by  planetary  space.  Nor  was 
his  aggressiveness  veiled,  it  was  the  man  him¬ 
self,  and  came  out  in  all  his  acts.  In  his  bulle¬ 
tins  and  familiar  soldier’s  talk  he  used  the  most 
offensive  language  towards  his  opponents,  spar¬ 
ing  not  even  a  woman  such  as  Queen  Louisa 
of  Prussia.  In  his  diplomatic  encounters  he 
showed  no  greater  generosity.  When  his  op¬ 
ponent  was  down  he  took  from  him  everything 
he  could,  and  even  when  possible,  more  than 
was  bargained  for.  Thus  it  was  after  the  treaty 
of  Pressburg  that  followed  Austerlitz.  By  the 
terms  of  peace  Napoleon  extorted  every  cession  ■ 
of  territory  and  of  money  he  could  ;  yet  he 
took  more  in  the  months  that  followed.  Hav¬ 
ing  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty  increased  the 
South  German  States,  especially  Bavaria,  at  the 
expense  of  Austria,  he  subsequently  proceeded 


1 4-4- 


NAPOLEON 


to  form  a  south  and  west  German  body  which 
he  called  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  and 
took  under  his  Protectorate.  Bavaria  and 
Wurtemberg  which  he  now  raised  to  the  rank 
of  kingdoms,  with  Westphalia  later,  were  the 
principal  among  the  numerous  German  States 
that  either  through  necessity  or  ambition  joined 
the  new  Confederation.  But  these  States  had 
been  component  parts  of  the  Germanic  body  or 
Germanic  Holy  Roman  Empire  of  which  the 
head  was  the  Emperor  Francis  of  Hapsburg- 
Lorraine.  The  Empire  had  long  been  a  weak 
and  tottering  institution,  this  thrust  of  Napoleon 
overthrew  it;  for  the  Emperor  Francis  there¬ 
upon  issued  a  declaration  announcing  the  dis¬ 
solution  of  the  Germanic  Empire  and  his 
assumption  of  the  style  of  Francis  first  heredi¬ 
tary  Emperor  of  Austria. 

There  was  another  feature  of  Napoleon’s 
system  of  politics  that  became  strongly  empha¬ 
sized  immediately  after  Austerlitz:  this  was 
that  he  intended  war  to  be  self-supporting. 
Heretofore  in  European  politics  war  had  been 
an  abnormal  condition  entailing  abnormal  ex¬ 
penditure  on  the  country  waging  it,  with  this 
consequence,  that  on  a  peace,  armaments  were 
reduced.  With  Napoleon  all  this  was  changed. 
After  Austerlitz  the  French  battalions  were 


NAPOLEONIC  POLICY  145 

not  reduced  by  one  man ;  the  army  was  to  its 
master  what  the  tool  is  to  the  craftsman,  and 
he  would  not  admit  of  its  efficiency  being 
diminished. 

At  the  same  time  it  appeared  in  every  way 
contrary  to  Napoleon’s  interests  that  the  abnor¬ 
mal  charge  for  maintaining  this  great  army 
should  be  borne  by  France.  He  consequently 
entered  on  the  policy  of  quartering  on  his 
enemies  if  possible,  otherwise  on  his  allies, 
large  bodies  of  troops  which  they  were  called 
on  to  maintain  and  in  many  cases  to  pay.  For' 
seven  years,  1806-13,  the  greater  part  of  Ger¬ 
many  thus  served  as  pasture  ground,  and  so  evil 
and  burdensome  was  the  system  that  even  the 
placid  people  of  that  prosperous  country  were 
nearly  driven  into  open  rebellion. 

When  the  victory  of  Friedland  forced  his 
last  great  continental  antagonist  to  confess 
defeat,  Napoleon  touched  the  summit  of  his 
power.  The  days  of  the  struggling  consulate 
appeared  long  past.  Already  after  Austerlitz 
a  great  change  had  come  over  him  physically. 
He  was  no  longer  the  lean,  intriguing  Corsican, 
Struggling  to  reach  the  front  rank,  but  had 
filled  out  and  assumed  a  better  satisfied  cor¬ 
poral  aspect.  He  had  now  established  his 
equality  with  the  greatest  sovereigns  of  Europe. 


10 


146 


NAPOLEON 


Eighteen  months  later,  at  Tilsit,  equality  no 
longer  satisfied  him,  and  he  decided  to  divide 
the  hegemony  of  the  Continent  with  the  Czar, 
providing  that  sovereign  would  consent  to 
follow  his  policy  against  Great  Britain.  France 
and  Russia  could  clearly  dictate  terms,  for 
Prussia  was  reduced  to  a  secondary  rank,  while 
Austria  alone  retained  a  claim  to  military 
power.  It  was  on  this  basis  that  Napoleon 
framed  his  policy  at  Tilsit.  He  was  prepared 
to  be  friendly  with  Russia.  Of  Alexander  he 
claimed  no  territory,  save  the  little  island  of 
Corfu;  all  he  asked  was  co-operation  in  his 
struggle  against  England.  He  took  pains  to 
charm  the  Czar,  and  succeeded,  for  his  fascina¬ 
tion  could  be  as  great  as  his  invective  was 
brutal.  Alexander  agreed  to  all  that  Napoleon 
asked  of  him,  was  content  to  see  peace  made 
at  the  expense  of  Prussia,  and  was  repaid  by 
gaining  a  free  hand  to  take  Finland  from 
Sweden  and  various  provinces  from  Turkey. 
The  Czar  begged  hard  for  his  ex-ally,  King 
Frederick  William,  but  Napoleon  was  bent  on 
crushing  the  Prussian  monarchy  under  his 
heel.  By  the  terms  of  peace  Prussia  was  not 
only  despoiled  of  much  territory,  but  was  also 
charged  with  an  enormous  war  indemnity, 
pending  payment  of  which  French  troops  were 


NAPOLEONIC  POLICY  147 

to  occupy  Berlin  and  her  most  fruitful  prov¬ 
inces.  So  loose  were  the  terms  of  the  treaty 
that  Prussia  remained  saddled  with  the  French 
occupation  until  after  the  great  catastrophe  of 
November — December  1812. 

But  the  point  of  greatest  interest  in  the 
agreement  arrived  at  by  the  two  Emperors  was 
that  which  concerned  Great  Britain.  Alexan¬ 
der,  glad  to  pay  for  Austerlitz  and  Friedland 
at  so  little  direct  cost,  fascinated  by  the 
cajoleries  of  the  great  captain,  agreed  to  turn 
against  his  ancient  ally.  This  part  of  the 
negotiations  was  intended  to  be  kept  secret 
for  the  present,  but  the  British  Cabinet  secured 
information  and  determined  to  forestall  a  pro¬ 
jected  move  of  the  two  great  continental 
Powers.  Instead  of  accepting  a  proposal  for 
the  mediation  of  Russia  with  a  view  to  a 
general  peace,  the  government  of  King  George 
sent  an  expedition  to  Copenhagen  to  seize  the 
Danish  fleet. 

This  event  (September  1807)  rendered  pros¬ 
pects  of  a  peace  with  Great  Britain  even  more 
remote,  it  ruined  Napoleon’s  naval  projects, 
and  it  prompted  him  to  a  counterstroke  at 
England.  Nearly  every  country  of  the  Con¬ 
tinent  except  Sweden  and  Turkey  was  now 
closed  to  British  trade.  But  in  Portugal  her 


148 


NAPOLEON 


commerce  found  free  outlet,  and  Napoleon  de¬ 
termined,  as  an  offset  to  Copenhagen,  to  close 
the  Portuguese  ports  to  Great  Britain.  To 
effect  this,  military  action  became  necessary, 
and  a  small  army  under  General  Junot  was 
marched  through  Spain  and  occupied  Lisbon 
at  the  end  of  November  1807.  The  Portuguese 
royal  family  fled  to  Brazil. 

This  incursion  into  Portugal,  though  it  ap¬ 
peared  merely  a  counterstroke  for  the  British 
seizure  of  the  Danish  fleet,  was  in  reality  an 
integral  part  of  a  vast  scheme  which  Napoleon’s 
mind  had  long  been  maturing.  The  war  of 
1805  had  drawn  him  from  the  Channel;  Tra¬ 
falgar  and  Copenhagen  had  deprived  him  of 
the  naval  strength  he  required,  and  the  invasion 
of  England  had  faded  into  the  background  of 
possibilities.  But  though  invasion  was  no 
longer  possible,  the  commercial  attack  was; 
if  Napoleon  could  no  longer  march  an  army 
to  London,  he  might  yet  hope  to  starve  and 
ruin  her.  His  first  step  towards  effecting  this 
was  when  the  conquest  of  Prussia  gave  him 
the  power  to  stretch  his  hand  over  the  north¬ 
western  seaports.  In  November  1806  he 
issued  the  famous  Decree  of  Berlin,  whereby 
it  was  ordered  that  no  port  in  the  French 
Empire  or  its  dependencies  should  receive  any 


NAPOLEONIC  POLICY  149 

ship  coming  from  Great  Britain  or  any  of  her 
colonies,  that  Great  Britain  herself  was  in  a 
state  of  blockade,  and  that  all  British  goods 
were  seizable  wherever  found.  To  this  the 
British  reply  was  an  Order  in  Council  practi¬ 
cally  forbidding  neutral  vessels  to  trade  except 
through  British  ports,  and  later  proclaim¬ 
ing  all  French  ports  blockaded.  Napoleon 
answered  this  by  declaring  all  neutral  vessels 
carrying  British  papers  denationalized  and 
seizable.  This  last  decree  was  in  November 
1807.  The  whole  force  of  Napoleon’s  intellect 
was  now  turned  towards  making  this  extraor¬ 
dinary  economic  policy  effective.  He  had  not 
only  to  devise  means  whereby  English  cottons 
and  colonial  products  should  not  be  smuggled 
through  his  extensive  cordons  of  custom  house 
officers,  but  he  had  to  devise  means  of  bringing 
the  whole  of  the  Continent  into  his  policy,  for 
it  was  only  on  the  largest  scale  that  it  could 
be  effective.  Having  secured  the  Czar’s  promise 
of  co-operation,  having  a  strong  hold  on  the 
coasts  of  the  Baltic  and  North  Seas,  his  atten¬ 
tion  was  now  more  closely  directed  to  the 
south.  Italy  was  his  as  far  as  the  Strait  of 
Messina,  for  the  treaty  of  Pressburg  had  added 
Venetia  to  the  kingdom  of  Italy;  the  Papal 
dominions  were  virtually  under  French  control; 


150 


N APO LEON 


the  Bourbons  had  been  driven  from  Naples, 
where  Joseph  Bonaparte  was  installed  king- 
in  1806.  The  treaty  of  Tilsit  had  given  Corfu 
to  France,  and  now,  in  the  winter  of  1807-08, 
Napoleon  was  revolving  plans  whereby,  acting 
from  that  island  and  in  concert  with  Russia, 
he  might  arrange  to  partition  Turkey  and 
thence  launch  a  Franco-Russian  expedition 
through  Persia  towards  India.  These  schemes 
were  inordinately  vast,  and  their  execution 
never  passed  the  initial  stages ;  but  leaving 
the  eastern  for  the  western  basin  of  the  Med¬ 
iterranean  there  was  another  detail  of  the 
Napoleonic  plans  that  required  attention  but 
appeared  to  offer  little  or  no  difficulty. 

Junot’s  march  to  Lisbon  in  the  autumn  of 
1807  has  already  been  noticed.  Portugal  had 
fallen  without  resistance  and  the  capital  had 
not  fired  a  shot  to  stop  the  paltry  force  that 
captured  it.  Spain  appeared  as  rotten,  as 
effete,  as  Portugal.  The  king,  Charles  IV., 
was  perhaps  the  most  inept  of  all  Bourbon  sov¬ 
ereigns,  and  to  make  matters  worse  the  Queen 
and  the  favourite  Godoy  were  little  better  than 
the  King.  In  1795  Spain  had  abandoned  the 
struggle  against  the  French  Republic  and  ever 
since  had  dragged  by  her  side  in  an  uncon¬ 
vinced  and  ineffective  alliance.  But  the  people 


NAPOLEONIC  POLICY  1 5 1 

and  even  the  minister  tired  of  French  dicta¬ 
tion,  and  in  1806,  shortly  before  Jena,  Godoy 
showed  clear  indications  that  he  only  awaited 
a  favourable  opportunity  to  turn  against  Napo¬ 
leon.  The  Spaniard  chose  his  time  badly;  the 
Corsican  played  his  game  more  deliberately. 
He  wanted  the  full  use  of  the  Spanish  naval 
resources  against  England,  he  viewed  with  con¬ 
tempt  the  Bourbon  occupant  of  the  throne, 
he  did  not  contemplate  as  possible  a  serious 
resistance  from  Spain  to  the  conqueror  of 
Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia.  Without  show¬ 
ing  his  hand  very  clearly,  without  perhaps  quite 
deciding  what  his  precise  policy  should  be,  he 
pushed  on  supporting  columns  behind  Junot’s 
army  of  Portugal,  and  gradually  established  a 
considerable  force  in  the  northern  provinces 
of  Spain. 

In  the  early  months  of  1808  Napoleon  showed 
his  hand  more  clearly;  a  large  French  army  was 
now  moving  towards  Madrid,  and  Murat  was 
given  supreme  command.  This  steadily  in¬ 
creasing  pressure  applied  by  Napoleon  proved 
too  much  for  the  Bourbons,  dislodged  them 
from  their  throne.  There  were  recriminations 
between  Charles  IV.,  his  son  Ferdinand,  and 
his  minister  Godoy.  Popular  discontent  broke 
out.  Charles  IV.  resigned.  A  mob  nearly  mas- 


I52 


NAPOLEON 


sacred  Godoy  who  was  barely  saved  by  the 
French  troops.  Murat,  who  had  quietly  in¬ 
stalled  himself  at  Madrid,  declined  to  recognise 
Ferdinand  as  king,  and  Charles  repented  his 
hasty  abdication.  Father  and  son  proceeded 
to  Bayonne  to  lay  their  case  before  Napoleon, 
and  he  by  menace  and  cajolery  obtained  from 
them  a  renunciation  of  their  rights  in  his  favour. 
Spain  was  now  apparently  his,  and  he  appointed 
to  its  throne  his  brother  Joseph,  giving  in  turn 
that  of  Naples  to  Murat. 

It  was  on  the  5th  of  May  that  the  renuncia¬ 
tion  of  his  crown  by  Charles  IV.  gave  Napoleon 
Spain  with  a  stroke  of  the  pen,  but  the  people 
of  Madrid  had  demonstrated  that  they  were  no 
willing  parties  to  the  shameful  transaction  of 
their  king  three  days  earlier.  A  street  insur¬ 
rection  broke  out  which  Murat  subdued  with 
much  trouble  and  punished  severely.  It  was 
the  precursor  of  a  national  rising  continued  for 
five  years  and  that  ended  in  success.  France 
had  hitherto  conquered  by  means  of  a  national 
army;  she  was  now  to  be  met  with  the  same 
arm  she  had  so  triumphantly  used  and  abused. 

French  troops  were  now  advancing  in  every 
direction,  but  a  provisional  government  or¬ 
ganised  resistance,  and  within  a  few  weeks  the 
imperial  arms  received  the  most  decisive  check 


NAPOLEONIC  POLICY  153 

they  had  yet  met  with.  South  of  Madrid  the 
French  general  Dupont  allowed  his  communi¬ 
cations  to  be  cut,  and  failing  to  force  a  passage  l 
was  compelled  to  surrender  with  twenty  thou¬ 
sand  men  at  Baylen  (July  19).  A  few  weeks 
later  a  similar  disaster  occurred  in  Portugal. 
A  British  force  under  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley, 
afterwards  Duke  of  Wellington,  landed  close 
to  Lisbon,  fought  and  defeated  Junot’s  army 
(Vimiero,  August  21).  A  capitulation  was 
signed  at  Cintra  a  few  days  later,  whereby  the 
French  evacuated  Portugal. 

These  unexpected  reverses  roused  Napoleon. 
His  army  in  Spain  was  made  up  mostly  of  new 
levies ;  he  now  ordered  several  corps  of  the 
Grande  Armee  to  leave  their  cantonments  in 
Germany  for  the  peninsula.  Other  corps  were 
formed  in  France  and  hurried  to  the  frontier, 
and  Napoleon  determined  to  take  command  in 
person.  He  joined  his  troops  in  November; 
they  were  then  concentrated  between  the  Ebro 
and  the  Pyrenees,  faced  by  several  Spanish 
armies  for  the  most  part  poorly  drilled,  insuffi¬ 
ciently  equipped,  and  miserably  led.  A  few 
rapid  strokes  to  the  right  and  left  shattered  re¬ 
sistance,  and  Napoleon  marched  irresistibly 
on  Madrid,  which  he  entered  on  the  4th  of 
December. 


1 54- 


NAPOLEON 


This  first  success  was  illusive.  There  were 
several  peculiarities  that  rendered  campaigning 
in  Spain  a  far  more  difficult  task  than  in  Italy 
or  Germany.  The  country  was  poor  and  troops 
had  to  be  accompanied  by  long  convoys  ;  the 
peasantry,  fanaticized  by  the  priests,  took  up 
arms,  cut  off  detached  parties,  and  isolated  the 
French  columns;  the  mountain  ranges  of  the 
peninsula  ran  generally  east  and  west,  that  is 
across  the  line  of  invasion,  making  movements 
slow  and  arduous,  and  affording  continuous 
openings  for  rapid  flank  attacks  up  the  val¬ 
leys.  While  Napoleon  was  marching  south  on 
Madrid,  a  British  army  under  Sir  John  Moore 
was  moving  east  from  Lisbon  and  nearly  suc¬ 
ceeded  in  striking  the  French  line  of  communi¬ 
cations  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Valladolid. 
No  sooner  did  Napoleon  realize  the  presence 
of  this  new  enemy  than  he  turned  all  his 
available  force  towards  the  British,  and  taking 
command  pushed  forward  to  attack  Sir  John 
Moore.  It  was  now  winter  and  the  mountain 
passes  were  covered  with  snow,  but  the  French 
pressed  on  rapidly,  and  the  British  general, 
heavily  outnumbered,  hastily  retreated.  He 
eventually  reached  Corunna  after  severe  losses 
and  hardships,  and  there  succeeded  in  embark¬ 
ing  his  army  but  lost  his  life  in  the  fighting. 


NAPOLEONIC  POLICY  155 

Napoleon  had  not  pursued  the  British  as  far 
as  Corunna  ;  midway  important  dispatches  had 
reached  him  from  Paris.  Handing  over  the 
command  to  Marshal  Soult  he  took  a  few  per¬ 
sonal  attendants,  and  galloping  as  fast  as  saddle 
and  post  horses  could  carry  him,  unexpectedly 
reached  his  capital  on  the  23d  of  January 
1809. 


CHRONOLOGY 


7  July,  1807. 
Sept.,  “ 

30  Nov.,  “ 

2  May,  1808. 
5  “ 

19  July,  “ 

21  Aug.,  “ 
Sept.,  “ 
Nov.,  “ 

4  Dec.,  “ 

23  Jan.,  1809. 


Treaty  of  Tilsit. 

Capture  of  Danish  fleet  at  Copenhagen. 
Junot  occupies  Lisbon. 

Madrid  riot. 

Bayonne.  Charles  IV.  resigns  his  crown. 
Surrender  of  Dupont  at  Baylen. 

Junot  defeated  at  Vimiero. 

Interview  of  Erfurt. 

Napoleon  joins  army  in  Spain. 

Occupies  Madrid. 

Napoleon  returns  to  Paris. 


NOTE 

Bibliographical  :  General.  —  See  page  1 1 . 

For  Tilsit  and  the  relations  of  France  and  Russia  there 
is  no  authority  comparable  to  Vandal’s  Napoleon  e t  Alex¬ 
andre,  Paris,  1896.  For  the  Continental  blockade  see 
Mahan,  Influence  of  Sea  Power,  London,  1892.  For 


NAPOLEON 


iS6 


Spain,  Oman,  Peninsular  War,  London,  1902-03  (two  vol¬ 
umes  only,  to  1809)  ;  or  the  classic  but  not  altogether 
reliable  Napier,  Pe?iinsular  War. 

Rose  is  good  to  consult  on  France  and  Great  Britain 
after  Tilsit,  and  Fisher  on  Germany. 

The  war  in  Spain  will  not  be  followed  after  this  chapter, 
as  Napoleon  took  no  further  personal  part  in  it ;  only  such 
brief  allusions  to  it  will  be  made  as  will  suffice  to  keep  the 
reader  abreast  with  the  general  progress  of  affairs. 


CHAPTER  XII 


WAGRAM 

Austrian  Jealousy  —  French  Discontent  —  Napoleon  leaves 
Spain  —  War  with  Austria  —  Aspern  and  Essling — Dis¬ 
possession  of  the  Pope  — Wagram  —  Peace. 

AT  ^HERE  were  two  causes  that  brought 
Napoleon  suddenly  back  from  Spain 
to  Paris,  one  general  and  widely  known, 
the  other  of  a  more  intimate  and  obscure  char¬ 
acter.  The  first  of  these  was  connected  with 
the  relations  of  France  with  the  great  Powers 
of  north-eastern  Europe ;  to  understand  it  we 
must  go  back  a  little  and  pick  up  the  thread  of 
policy  spun  by  Napoleon  at  Tilsit  in  1807. 

With  Prussia  reduced  to  impotence  and 
largely  occupied  by  French  troops,  there  were 
now  as  military  factors  but  two  Powers  in  the 
north-east,  Russia  and  Austria.  The  friendly 
advances  of  Napoleon  to  the  former  indicated 
beyond  question  that  his  policy  in  that  quar¬ 
ter  would  turn  on  the  balancing  of  these  two 
Powers  one  against  the  other.  And  further,  his 
friendship  with  Russia  was  held  at  Vienna  to 

iS7 


NAPOLEON 


158 

imply  hostility  to  Austria.  The  inference  was 
obvious  and  told  more  deeply  owing  to  the 
repeated  humiliations  Austria  had  met  with, 
though  Napoleon  would  doubtless  have  been 
pleased  to  remain  at  peace  with  her.  From 
the  time  when  Eylau  opened  anew  the  possi¬ 
bility  of  shaking  off  the  Napoleonic  yoke,  the 
Cabinet  of  Vienna  made  great  efforts  to  re¬ 
organize  its  army  and  resources. 

But  the  Emperor’s  relations  with  Alexan¬ 
der,  though  outwardly  friendly,  had  already 
developed  slight  points  of  friction,  and  in  the 
summer  of  1808  an  interview  between  the  two 
was  arranged  for  the  discussion  of  their  in¬ 
terests.  It  took  place  at  Erfurt.  Here  amid 
much  pomp,  surrounded  by  the  princes  of  Ger¬ 
many  and  of  the  French  Empire,  they  privately 
debated  the  questions  of  Poland,  of  Prussia,  of 
Great  Britain,  and  in  short  the  whole  political 
field  from  St.  Petersburg  to  Cadiz  and  from 
Norway  to  India.  The  nature  of  these  con¬ 
ferences  was  not  generally  known,  and  it  was 
only  a  few  of  the  best  placed  and  most  astute 
observers,  such  as  Talleyrand,  who  detected  the 
fundamental  incompatibility  of  views  between 
Napoleon  and  Alexander  that  must  sooner  or 
later  break  down  their  alliance.  The  general 
opinion  was  that  France  and  Russia  were  in 


WAGRAM 


lS9 


perfect  accord,  and  that  jointly  they  could  con¬ 
trol  the  whole  of  continental  Europe.  In  reality 
the  Czar  chafed  at  the  pressure  of  the  French 
Empire  eastwards  in  Prussia,  in  Poland,  in  the 
Balkan  peninsula. 

The  conference  at  Erfurt  alarmed  Austria. 
Her  statesmen  were  not  sure  that  Napoleon 
had  not  given  Russia  a  free  hand  against 
Sweden  and  Turkey  as  a  price  for  her  absten¬ 
tion  from  interfering  against  his  carrying  out 
some  design  against  Austria.  Was  it  his  in¬ 
tention  to  reduce  the  Emperor  Francis  to  the 
position  of  King  Frederick  William,  or  perhaps 
even  to  steal  his  throne,  as  he  had  that  of 
Charles  IV.  ?  There  was  little  present  ground 
for  fear,  yet  Austria  pressed  her  armaments  for¬ 
ward.  Napoleon  declared  to  Count  Metternich, 
Austrian  ambassador  at  Paris,  that  if  Austria 
armed  she  could  never  afford  to  disarm  without 
fighting  and  that  war  must  therefore  follow,  and 
he  disclaimed,  probably  sincerely,  all  hostile 
intention.  Yet  the  dangerous  process  continued 
during  the  autumn  and  winter  months  of  1808. 
By  the  beginning  of  1809  Austria  had  gone 
so  far  that  war  was  inevitable  and  it  became 
clear  that  sooner  or  later  Napoleon  must  leave 
Spain  and  return  to  Germany.)  It  does  not 
appear  probable,  however,  that  he  would  have 


160  NAPOLEON 

abandoned  the  pursuit  of  Sir  John  Moore  quite 
so  precipitately  as  he  did,  had  there  not  been 
another  matter  of  importance  that  required  his 
presence  in  Paris  without  delay. 

On  1799  Bonaparte’s  advent  to  power  had 
been  eagerly  supported  by  reasonable  men  of 
many  shades  of  political  opinion.  His  early 
steps  as  a  ruler  tended  to  confirm  the  hopes  of 
those  who  looked  to  him  to  provide  stability ; 
and  even  if  he  aimed  openly  at  personal  power, 
yet  through  him  was  introduced  such  sound 
administration,  finance,  and  justice  as  France 
had  never  known.  Many,  therefore,  viewed  his 
personal  rule  so  far  as  a  blessing.  But  the 
development  of  Napoleon’s  policy  after  the  proc¬ 
lamation  of  the  Empire,  after  Austerlitz,  after 
Jena,  and  especially  after  Tilsit,  frightened 
those  who  dared  think  for  themselves  and  whose 
insight  was  not  obscured  by  apparent  prosper¬ 
ity,  large  salaries  and  unaccustomed  titles. 
Talleyrand  after  long  directing  the  Ministry  for 
Foreign  Affairs  had  held  back  strongly  from 
the  Tilsit  policy,  and  had  been  transferred  to  the 
non-political  functions  of  High  Chamberlain. 
Fouclie,  the  ex-Terrorist  and  Jacobin,  head  of 
the  secret  police,  thought  that  Napoleon  was 
going  too  far,  saw  in  the  Spanish  war  the  pos¬ 
sibility  of  a  personal  or  military  disaster  for 


WAGRAM 


1 6 1 


the  Emperor,  and  ever  on  the  lookout  for 
political  evolutions,  viewed  with  complacency 
an  eventual  vacancy  of  the  throne  and  the  pos¬ 
sible  promotion  of  his  friend,  the  dashing, 
popular,  liberal-minded,  and  liberal-handed  Joa¬ 
chim  Murat,  King  of  Naples.  Nothing  much 
was  actually  done,  yet  a  political  demonstra¬ 
tion  of  the  greatest  significance  occurred.'  For 
many  years  Talleyrand  and  Fouche  had  been 
estranged  and  barely  on  speaking  terms.  One 
night,  while  Napoleon  was  toiling  through  the 
snow-clad  passes  of  revolted  Spain  after  Sir 
John  Moore,  these  two  important  political  per¬ 
sonages  made  their  entrance  at  a  fashionable 
reception  arm  in  arm,  and  ostentatiously  prome¬ 
naded  their  alliance  before  the  astonished  guests 
It  was  a  little  thing,  and  yet  it  was  a  great  one; 
for  Talleyrand  and  Fouche  were  the  two  most 
delicate  political  weathercocks  in  France,  and 
if  they  both  veered  together  it  was  safe  to  con¬ 
clude  there  was  something  in  the  wind. 

So  Napoleon  thought,  as  he  spurred  and 
galloped  back  to  Paris.)  He  publicly  disgraced 
Talleyrand;  he  privately  admonished  Fouche, 
but  continued  to  employ  him.  But  though  on 
the  surface  this  was  the  close  of  the  incident, 
there  can  be  little  doubt  when  the  course  of 
events  is  noted,  that  Napoleon  now  had 


II 


162 


NAPOLEON 


brought  into  stronger  prominence  before  him 
than  ever  the  perplexing  question  of  the  im¬ 
perial  succession.  vHe  was  now  the  most 
powerful  sovereign  of  Europe  ;\  he  had  already 
established  his  fame  as  the  greatest  legislator 
and  conqueror  of  history;  yet  two  of  his  subjects 
could  venture  to  suggest  publicly  that  they,  and 
not  he,  might  eventually  decide  to  whom  his 
magnificent  empire  should  revert.  Josephine 
could  not  give  him  an  heir;  he  had  no  faith  in 
the  power  of  any  of  his  brothers  to  retain  his 
throne.  Yet  he  could  not  live  for  ever,  more 
especially  if  continually  exposing  his  life  to  the 
dangers  of  the  battle-field. 

It  was  in  no  pleasant  mood  that  Napoleon 
now  faced  the  fast-approaching  war  with 
Austria, — a  war  he  did  not  seek,  from  which 
he  could  gain  little,  and  that  interfered  with 
the  completion  of  the  conquest  of  Spain.  It 
came  at  the  last  somewhat  unexpectedly.  On 
the  tenth  day  of  April  1809,  the  Archduke 
Charles  crossed  the  Bavarian  frontier  announc¬ 
ing  in  his  proclamations  that  Austria  was 
championing  the  cause  of  European  liberty 
and  calling  on  all  Germans  to  rise  against 
their  oppressors;.  It  was  making  the  coura¬ 
geous  stand  of  the  people  of  Spain  a  text  for  all 
the  nations  of  Europe.  For  a  few  days  the 


WAGRAM 


163 

Archduke  held  a  great  strategic  advantage, 
and  had  he  pressed  forward  among  the  scat¬ 
tered  French  corps,  would  probably  have  won 
considerable  successes.  Napoleon  hurried  on 
from  Paris  and  by  a  series  of  rapid  manoeuvres 
which  he  always  considered  the  most  brilliant 
he  ever  carried  out,  concentrated  his  corps, 
forced  the  passage  of  the  Isar,  and  brought  the 
Archduke  to  a  general  engagement  at  Eckmuhl. 
The  interest  of  these  operations  depends  on  an 
examination  too  minute  and  lengthy  to  be  fol¬ 
lowed  out  here;  all  that  it  will  be  possible  to 
say  is  that  at  Eckmuhl  the  Archduke  Charles 
was  severely  defeated  and  Napoleon  found 
himself,  as  after  Ulm,  on  the  highroad  to 
Vienna. 

On  the  10th  of  May  occurred  a  slight 
incident  of  which  the  interest  is  of  a  character 
rarely  to  be  found  in  the  life  of  Napoleon. 
The  French  had  arrived  in  front  of  Vienna, 
and  although  the  Archduke  Charles  with  the 
great  mass  of  the  Austrian  army  was  on  the 
further  bank  of  the  Danube,  there  was  an 
attempt  at  resistance.  The  invaders  brought- 
artillery  into  position  and  opened  fire  on  the 
city.  Napoleon  was  now  informed  that  the 
young  Archduchess  Maria  Louisa  had  not 
been  able  to  leave  the  palace  owing  to  illness; 


164 


NAPOLEON 


he  immediately  gave  orders  to  have  the  guns 
trained  in  another  direction.  He  probably 
little  guessed  that  the  princess  for  whom  he 
showed  this  consideration  would  in  less  than 
twelve  months  be  Empress  of  the  French. 

The  resistance  of  Vienna  was  not  serious, 
and  the  French  army  quickly  occupied  itl 
While  Napoleon  was  maturing  a  plan  for 
crossing  to  the  north  side  of  the  Danube, 
whence  the  Archduke  Charles  was  watching 
his  movements  with  a  large  army,  he  issued  a 
decree  annexing  Rome  to  the  Empire  (May  17). 
The  army  was  now  moved  a  few  miles  east  of 
Vienna,  bridges  were  constructed,  and  on  the 
2 1  st  the  leading  brigades  began  to  deploy  on 
the  further  bank  between  the  villages  of  Aspern 
and  Essling.  At  this  point  desperate  fighting 
took  place  during  the  21st  and  22d.  The 
Archduke  Charles  attacked  in  force  ;  the  French 
numbers  on  the  northern  bank  gradually  in¬ 
creased  until  on  the  second  day  a  rise  of  the 
Danube  broke  down  the  bridges.  Then  it  be¬ 
came  a  question  of  whether  the  French  could 
hold  their  ground.  While  engineers  worked 
desperately  to  re-establish  communications, 
Lannes  and  Massena  held  the  Austrians  at 
bay  with  dogged  obstinacy,  fought  on  till  night, 
and  thus  enabled  the  troops  to  retreat  in  safety. 


Enzensdorf 


i  Austrian  Positions. 


Wagram 


W AGRAM 


i65 

But  Napoleon  had  lost  twenty-five  thousand 
men,  including  Marshal  Lannes  who  was  mor¬ 
tally  wounded  at  the  close  of  the  dayf  and 
whatever  excuses  there  might  be  to  offer,  he 
had  been  defeated  by  the  Archduke  Charles. 

The  French  army  had  now  retreated  from  the 
northern  bank  into  the  large  island  of  Lobau, 
and  the  marshals  whom  Napoleon  consulted 
were  all  of  opinion  that  the  retreat  should  be 
continued  to  Vienna,  or  at  all  events  to  the 
southern  bank.  Napoleon’s  decision  admirably 
illustrates  a  cardinal  principle  of  strategy.  It 
is  nearly  invariably  the  rule  that  of  two  armies 
one  is  attacking,  the  other  defending ;  one  has 
the  offensive,  the  other  the  defensive.  So  long 
as  that  relation  holds  the  army  on  the  offensive 
has  the  move;  that  is,  it  may  within  certain 
limits  choose  a  line  of  operations  which  its 
opponent  is  compelled  to  devise  methods  to 
defend.  The  offensive  in  the  hands  of  a  com¬ 
petent  general  is  an  immense  military  advan¬ 
tage  to  be  retained  at  any  cost,  and  for  this 
reason  Napoleon  decided  to  keep  his  army  in 
the  island  of  Lobau  rather  than  seek  safety  on 
the  southern  bank  of  the  Danube]  For  in 
that  position  he  still  threatened  Aspern  and 
Essling  which  the  Archduke  could  not  aban¬ 
don  ;  but  had  he  fallen  back,  then  the  offensive 


1 66 


NAPOLEON 


would  have  passed  to  the  enemy  and  he  would 
have  been  obliged  to  reply  to  whatever  move 
the  Archduke  chose  to  make. 
v  Napoleon  therefore  remained  cooped  up  with 
his  army  in  the  island  of  Lobau  while  the  Aus¬ 
trians  daily  intrenched  themselves  along  his 
front.  iThe  check  was  not  unlike  that  at  Eylau, 
and  all  Europe  was  eagerly  on  the  watch  for 
several  weeks  to  see  what  the  next  move  would 
be.  I  The  opponents  of  Napoleon  plucked  up 
courage,  the  more  so  as  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley 
was  once  more  operating  in  Portugal  and  had 
defeated  Soult  at  Oporto.  Germany  appeared 
on  the  point  of  rising;  the  dispossessed  Pope 
fulminated  a  degree  of  excommunication  against 
his  spoilers  and  had  to  be  removed  from  Rome 
as  a  prisoner;  a  British  fleet  and  army  occupied 
the  island  of  Ischia  in  the  bay  of  Naples  and 
threatened  Joachim  Murat  in  his  capital. 

Once  more,  as  at  Austerlitz,  as  at  Friedland, 
Napoleon  cleared  a  threatening  situation  by  a 
great  military  stroke.  At  the  north-west  corner 
of  the  island  of  Lobau  where  his  bridges  had 
been  established  opposite  the  heavily  forti¬ 
fied  Austrian  lines  at  Aspern  and  Essling, 
he  placed  his  largest  guns  and  opened  a  fierce 
bombardment.  He  wanted  the  Austrians  to 
believe  that  he  intended  forcing  their  position 


W AG  R A  M 


167 

by  a  frontal  attack.  In  the  meanwhile  secret 
preparations  were  made  for  another  move.  On 
the  night  of  the  4th  of  July  bridges  were 
rapidly  thrown  over  the  Danube  from  the 
lower  or  south-eastern  end  of  the  island,  and 
in  the  early  hours  of  the  5th,  the  army  had 
got  a  footing  on  the  northern  bank  in  the 
Marchfeld,  thus  turning  the  Archduke’s  posi¬ 
tion  at  EsslingA  The  Austrians  changed  front, 
and  during  that  day  there  was  considerable 
fighting  between  the  two  armies.  On  the  6th 
was  fought  the  memorable  battle  of  Wagram, 
in  which  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men  were  engaged. 

The  Austrians  having  abandoned  their  Ess- 
ling-Aspern  position  had  now  fallen  back  a 
few  miles  to  the  west.  Napoleon  faced  them 
and  made  dispositions  not  dissimilar  to  those 
that  had  given  him  such  a  complete  victory  at 
Austerlitz.  The  Archduke's  right  was  extended 
towards  the  Danube  nearly  opposite  Vienna, 
and  it  was  clearly  to  his  interest  not  to  be 
driven  back  at  this  point.  There  was  a  further 
incitement  to  strengthen  this  wing,  because,  if 
the  opposite  wing  of  the  French  could  be  made 
to  give  away,  Napoleon’s  line  of  retreat  through 
the  island  of  Lobau  would  be  compromised. 
The  Emperor,  divining  his  opponent’s  thoughts 


1 68 


NAPOLEON 


and  relying  on  his  own  numerical  superiority, 
decided  to  encourage  the  Archduke  to  attack 
this  part  of  his  line,  but  placed  Massena,  the 
most  resolute  and  resourceful  of  all  the  mar¬ 
shals,  in  command.  In  the  meantime  the 
French  right  under  Davoust  strongly  attacked 
the  Austrian  left.  The  Archduke  Charles  met 
with  some  measure  of  success  at  first ;  though 
pressed  by  Davoust  on  his  left,  his  centre  held 
its  ground  and  his  right  was  slowly  driving  back 
Massena.  As  success  began  to  appear  possible 
on  this  part  of  the  field  the  Austrian  supports 
were  gradually  pushed  out  from  the  centre 
towards  the  right,  until  at  last  Napoleon  judged 
the  moment  had  come  for  the  decisive  move¬ 
ment.  A  battery  of  one  hundred  and  twenty 
guns  was  suddenly  massed  within  short  range 
of  the  Austrian  centre.  Bernadotte  and  Mac¬ 
donald  were  pushed  forward  and  the  Archduke 
found  his  line  too  weak  to  resist.  His  right 
wing  was  in  the  greatest  danger  of  being  cut 
off  and  separated,  and  there  was  no  alternative 
but  to  order  a  retreat  along  the  whole  line. 
He  drew  off  his  army,  defeated,  but  far  from 
routed.  Some  fifty  thousand  men  were  killed 
and  wounded,  the  losses  being  fairly  equally 
divided,  but  though  beaten  the  Austrians  left 
behind  them  practically  no  prisoners. 


WAGR AM 


169 

^Shortly  afterwards  an  armistice  was  con¬ 
cluded,  and  for  the  fourth  time  Austria  accepted 
defeat  at  the  hands  of  Napoleon.y  This  was 
recorded  in  the  treaty  of  Schonbrunn  whereby 
she  lost  with  other  territory,  Trieste  and  Illyria, 
thus  becoming  an  inland  power.  But,  how¬ 
ever  humbled  and  weakened  for  the  moment, 
an  unexpected  event  a  few  months  later  gave 
the  House  of  Hapsburg  renewed  importance  in 
the  politics  of  Europe.  That  event  must  be 
discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 

CHRONOLOGY 

Eckmtihl. 

Vienna  occupied. 

Decree  annexing  Rome  to  the  Empire. 
Napoleon  defeated  at  Aspern. 

Wagram. 

Treaty  of  Schonbrunn. 

NOTES 

Bibliographical  :  General.  —  See  page  1 1 . 

For  War  of  1809  see  Saski,  Campagne  de  ’og,  Paris, 
1899.  On  the  picturesque  side,  Marbot,  Memoirs,  Vol.  II. 
For  an  account  of  Hofer  and  the  revolt  of  the  Tyrol,  see 
Clair,  Hofer  et  Vinsurrection  du  Tyrol,  Paris,  1873.  The 
Duke  of  Brunswick’s  raid  through  Germany  has  been  the 
subject  of  Review  articles.  For  the  Austrian  point  of 
view  see  various  works  of  Fournier  and  Wertheimer. 

y 


22  April,  1809. 

13  May,  “ 

17“  “ 

22  “  “ 

6  July,  “ 

14  Oct.,  “ 


CHAPTER  XIII 


THE  AUSTRIAN  MARRIAGE  AND  THE  CAMPAIGN 
OF  RUSSIA 

Dynastic  Question  —  Napoleon  marries  Maria  Louisa  —  Jeal¬ 
ousy  of  Russia  —  Causes  for  War  —  Preparations  —  Cam¬ 
paign  of  Russia  —  Borodino  —  Moscow  —  The  Retreat. 

HAVING  concluded  the  treaty  of  Schon- 
brunn  with  Austria,  Napoleon  left 
Vienna  for  France-  but  he  returned  in 
a  far  different  mood  to  that  in  which  he  had 
returned  from  Tilsit  in  1807.  Then  an  un¬ 
clouded  series  of  successes  lay  behind  him,  and 
before  him  arose  great  schemes  that  were  to 
lead  to  the  glorious  day  when  Great  Britain 
should  be  at  his  feet ;  but  now  his  pre¬ 
occupations  were  on  a  smaller  scale,  for  the 
security  of  his  own  throne  shared  his  thoughts 
with  the  overthrow  of  his  hated  enemy. 

There  were  many  reasons  for  the  Emperor’s 
dissatisfaction.  The  defeat  of  Austria  had 
proved  a  harder  task  than  ever  before-*;  at 
Essling  the  Archduke  Charles  had  claimed  a 
victory,  at  Wagram  he  had  withdrawn  his 

170 


The  French  Empire  after  Wagram 


THE  AUSTRIAN  MARRIAGE  171 

army  from  the  field  virtually  intact.  In  Spain, 
too,  a  British  general  was  proving  more  than 
a  match  for  the  best  marshals  of  the  Empire, 
while  from  one  end  of  the  Peninsula  to  the 
other  insurrection  blazed,  and  King  Joseph 
could  barely  maintain  himself  at  Madrid. 
Greatest  of  all  his  anxieties  was  the  dynastic 
question :  whose  was  to  be  the  reversion  of 
the  imperial  throne  ?  The  idea  had  long  been 
working  in  his  head ;  the  question  had  now 
become  an  acute  one ;  perhaps  an  incident 
that  occurred  during  his  stay  at  Vienna  drove 
him  finally  and  reluctantly  to  an  act  that  he 
had  first  contemplated  on  his  return  from 
Egypt  in  1799.  While  the  peace  negotiations 
were  progressing  a  German  student  named 
Staps  approached  the  Emperor  as  he  was  in¬ 
specting  the  guards  in  the  court  of  the  palace 
of  Schonbrunn.  His  movements  were  sus¬ 
picious;  he  was  arrested  and  on  him  was  found 
a  knife  that  could  leave  no  doubt  as  to 
his  intentions.  Brought  before  Napoleon  he 
avowed,  with  perfect  composure,  his  intention 
of  killing  him  as  an  enemy  of  the  human  race  y 
and  on  the  Emperor’s  asking  him  what  he 
would  do  if  he  were  released,  he  replied  phleg¬ 
matically  that  he  would  take  the  earliest  oppor¬ 
tunity  of  assassinating  him.  This  courageous 


17  2 


NAPOLEON 


student  was  necessarily  shot,  but  he  had 
evoked  before  the  Emperor  the  spectre  of 
revenge  that  underlay  German  opinion,  and 
Napoleon  was  profoundly  affected  by  the 
incident. 

On  his  return  to  France  his  resolve  was 
fixed ;  he  had  decided  that  there  must  be  a 
direct  heir  to  the  Empire,  and  he  promptly 
announced  her  fate  to  Josephine.  After  a 
painful  scene  she  consented  to  all  that  was 
asked  of  her,  and  a  divorce  was  decided  on. 
The  Pope  refusing  his  consent,  a  somewhat 
irregular  form  was  gone  through  by  the  com¬ 
plaisance  of  a  committee  of  cardinals,  but  had 
Napoleon  pronounced  the  decree  of  his  own 
will  and  authority  it  is  not  likely  that  any  one 
would  have  dared  question  its  efficacy. 

In  the  meanwhile  it  was  necessary  to  find 
a  suitable  consort  for  the  Emperor  and  the 
alliance  between  France  and  Russia  imme¬ 
diately  suggested  the  Grand  Duchess  Anna, 
sister  of  the  Czar.  Informal  overtures  were 
made  at  St.  Petersburg;  they  met  with  doubt¬ 
ful  answers ;  it  appeared  possible  that  an 
eventual  no  would  be  the  result,  and  this  was 
an  affront  Napoleon  could  not  bear  to  face. 
Just  at  this  delicate  moment  Austrian  diplo¬ 
macy,  now  under  the  wary  guidance  of  Count 


THE  AUSTRIAN  MARRIAGE  173 


Metternich,  succeeded  in  suggesting  the  Arch¬ 
duchess  Maria  Louisa,  who  in  point  of  age 
was  far  more  suitable  than  the  young  Russian 
princess.  Metternich,  whom  the  Emperor  had 
liked  as  ambassador,  promptly  seized  the 
opportunity,  placed  it  beyond  doubt  that  a 
favourable  reply  would  be  given  to  any  proposal 
made,  and  secured  this  enormous  politico- 
matrimonial  prize  for  his  master’s  daughter. 

The  rapid  conduct  of  the  preliminaries,  the 
pomp  and  magnificence  of  the  ceremonies, 
the  effusions  of  the  French  and  Austrian 
courts,  the  gratification  of  Napoleon  with  his 
Hapsburg  bride,  the  amicable  married  life  that 
ensued, — all  these  are  matters  of  which  the 
details  can  find  no  space  here.  It  is  the  grim 
reverse  of  the  medal  that  must  be  dwelt  on, 
the  political  aspects  of  the  marriage,  the  so- 
called  reasons  of  State  that  made  the  bringing 
of  one  child  into  existence  the  cause  for  the 
destruction  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  lives! 

Metternich  had  come  into  power  at  the 
moment  when  Austria  had  touched  her  lowest 
point.  He  was  determined  to  restore  her  for¬ 
tunes,  and  to  do  that  he  saw  clearly  that  she 
must  not  again  bear  the  brunt  of  war,  but, 
leaving  that  to  others,  quietly  prepare  to  throw 
in  her  sword  when  next  the  scale  balanced 


/ 


174 


NAPOLEON 


and  her  intervention  might  be  decisive.  He 
followed  up  the  French  marriage  closely, 
anxious  to  profit,  clearly  perceiving  that  France 
must  lean  either  on  Russia  or  on  Austria,  and 
already  convinced  that  the  Czar  and  Napoleon 
were  fast  drifting  apart>, 

Two  new  and  grave  causes  of  disagreement 
had  arisen  between  France  and  Russia  as  a  con¬ 
sequence  of  the  war  of  180c),.  One  was  the  sud¬ 
den  manner  in  which  Napoleon  had  dropped  the 
proposal  for  marrying  the  Grand  Duchess  Anna, 
the  other  was  of  an  even  more  serious  char¬ 
acter.  At  the  peace  of  1807,  partly  to  reward 
the  Poles  who  had  long  served  France,  partly 
to  obtain  a  political  support  in  the  north-east, 
Napoleon  had  formed  of  Prussian  Poland  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw  under  the  rule  of  his 
ally,  the  King  of  Saxony.  This  was  virtually 
reconstituting  Polish  independence  and  caused 
great  uneasiness  to  the  Czar.  When  the  war 
of  1809  broke  out,  Napoleon  called  on  Alex¬ 
ander  as  his  ally  to  place  an  army  in  the  field. 
This  the  Czar  did  but  in  an  inefficient  way  that 
did  nothing  to  help  Napoleon’s  operations. 
The  Poles  of  the  Grand  Duchy  however,  ably 
led  by  Poniatowski,  made  a  strong  diversion 
in  Galicia,  and  Napoleon  duly  rewarded  them 
with  a  large  slice  of  Austrian  Poland  when 


THE  AUSTRIAN  MARRIAGE  175 

peace  was  signed  after  Wagram.  Nothing 
could  have  been  more  calculated  to  alarm  and 
alienate  the  Czar,  who  was  now  declaredly 
offended  at  the  course  of  French  policy.  The 
year  1810  was  not  old  before  it  was  common 
report  that  a  war  between  the  two  great 
empires  must  surely  ensue,  and  it  appears  that 
from  that  date  both  Napoleon  and  Alexander 
began  quietly  to  make  preparations  for  the 
gigantic  struggle  all  felt  was  coming. 

But  in  its  essential  aspect  this  great  war 
arose  from  Napoleon’s  policy  of  the  continental 
blockade.  For  a  brief  moment  it  looked  as 
though  that  policy  might  meet  with  success. 
In  1810  British  funds  fell  to  65,  commer¬ 
cial  ruin  appeared  imminent,  bread  was  at 
famine  prices,  the  Tory  Cabinet  was  falling 
to  pieces.  Wellington’s  generalship  probably 
saved  his  country  from  a  humiliating  peace. 
Driven  from  Spain  by  Massena  he  fell  back 
on  the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras  in  front  of  Lisbon 
and  there  successfully  stopped  the  French  ad¬ 
vance  to  the  sea.  His  foresight  and  strategy 
had  turned  the  scale  in  the  Spanish  war,  for 
from  this  moment  the  Anglo-Spanish  position 
grew  steadily  stronger,  and  it  may  be  said  with 
little  exaggeration  that  the  lines  of  Torres 
Vedras  mark  one  of  the  great  turning-points 


NAPOLEON 


176 

in  Napoleonic  history.  xFor  it  was  essentially 
the  commercial  necessities  of  the  war  against 

O 

Great  Britain  that  led  to  the  rupture  between 
France  and  Russia  in  1812.'  Even  in  northern 
Germany,  —  notwithstanding  armies  of  custom¬ 
house  officers,  repressive  and  inquisitive  laws, 
wholesale  burnings  and  destroyings,  —  British 
goods  still  found  a  market,  though  at  exorbitant 
rates.  The  Baltic  trade  was  still  carried  on 
under  the  neutral  flag,  and  Russia,  in  defiance 
of  the  continued  representations  of  the  French 
ambassador,  did  not  defend  herself  very  strenu¬ 
ously  against  the  importation  of  British  luxuries. 
The  court  party  at  St.  Petersburg  constantly 
opposed  the  French  policy,  and  Alexander  was 
easily  convinced  that  he  must  arm  and  prepare 
to  struggle  against  Napoleon's  dictation\ 

In  the  spring  of  1811  both  empires  were 
openly  preparing  for  war,  yet  in  Paris  all 
appeared  prosperous^  Never  had  Napoleon 
enjoyed  the  splendour  of  reigning  as  he  did 
at  this  period,  and  his  last  wish  was  gratified 
/when,  on  the  20th  of  March  1811,  the  Empress 
Maria  Louisa  gave  birth  to  a  son  whom  he 
named  King  of  RomeV  The  title  of  this  ill- 
fated  child,  taken  from  what  was  now  the 
second  city  of  the  Empire,  was  reminiscent  of 
the  King  of  the  Romans,  the  appointed  succes- 


THE  AUSTRIAN  MARRIAGE  177 

sor  to  the  crown  of  the  Germanic  Roman 
Empire  that  Napoleon  had  destroyed. 

'In  the  early  part  of  1812  came  the  long- 
expected  crisis  in  the  relations  of  France  and 
Russia'.  Napoleon  summoned  Alexander  to 
carry  out  his  obligations  and  exclude  British 
commerce;  elusive  answers  were  returned,  and 
the  troops  received  marching  orders.  Napoleon 
had  often  declared  that  an  invasion  of  Russia 
was  a  foolhardy  undertaking,  and  that  he  would 
never,  as  Charles  XII.  had,  lead  an  army  to 
destruction  in  the  steppes.  He  had  always  dis¬ 
liked  the  enterprise,  and  it  was  only  the  alter¬ 
native  of  seeing  the  continental  blockade  policy 
fail  that  drove  him  into  it.  His  preparations 
were  of  the  most  elaborate  nature  ;  the  army  he 
assembled  was  gigantic.  In  18 11  the  move¬ 
ment  of  these  masses  from  France,  Germany, 
and  Italy  towards  Poland  and  Russia  had  begun.) 
Every  little  detail  of  organization  and  especially 
of  transport  received  the  Emperor’s  personal 
attention.  Austria  was  summoned  to  affirm  her 
alliance  by  placing  an  army  in  the  field,  and 
sent  thirty  thousand  men  to  the  frontier  under 
Schwarzenberg ;  this  body  formed  Napoleon’s 
extreme  right.  Unfortunate  Prussia  was  com¬ 
pelled,  at  the  point  of  the  sword,  also  to  furnish 
a  body  of  troops  which,  together  with  a  French 
12 


NAPOLEON 


178 

corps  under  the  command  of  Marshal  Mac¬ 
donald,  was  to  operate  along  the  Baltic  and 
form  the  extreme  left.  In  the  centre  came  the 
vast  hosts  that  Napoleon  in  person  was  to  lead.) 
The  old  corps  of  the  Grande  Armee,  under  such 
leaders  as  Davoust,  Ney,  Oudinot,  St.  Cyr,  Bes- 
sieres,  Junot,  Victor;  the  massed  cavalry,  chas¬ 
seurs,  lancers,  dragoons,  and  cuirassiers  under 
the  King  of  Naples;  the  Westphalians  under 
King  Jerome;  the  Italians  under  Prince  Eu¬ 
gene;  the  Poles  under  Poniatowski ;  the  Saxons, 
the  Bavarians,  the  magnificent  divisions  of  the 
Old  and  Young  Guard,  with  its  veteran  bodies 
of  grenadiers  and  voltigeurs  and  its  superb  horse 
artillery  and  cavalry,  — \all  made  up  a  central 
army  of  more  than  three  hundred  thousand 
men\  Including  the  flanking  armies  and  the 
supports  that  followed  the  main  columns,  it  is 
calculated  that  over  five  hundred  thousand 
men  marched  into  Russia  that  summer; 

As  had  been  the  case  in  1807  it  was  well  on 
in  June  before  active  operations  became  pos¬ 
sible.  Napoleon  and  Maria  Louisa  made  a 
short  stay  at  Dresden,  capital  of  their  ally,  the 
King  of  Saxony ;  there  they  met  the  Emperor 
and  Empress  of  Austria,  with  many  of  the 
Princes  of  Germany.  Thence  the  Emperor 
proceeded  to  join  his  army  whose  columns 


THE  AUSTRIAN  MARRIAGE  179 

were  already  converging  on  the  Niemen.  The 
French  army  crossed  that  river,  nearly  one  thou¬ 
sand  miles  from  the  frontiers  of  France,  on  the 
24th  of  June  18 1 2)  Napoleon  hoped  to  be 
opposed,  to  crush  the  Russian  generals  with 
his  superior  numbers,  and  to  conclude  a  prompt 
peace  without  advancing  far ;  but  in  all  this  he 
was  disappointed.  The  advance  of  the  French 
was  opposed  only  by  Cossacks  or  light  cavalry, 
the  Russians  showed  no  sign  of  effective  resist¬ 
ance.  On  the  28th  Napoleon  reached  Wilna, 
and  so  disinclined  was  he  to  plunge  further  into 
the  half-desert  country  beyond  that  he  stayed 
there  three  weeks  hoping  for  some  arrange¬ 
ment.  But  Alexander  gave  no  sign ;  he  had 
long  foreseen  the  situation  that  now  faced  him, 
and  both  he  and  his  advisers  believed  that 
Napoleon  could  be  defeated.  \More  than  two 
hundred  thousand  Russians  were  in  the  field, 
but  the  Czar  had  decided  not  to  rely  on  his 
troops  alone,  but  also  on  the  nature  of  his  coun¬ 
try.  From  the  Niemen  to  Moscow  was  a  dis¬ 
tance  of  some  seven  hundred  miles  through 
thinly  peopled  steppes  in  which  supplies  could 
only  be  obtained  during  the  summer  months. 
Moscow  was  nearly  two  thousand  miles  from 
Paris'^  and  between  them  lay  hostile  Europe  ; 
was  it  possible  that  Napoleon  could  maintain 


NAPOLEON 


1 80 

himself  there?  Such  was  the  Czar’s  reasoned 
attitude,  and  the  Russian  armies  were  given 
orders  not  to  engage,  but  to  fall  back  before 
the  French  advance,  until  a  favourable  oppor¬ 
tunity  should  arise. 

Finding  the  occupation  of  Wilna  fruitless, 
Napoleon  advanced  into  the  interior  of  Russia, 
and  after  an  action  with  the  enemy’s  rear  guard 
occupied  Smolensk  on  the  18th  of  August. 
His  line  was  now  extremely  extended ;  his 
transport  arrangements  had  broken  down ;  the 
army  was  much  disorganized.  'Yet,  against 
the  feeling  of  all  the  marshals,  he  decided  that 
the  war  must  be  brought  to  a  conclusion  by  a 
decisive  move  and  ordered  the  advance  to 
Moscow. 

The  Czar  now  departed  from  his  policy  of 
retreat,  for  it  was  impossible  and  impolitic  to 
resist  the  clamour  of  the  Russian  army  to  fight ; 
it  was  decided  to  make  a  stand  before  Moscow 
and  Kutusoff  selected  a  strong  position  barring 
the  road  at  Borodino  on  the  Moskva.  Here 
on  the  7th  of  September  the  two  armies  met, 
the  French  numbering  rather  more,  the  Rus¬ 
sians  rather  less  than  one  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand  men.  j  The  fighting  was  of  a  des¬ 
perate  character  and  might  have  ended  in  a 
decisive  victory  for  Napoleon  had  he  consented 


THE  AUSTRIAN  MARRIAGE  181 


to  employ  the  Guard  ;  but  he  probably  already 
viewed  his  position  so  far  from  France  with 
secret  anxiety  and  would  not  risk  impairing 
the  efficiency  of  that  splendid  body.  As  it  was, 
a  bare  victory  was  won  at  the  frightful  cost  of 
not  less  than  thirty  thousand  men  to  each  side? 
and  Kutusoff  retreated  during  the  night,  leaving 
Moscow  at  the  mercy  of  the  French. 

Napoleon  entered  the  ancient  capital  of 
Russia  on  the  14th  of  September  and  there 
awaited  once  more  proposals  for  peace  from 
Alexander.  But  they  came  not,  and  Moscow 
itself  was  burned  down  by  incendiaries.  It 
was  difficult  to  feed  the  army  from  day  to  day, 
and  the  Cossacks  made  foraging  difficult.  The 
total  of  the  Grande  Arm'ee  after  its  losses  in 
detachments  and  in  action  was  barely  ninety 
thousand  men.  The  King  of  Naples  was  hard 
pressed  to  maintain  his  line  of  outposts  against 
Kutusoff,  and  suffered  one  severe  reverse.  Au¬ 
tumn  was  now  nearly  spent  and  to  delay  longer 
was  madness  ;  on  the  1 8th  of  October  Napoleon 
began  his  retreat.  He  attempted  to  follow  a 
road  to  the  south  of  that  by  which  he  had  ad¬ 
vanced,  so  as  to  pass  through  country  not  yet 
wasted  by  war.  But  Kutusoff  barred  the  way, 
and  for  some  days  there  was  heavy  fighting  and 
marching.  It  appears  probable  that  Napoleon 


i82 


NAPOLEON 


could  have  forced  a  passage,  but  he  dared  not 
draw  too  largely  on  his  reserves  of  ammunition 
and  abandoned  the  road  throusrh  Kalou^a  to 
return  to  that  by  which  he  had  advanced,  past 
the  ghastly  fields  of  Borodino,  where  the  remains 
of  thousands  of  their  unburied  comrades  greeted 
the  retreating  troops.  In  the  first  week  of 
November,  when  midway  to  Smolensk,  the 
Grande  Armee  was  suddenly  struck  by  the  first 
wave  of  the  Russian  winter.  vThe  roads  became 
frozen  sheets  of  ice  and  in  a  week  nearly  all  the 
horses  perished.  The  cavalry  was  dismounted 
and  could  no  longer  patrol  and  ward  off  the 
Cossacks;  many  of  the  guns  had  to  be  aban¬ 
doned,  and  there  was  no  artillery  to  fight  a  big 
battle  ;  the  convoy  was  in  large  part  unhorsed, 
and  the  army’s  supplies  had  to  be  abandoned. 
Food  had  been  scanty  enough  from  the  first, 
but  now  the  soldiers  had  little  else  than  what 
they  could  find  in  the  desolate  villages  they  had 
already  plundered  in  their  advance.  The  ma¬ 
rauders  were  cut  down  and  captured  by  the 
Cossacks,  and  the  army  began  to  melt  at  a 
frightful  rate.  There  was  nothing  to  do  now 
but  to  press  forward,  giving  Kutusoff  no  time 
to  catch  up  the  fugitives  before  they  reached 
Smolensk.  At  that  point  were  large  maga¬ 
zines,  and  there  Napoleon  hoped  he  would  be 


THE  AUSTRIAN  MARRIAGE  183 

able  to  restore  order  and  perhaps  take  winter 
quarters. 

But  the  disintegration  and  demoralization  of 
the  starving  army  made  such  alarming  progress 
that  Napoleon  was  only  able  to  stay  a  few  hours 
at  Smolensk.  The  first  column  of  the  fugitives 
to  reach  the  town  threw  themselves  on  the 
magazines,  and,  before  the  last  passed  out, 
it  had  been  completely  pillaged  and  gutted. 
Just  beyond  Smolensk  Kutusoff  succeeded  in 
throwing  his  leading  division  across  the*  road, 
cutting  off  the  French  rear  guard  under 
Ney.  The  marshal  succeeded  in  holding 
his  ground  all  day,  crossed  the  Dnieper  on 
the  ice  during  the  night,  made  a  long  detour, 
and  finally  rejoined  the  army  a  few  days  later;  _ 
but  his  corps  had  dwindled  away  to  less  than 
a  hundred  men.  The  army  was  now  reduced 
to  some  fifteen  thousand  men ;  it  presented  an 
appalling  spectacle  of  misery  and  appeared 
doomed.  At  its  head  marched  Napoleon  clad 
in  furs  and  supporting  himself  with  a  stick,  his 
face  covered  with  a  beard,  his  expression  set 
but  curiously  placid.  Behind  him  marched  a 
new  formed  corps  in  which  the  rank  and  file 
were  captains  or  lieutenants,  and  officers  of  the 
highest  rank  acted  as  majors  and  captains. 
Then  on  the  road  came  a  few  harnessed  wag- 


NAPOLEON 


1 84 

ons  with  the  Emperor’s  papers  and  war  chest, 
and  behind  them  a  long  column  of  men  in* 
which  only  here  and  there  was  there  any  sem¬ 
blance  of  alignment  or  discipline.  Towards  the 
end  came  the  stragglers,  unarmed,  limping,  half 
frozen,  some  wandering  away  with  ravenous 
looks,  others  dropping  by  the  roadside.  Thus 
marched  the  army  in  several  divisions  from 
Smolensk  westwards. 

Between  Smolensk  and  the  river  Berezina, 
a  few  days’  march  distant,  was  the  most  critical 
point  of  the  retreat.  To  the  north  of  Smolensk, 
Oudinot  and  Victor  had  been  operating  to 
cover  the  line  of  communications  against  a 
Russian  army  under  Wittgenstein.  They  were 
now  retreating  before  him  to  join  Napoleon, 
with  some  eighteen  thousand  men  in  fair 
fighting  condition.  So  here  were  two  French 
armies  converging  on  the  Berezina,  one  from 
the  east  the  other  from  the  north-east,  each 
with  a  superior  Russian  force  in  hot  pur¬ 
suit.  -  But  there  was  a  third  Russian  army 
marching  from  a  totally  different  direction, 
the  south  ;  that  army  under  the  command  of 
Tchitchagof  was  on  the  further  side  of  the 
Berezina  and  reached  its  southern  bank  just 
in  time  to  oppose  the  passage  of  the  French. 
To  make  matters  worse  for  Napoleon  the 


THE  AUSTRIAN  MARRIAGE  185 

wave  of  cold  was  now  spent,  a  thaw  had  set 
in,  the  ice  was  broken  up,  and  the  rivers  were 
impassable. 1 

To  steal  apassage  across  the  Berezina  between 
the  three  converging  Russian  armies  was  now 
the  only  means  of  escape,  and  Napoleon  solved 
the  problem  on  familiar  lines.  He  demon¬ 
strated  ostentatiously  at  the  point  where  he  did 
not  mean  to  cross,  and  thus  persuaded  Tchitcha- 
gof  to  draw  off  his  troops  from  the  point  he 
had  decided  on.  Victor’s  and  Oudinot’s  corps 
were  drawn  up  so  as  to  hold  off  Wittgenstein 
and  Kutusoff,  and  the  long  train  of  fugitives  be¬ 
gan  to  cross  the  bridges.  The  passage  closed 
in  disaster.  Wittgenstein  drove  in  the  French 
rear  guard  long  before  the  crowd  of  fugitives 
had  finished  crossing;  many  of  the  stampeded 
mob  were  crowded  into  the  river ;  the  Russian 
artillery  found  them  an  easy  target  and,  most 
horrible  of  all,  the  French  rear  guard  corps 
whose  efficiency  made  them  too  precious  to  lose, 
received  orders  to  force  their  way  through  to 
the  bridge  by  firing  on  their  disbanded  and  un¬ 
armed  comrades.  Last  of  all  the  bridges  were 
broken  down  amid  the  despairing  shrieks  of 
the  wretched  beings  who  saw  in  them  their 
only  avenue  to  safety.  The  tragic  passage  of 
the  Berezina  cost  the  French  army  about  eigh- 


1 86  NAPOLEON 

teen  thousand  lives,  roughly  one  half  of  its 
strength. 

No  sooner  had  the  remnant  of  the  army 
crossed  than  a  second  and  more  severe  cold 
wave  overtook  it.'  The  Russian  pursuit,  save 
that  of  the  Cossacks,  was  now  fairly  distanced, 
but  Nature  proved  an  even  more  terrible  de¬ 
stroyer.  Thefew remaining  thousands  struggled 
on,  but  hunger  and  cold  killed  the  greater  part. 
Every  morning  fewer  men  arose  from  the  snowy 
bivouacs  than  had  lain  down  the  night  before^ 
Advancing  supports  fared  no  better  than  the 
exhausted  men  who  had  marched  the  whole 
weary  way  from  Moscow.  Two  regiments  of 
light  horse  of  the  Neapolitan  Royal  Guard, 
freshly  arrived  from  the  south,  were  nearly  en¬ 
tirely  destroyed  in  two  nights  without  even 
seeing  the  enemy. 

At  Gumbinnen  near  the  frontier  Napoleon 
decided  to  leave  the  army  for  Paris,  where  his 
presence  was  urgently  required.  He  handed 
over  the  command  to  the  King  of  Naples,  and 
wrote  the  famous  Twenty-ninth  Bulletin  of  the 
Grande  Arm'ee ,  in  which  he  acknowledged  such 
parts  of  the  catastrophe  that  had  overtaken  him 
as  it  was  useless  to  deny.  But  in  what  light  did 
that  great  calamity,  that  direct  and  awful  warn¬ 
ing  of  Nature  as  many  thought  it,  appear  to  him 


THE  AUSTRIAN  MARRIAGE  187 

on  whose  shoulders  was  its  responsibility?  He 
closed  the  Bulletin  with  the  words:  “The  Em¬ 
peror  has  never  been  in  better  health  ”!  The 
awful  destruction,  and  death,  and  sorrow,  the 
loss  of  so  many  brave  lives,  all  counted  but  as 
an  incident  in  the  personal  career  of  a  soldier 
of  fortune ! 

On  the  6th  of  December  the  fugitives  reached 
Wilna,  still  numbering  twenty  thousand  men.1 
When  Marshal  Ney,  the  bravest  of  the  brave, 
musket  in  hand,  brought  the  rear  guard  in  to 
Konigsberg  some  days  later,  he  counted  less 
than  one  thousand  men  under  arms. 

1  The  discrepancy  in  figures  is  only  apparent.  As  the  army 
retreated  it  picked  up  some  detachments  left  in  garrison,  and 
met  others  advancing  from  the  base. 


CHRONOLOGY 


2  April, 

1810. 

Marriage  of  Napoleon  and  Maria 

Louisa. 

July, 

Ct 

Wellington  retreats  on  lines  of  Torres 

Vedras. 

20  March, 

1811. 

Birth  of  the  King  of  Rome. 

24  June, 

1812. 

French  army  invades  Russia. 

7  Sept., 

u 

Borodino. 

14  “ 

u 

Moscow  occupied. 

1 88 


NAPOLEON 


1 8  Oct.,  1812.  Retreat  begun. 

26-29  Nov.,  “  Passage  of  the  Berezina. 

5  Dec.,  “  Napoleon  leaves  army  for  Paris. 

NOTE 

Bibliographical:  General.  —  Seepage  11. 

For  the  negotiations  and  rupture  between  France  and 
Russia  see  Vandal,  Napoleon  et  Alexandre.  For  the  divorce 
and  second  marriage  of  Napoleon,  see  Welschinger,  Le 
divorce  de  Napoleon,  Paris,  1889  ;  Helfert,  Marie  Louise, 
Vienna,  1882.  For  the  campaign  of  Russia  the  classical  but 
not  very  trustworthy  account  is  that  of  Segur,  Histoire,  Paris, 
1873  ;  f°r  picturesque  details  see  such  Memoirs  as  Wil¬ 
son,  Belliard,  Marbot,  Bausset,  Bourgogne,  and  others ; 
also  among  more  recent  writers  :  Margueron,  Campagne  de 
Lassie,  Paris,  1897  (only  in  part  published)  ;  George, 
Napoleon's  Invasion  of  Russia,  London,  1899. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  GERMANY  AND  ITALY 
1813 

Effects  of  the  Russian  Catastrophe  —  Lutzen  and  Bautzen  — 
Austrian  Intervention  —  Dresden  —  Leipzig  —  Murat  and 
Italy. 

THE  great  catastrophe  of  Russia  had  a 
twofold  effect,  material  and  moral.  It 
destroyed  the  veteran  army  that  had 
for  so  long  imposed  its  master’s  will  on  the 
Continent,  it  broke  the  spell  of  invincibility 
that  had  so  often  paralyzed  Napoleon’s  enemies. 
Schwarzenberg,  who  had  done  little  or  nothing, 
concluded  a  military  convention  with  the  Rus¬ 
sian  general  and  withdrew  his  troops.  The 
Prussians  serving  under  Macdonald  deserted 
him  and)before  many  weeks  had  passed,  the  Prus¬ 
sian  government  plucked  up  enough  courage 
to  approve  this  course  officially,  signed  a  treaty 
of  alliance  with  Russia  (Kalisch,  February  27) 
and  declared  war.  The  King  of  Naples  soon 
abandoned  his  trust  as  commander-in-chief  to 
return  to  his  capital,  and  Prince  Eugene,  who 
assumed  command,  then  gradually  withdrew  the 

189 


190 


NAPOLEON 


small  army  he  had  collected  from  the  Vistula 
to  the  Oder,  and  then  from  the  Oder  to  the 
Elbe;  his  numbers  were  quite  insufficient  to 
meet  the  Russians  and  Prussians  in  the  field. 

Meanwhile  Napoleon  in  Paris  was  making 
gigantic  efforts  to  retrieve  his  impaired  fortunes. 
New  levies  were  raised  amounting  for  the  whole 
year  1813  to  over  a  million  men.  .Women, 
^children  and  old  men  did  the  work  of  the  fields, 
while  every  able-bodied  man  and  boy  was  seized 
by  the  conscription,  passed  through  the  barrack- 
yard,  armed,  uniformed,  and  marched  on  the 
road  to  Germany) 

By  the  month  of  April  Napoleon  once  more 
had  a  large  army  across  the  Rhine  rapidly  ad¬ 
vancing  to  join  that  of  Prince  Eugene)  The 
Emperor  took  command  in  person  and  pushed 
on  towards  Leipzig.  He  effected  his  junction 
with  the  prince  and  was  preparing  to  march  on 
Berlin  when  he  was  attacked  in  flank  by  the 
,/ Russians  and  Prussians  under  Wittgenstein  and 
Blucher  at  Lutzen  (May  2).  Here  a  great 
battle  was  fought  and  the  French  conscripts 
astonished  their  generals  and  brought  victory 
back  to  the  imperial  standards.  But  Lutzen 
was  a  hard-fought  field  barely  won,  and  Napo¬ 
leon’s  lack  of  cavalry  prevented  his  impeding 
the  retreat  of  the  allies. 


Campaign  of  Germany,  1813 


GERMANY  AND  ITALY  191 

Three  weeks  later  another  battle  was  fought, 
with  much  the  same  results  at  Bautzen./  In 
the  pursuit  that  followed  into  Silesia  Napoleon 
once  more  sadly  missed  an  efficient  force  of 
cavalry  and  on  the  4th  of  June  he  agreed  to  an 
armistice  that  gave  him  Saxony  and  the  line 
of  the  Elbe.  He  hoped  by  this  means  to  gain 
time  to  bring  up  his  strength  in  men  and  horses, 
but  as  events  turned  out,  the  suspension  of 
hostilities  proved  more  to  the  advantage  of  the 
allies.  During  this  armistice  came  the  news 
of  Wellington’s  decisive  victory  at  Vittoria 
which  drove  the  French  from  Spain,  and 
Austria  notified  France  that  she  was  prepared 
to  offer  her  mediation  with  a  view  to  peace/ 

As  soon  as  Metternich  had  realized  the  mas;- 
nitude  of  the  disaster  that  had  overtaken  the 
French  army  in  Russia,  he  determined  to  pre¬ 
pare  to  take  advantage  of  it,  but  advanced  with 
prudence.  The  Austrian  army  was  rapidly  in¬ 
creased  and  placed  on  a  war  footing,  and  after 
many  hesitations  due  to  the  timidity  of  the 
Emperor  Francis,  Austria  finally  put  forward 
her  conditions.  These  were  broadly  that  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw  should  be  abolished ; 
that  Prussia  should  regain  her  boundaries  of 
1805  ;\  that  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine 
should  be  dissolved,  and  that  Austria  should 


192 


NAPOLEON 


regain  Trieste  and  Dalmatia.  There  followed 
interviews  between  Napoleon  and  Metternich, 
extensions  of  the  armistice,  a  peace  Congress 
at  Prague,  but  the  Emperor  never  meant  to 
accept  peace,  he  was  only  negotiating  to  gain 
time.  The  upshot  was  that  Austria,  on  her 
mediation  failing,  joined  the  allied  Powers. 

On  the  10th  of  August  hostilities  were 
resumed,  and  Napoleon  now  had  to  face  an 
Austrian  army  of  two  hundred  thousand  men 
besides  those  of  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Sweden.) 
For  Sweden  had  now  joined  the  allies  ;  Mar¬ 
shal  Bernadotte  had  been  elected  Crown  Prince 
three  years  before  and  now  led  her  army,  while 
another  Frenchman,  General  Moreau,  had  left 
the  United  States  and  joined  the  staff  of  the 
Czar  Alexander.  Even  Murat,  sick  of  war  and 
anxious  for  his  throne,  had  been  engaged  in 
negotiations  with  Austria,  while  the  French 
army  was  utterly  dispirited  and  longed  for  peace. 
The  marshals  were  weary  and  entreated  the 
Emperor  to  accept  reasonable  conditions,  the 
conscripts  mutilated  themselves  by  thousands 
so  as  to  be  sent  home.  Yet  Napoleon’s  relent¬ 
less  energy  drove  his  army  to  victory  once 
more.\  At  Dresden,  on  the  27th  of  August,  the 
Austrians  under  Schwarzenberg  were  heavily 
defeated,  largely  owing  to  the  King  of  Naples’ 


GERMANY  AND  ITALY  193 


brilliant  leadership  of  the  French  right.  Then 
followed  a  series  of  inconclusive  manoeuvres 
and  partial  engagements  in  which  the  allies 
were  constantly  successful  against  the  detached 
French  corps.  The  weather  was  inclement, 
the  country  exhausted,  and  the  French  army 
was  reduced  to  some  two  hundred  thousand 
men, Awhile  that  of  the  allies  had  gradually  in¬ 
creased  to  more  than  double  that  figure.  Ger¬ 
many  was  now  partly  in  arms,  and  as  success 
appeared  more  hopeful,  defection  spread  from 
one  State  to  another.  North,  south,  and  east 
of  the  Elbe  between  Dresden  and  Magdeburg 
three  great  allied  armies  nearly  surrounded  that 
of  Napoleon,  avoiding  battle  with  him,  but 
engaging  his  marshals  when  he  was  absent. 
Finally,  on  Bavaria  joining  the  allies,  Schwar- 
zenbers:  moved  from  Bohemia  westwards  and 


threatened  to  strike  at  the  Mayence-Leipzig 
road  in  Napoleon’s  rear.  The  Emperor  now 
divided  his  army  ;  one  half  marched  northwards 
under  his  own  orders  for  a  stroke  at  Blucher 
or  Bernadotte ;  the  other  under  the  King  of 
Naples  was  left  to  contain  Schwarzenberg. 
Napoleon  failed  in  his  attempt  to  bring  the 
Prusso-Russians,  or  Swedes,  to  an  engage¬ 
ment,  and  fell  back  towards  Leipzig;  at  the 
same  time  the  King  of  Naples  retired  towards 


*3 


1 94- 


NAPOLEON 


the  same  point,  pressed  hard  by  Schwarzenberg’s 
superior  numbers. 

)  All  the  armies  were  now  converging  from 
south,  east,  and  north  on  Leipzig,  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  French,  three  hundred  thou¬ 
sand  allies,  and  on  the  16th  and  18th  of  October 
a  decisive  battle  was  fought  there.!  The  French, 
placed  in  a  semicircle,  fought  on  the  defensive, 
but  were  slowly  and  surely  driven  back.  A 
dramatic  incident  marked  the  second  day’s 
fighting,  when  a  corps  of  Saxon  troops  left 
their  position  in  the  French  lines  and  went 
over  to  the  enemy.  \On  the  night  of  the  19th 
Napoleon,  though  hard  pressed  and  driven 
back,  still  held  positions  covering  the  town,  but 
he  was  virtually  defeated  and  had  not  enough 
ammunition  in  hand  to  continue  the  struggle.'. 
Orders  for  a  retreat  were  therefore  issued. 
But  to  leave  Leipzig  by  the  road  to  Mayence 
a  bridge  over  the  Elster  had  to  be  crossed. 
This  was  insufficient  for  the  passage  of  the 
army,  and  Napoleon,  bent  as  ever  on  the  offen¬ 
sive,  had  neglected  to  make  provision  for  a 
retreat.  \On  the  morning  of  the  19th  the  last 
French  corps  were  caught  in  the  trap,  and  the 
bridge  was  blown  up  when  thirty  thousand  men 
or  more  were  still  on  the  further  bank.!  Probably 
Napoleon’s  total  losses  at  Leipzig  did  not  fall 


GERMANY  AND  ITALY  195 

far  short  of  sixty  thousand  meql,  and  a  few 
weeks  later  the  army  he  led  back  across  the 
Rhine  only  numbered  about  seventy  thousand. 

An  incident  of  this  retreat  must  now  be 
mentioned  that  will  lead  to  a  digression  on  the 
affairs  of  Italy  hitherto  somewhat  neglected. 
A  few  days  after  leaving  Leipzig  Joachim 
Murat  suddenly  left  headquarters  and,  travel¬ 
ling  post-haste,  returned  to  Naples,  where  he 
arrived  in  the  first  week  of  November.  ‘'Murat, 
like  nearly  every  one  of  Napoleon’s  generals, 
was  heartily  sick  of  war,  and  now  considered 
the  Emperor  irretrievably  defeated.  He  hoped 
for  a  prompt  peace,  but  was  anxious,  whatever 
happened,  to  maintain  his  own  position  as 
King  of  Naples.  If  fighting  were  to  continue 
this  could  only  be  done,  so  he  thought,  either 
by  treating  with  the  allies  or  in  another  way, 
one  that  opens  up  a  large  and  interesting 
question  of  policy. 

By  various  consecutive  steps,  by  the  creation 
of  the  kingdom  of  Italy,  by  the  conquest  of 
the  kingdom  of  Naples,  by  the  absorption^ 
of  the  States  of  the  Church,  Napoleon  had 
brought  all  the  peninsula  of  Italy  under  his 
rule.  For  the  first  time  since  the  days  of 
Rome,  Italians  from  north  and  from  south 
fought  under  the  same  flag,  obeyed  similar 


NAPOLEON 


196 

laws,  were  governed  by  the  same  system ;  and 
this  too  was  the  work  of  a  man  of  Italian 
race.  The  designation  he  had  chosen  for  his 
Lombard  provinces,  the  declarations  he  had 
made  during  the  campaign  of  1796,  the  title 
he  had  given  his  son,  were  all  indications 
of  a  possible  creation  of  an  Italian  nationality. 
I  Now  that  Germany  and  Spain  were  lost,  now 
that  victorious  Austria  was  on  the  point  of 
invading  her  lost  provinces  south  of  the  Alps, 
the  question  arose :  how  were  they  to  be 
defended?  Prince  Eugene,  Viceroy  of  Italy, 
had  been  sent  to  assume  command  of  such 
troops  as  could  be  collected.  But  his  army 
was  small,  there  was  no  public  spirit  behind 
him,  and  the  King  of  Naples  persistently 
declined  to  move  his  troops  to  assist  the 
Prince.  Murat  wanted  to  do  one  of  two 
things :  either  to  obtain  a  guarantee  of  his 
throne  from  Austria  and  Great  Britain,  or  to 
obtain  from  Napoleon  a  declaration  creating 
Italy  one,  and  giving  him  the  command  of 
her  combined  and  now  national  resources.  In 
the  latter  case  he  made  sure  that,  joining  his 
troops  to  those  of  the  Viceroy  and  supported 
by  the  nationalist  sentiment  of  the  people,  he 
could  successfully  resist  any  Austrian  invasion. 
Appealing  both  to  Metternich  and  to  Napoleon, 


GERMANY  AND  ITALY  197 

he  found  the  former  willing,  the  latter  unwill¬ 
ing  to  treat.  The  dream  of  Italian  unity 
faded  and  Murat  turned  traitor  to  his  old 
colours  by  signing  a  treaty  of  alliance  with 
Austria  on  the  nth  of  January  1814.]  At  that 
date  the  Austrians  had  already  occupied  Vene- 
tia  to  the  south  of  the  Alps,  while  to  the  north 
they  had  crossed  the  Rhine  and  were  marching 
on  Paris. 

CHRONOLOGY 

Lutzen. 

Bautzen. 

|  Armistice. 

Wellington  successful  at  Vittoria. 
Dresden. 

Leipzig. 

NOTE 

Bibliographical:  General.  —  Seepage  11. 

For  the  negotiations  between  Napoleon  and  Metternich, 
see  the  latter’s  Memoirs.  For  the  war  in  Germany  gen¬ 
erally,  see  Oncken,  Oesterreich  und  Preussen,  Berlin,  1876  ; 
Luckwaldt,  Oesterreich  und  die  Aufdnge  des  Be/reiungs- 
krieges,  Berlin,  1894;  Pain,  Manuscrit  de  1813,  Paris, 
1824.  For  the  affairs  of  Italy,  see  Helfert,  Murat, 
Vienna,  1878,  and  Weil,  Lc  Prince  Eugene,  Paris,  1902, 
and  Johnston,  The  Napoleonic  Empire  in  Southern  Italy 
and  the  Rise  of  the  Secret  Societies,  London,  1904. 


2  May,  1813. 
21  “  “ 

4  June,  “ 
10  Aug.,  “ 

21  June,  “ 
26  Aug.,  “ 
16-18  Oct.  “ 


CHAPTER  XV 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANCE 

Napoleon's  last  Defence  —  St.  Dizier  —  Brienne  —  La  Rothi&re 
—  Montmirail  —  Laon —  Chatillon  —  Fall  of  Paris  —  Abdica¬ 
tion —  The  Final  Scene  at  Fontainebleau. 

DRIVEN  from  Russia  in  1812,  from 
Germany  in  1813,  Napoleon  was  now, 
in  1814,  preparing  to  defend  France.! 
Yet  peace  had  always  been  within  his  reach, 
and  even  after  so  many  disasters,  when  the 
allies  were  mustering  half  a  million  of  men 
on  the  frontiers  of  exhausted  France,  she 
might  still  have  retained  the  natural  frontiers 
won  by  the  Republic,  —  the  Alps  and  the 
Rhine.  During  the  last  few  months  negotia¬ 
tions  proceeded,  at  Frankfort,  at  Chalons;  but 
beneath  the  diplomatic  superficialities  and 
wrancdinRS  was  the  unmistakable  fact  that 
'Napoleon  was  always  thinking  of  victory 
rather  than  of  peace  jj  he  aimed  at  regaining 
the  whole  of  his  position  and  would  not 
accept  a  diminished  portion  ;  he  was  the  man 
of  success  and  could  not  acknowledge  defeat. 

198 


,  V  \ 

\  y  XrcUb---_r--C-  Mcmux  a  -« - 

-"'><Vitry  ;?_i--°-’TroyeS  f  i'  ''-v 

^  X  *  1 


Campaign  of  France,  1814 


i 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANCE  199 

His  strategy,  usually  so  sound,  was  weakened 
by  the  extravagant  possibilities  of  victory  his 
ardent  imagination  evoked.  He  forgot  that 
soldiers  were  not  machines  always  equally 
responsive  to  their  driver’s  impulsion,  and  be¬ 
lieved  that  by  military  means  such  as  his 
genius  could  devise  he  could  plant  the  French 
eagles  once  more  in  Berlin  and  on  the  Vistula. 
To  retain  his  hold  on  Germany  he  had  left 
one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  in  her 
fortresses  from  Dresden  to  Hamburg  and 
Dantzig ;  these  were  now  swallowed  up  and 
useless,  while  in  France  there  were  not  enough 
soldiers  to  guard  the  Rhine.  The  remnants 
of  the  army  that  had  retreated  from  Leipzig 
had  been  distributed  along  the  frontier,  but 
typhus'' broke  out  among  the  troops  and  caused 
immense  losses.  When  the  Austrians,  Prus¬ 
sians,  and  Russians,  some  two  hundred  thou-, 
sand  strong,  crossed  the  Rhine  at  the  beginning 
of  1814,  they  met  with  no  resistance  and 
slowly  advanced  into  a  country  where  there 
was  apparently  no  army  to  oppose  them. 

To  understand  the  extraordinary  military 
events  that  followed,  a  glance  at  the  accom¬ 
panying  map  is  necessary.  Paris  was  the 
objective  of  the  allies,  and  there  were  three 
converging  routes  by  which  they  might  ad- 


200 


NAPOLEON 


vance.  The  first  of  these  ran  south-east  from 
the  Rhine  through  Namur  and  Laon ;  the 
second,  starting  from  points  on  the  Rhine 
between  Mayence  and  Basle,  followed  roads 
converging  about  Vitry  and  Chalons,  and 
thence  took  the  valley  of  the  Marne  to  the 
capital;  the  third  was  parallel  to  the  second 
and  to  the  south  of  it,  following  the  valley 
of  the  Seine.  As  the  campaign  opened,  the 
great  force  of  the  allies  under  the  supreme 
command  of  Schwarzenberg,  accompanied  by 
the  Emperors  of  Austria  and  Russia  and  the 
Kins;  of  Prussia  had  reached  the  Marne 
and  Seine  unopposed;  Blucher  with  seventy 
thousand  Prussians  and  Russians  was  on  the 
northern  road,  Schwarzenberg  with  one  hun¬ 
dred  and  fifty  thousand  Austrians  on  the 
southern. 

Napoleon  had  now  collected  about  fifty  thou¬ 
sand  men,  mostly  raw  recruits,  at  Chalons,  and 
marched  rapidly  up  the  Marne  valley,  striking 
Blucher’s  advance  at  St.  Dizier  on  the  27th  of 
January.  Fierce  fighting  followed,  and  Blucher, 
unable  to  hold  his  ground,  retreated,  abandon¬ 
ing  the  line  of  the  Marne  and  marching  south 
towards  Schwarzenberg.  Napoleon  followed 
hard,  overtook  and  surprised  the  Prussians  at 
Brienne  on  the  29th,  and  there  once  more  drove 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANCE  201 


them  off  the  field.  And  here  it  may  be  as  well 
to  note  the  peculiar  advantage  Napoleon  had 
in  this  campaign.  He  was  fighti  ng  on  his  own 
srou  nd.  The  name  of  Brienne  has  once  before 

O 

appeared  in  this  history,  for  here  it  was  that 
Napoleon  had  passed  most  of  his  schoolboy 
days;  .how  little  could  he  foresee  then  that  he 
would  one  day  surprise  and  nearly  capture  a 
Prussian  commander-in-chief  in  the  old  chateau 
where  he  had  investigated  the  initial  mysteries 
of  mathematics  and  literature  ! 

But  the  Austrians  were  now  at  hand.  On 
the  day  following  his  defeat  at  Brienne,  Blucher 
effected  his  junction  with  Schwarzenberg. 
Napoleon  determined  to  make  an  attempt  to 
bar  their  advance.  He  selected  a  strong 
position  at  La  Rothiere,  and  there  fought  a 
desperate  defensive  battle  against  immensely 
superior  numbers  on  the  1st  of  February. 
Making  up  for  his  lack  of  infantry  and  cavalry 
by  employing  and  risking  the  loss  of  immense 
batteries,  he  made  a  gallant  defence,  and  at 
nightfall  was  still  maintaining  the  fight.  But 
the  French  army  had  lost  too  severely  and 
was  too  exhausted  to  renew  the  engagement, 
and  in  the  night  Napoleon  retreated  down  the 
valley  of  the  Seine,  eventually  taking  position 
at  Nogent.  He  was  now  extremely  dejected, 


202 


NAPOLEON 


and  it  may  be  that  for  a  few  days  at  this  time 
his  instructions  to  Caulaincourt  for  negotiating 
a  peace  were  sincere.  But  the  aspect  of  affairs 
soon  changed. 

Their  victory  at  La  Rothiere  made  Blucher 
and  Schwarzenberg  lose  sight  of  the  extraordi¬ 
nary  and  indomitable  resource  of  their  enemy. 
The  original  scheme  was  resumed  and  Blucher 
returned  to  the  valley  of  the  Marne,  leaving 
Schwarzenberg  to  follow  that  of  the  Seine. 
From  Nogent  Napoleon  eagerly  watched  their 
movements.  With  a  detached  corps  he  demon¬ 
strated  in  Schwarzenberg’s  front  and  delayed 
his  advance ;  then,  timing  his  march  with  mar¬ 
vellous  precision,  he  suddenly  moved  north 
towards  the  valley  of  the  Marne.  Blucher  was 
advancing  westwards  along  the  road  that  follows 
that  valley,  there  being  about  three  days’  march 
between  his  front  and  rear  divisions.  [On  the 
ioth  of  February  Napoleon  struck  this  long 
column  at  its  centre,  destroyed  that,  and  turn¬ 
ing  right  and  left  in  the  course  of  the  next  two 
days  completely  shattered  the  Prussian  armjA 
the  principal  engagements  being  fought  at 
Champaubert,  Montmirail,  and  Vauchamps. 
Blucher  beat  a  disordered  retreat,  and  Napoleon 
was  so  elated  at  his  brilliant  success  that  he 
confidently  declared  that  one  more  such  vie- 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANCE  203 

tory  would  carry  the  French  arms  to  central 
Germany. 

But  while  this  fighting  was  proceeding  in 
the  valley  of  the  Marne,  Schwarzenberg  had 
pushed  on  up  the  valley  of  the  Seine,  and  was 
now  getting  threateningly  near  Paris.  The  Em¬ 
peror  could  not  pursue  Blucher,  but  fell  back 
nearer  the  capital  to  watch  the  Austrian  move¬ 
ments,  and  decided  to  try  against  Schwarzen¬ 
berg  the  same  strategy  that  had  succeeded  so 
well  against  Blucher.  He  rapidly  transferred 
his  army  from  the  valley  of  the  Marne  to 
the  valley  of  the  Seine  once  more,  struck 
the  Austrian  line  of  advance  in  flank,  and 
severely  handled  their  columns  in  a  series  of 
engagements  of  which  those  at  Nangis  and 
Montereau  only  need  be  mentioned  (February 
1 7  to  22). n  On  the  23d  of  February  Napoleon 
had  advanced  as  far  as  Troyes,  and  Schwarzen¬ 
berg  was  falling  back  in  full  retreat. 

These  wonderfully  brilliant  results,  this  ap¬ 
pearance  of  success,  proved  elusive.  The  rein¬ 
forcements  sent  from  Paris  to  the  army  barely 
sufficed  to  fill  the  gaps  caused  by  casualties, 
disease,  and  the  wholesale  desertions  of  the 
conscripts.  There  was  a  dearth,  too,  of  muskets, 
and  the  withdrawal  of  troops  from  the  southern 
army  under  Soult  had  enabled  Wellington  to 


204 


NAPOLEON 


get  a  foothold  north  of  the  Pyrenees.  While 
Napoleon,  though  successful,  saw  his  strength 
decrease,  the  defeated  allies  were  being  daily 
reinforced.  A  large  number  of  fresh  troops 
had  now  joined  Blucher,  while  other  corps  had 
begun  operations  in  the  direction  of  Laon,  and, 
after  much  hesitation  and  debate,  the  assembled 
monarchs,  'statesmen,  and  generals  of  the  allies 
decided  that  the  march  on  Paris  must  be  re¬ 
sumed.  Blucher  once  more  advanced  down 
the  valley  of  the  Marne,  and  this  time  reached 
Meaux  before  Napoleon  could  arrest  his  move¬ 
ment.  No  sooner,  however,  had  Blucher  real¬ 
ized  that  the  Emperor  was  once  more  nearing 
his  flank  than  he  hastily  crossed  to  the  further 
bank  of  the  Marne  (March  3),  and  retreated 
towards  the  north.  Napoleon  pursued,  and 
manoeuvred  to  surround  the  Prussians,  but  was 
unsuccessful,  partly  owing  to  the  advance  of 
fresh  allied  corps  down  the  Namur-Laon-Paris 
'i  road.  On  the  7th  a  severe  action  was  fought 
at  Craonne  with  little  result:  Blucher,  however, 
retreated,  and  on  the  9th  at  Laon  once  more 
offered  battle,  and  this  time  with  success. 
Napoleon  was  severely  defeated  and  retreated 
to  Rheims.  Still  hoping  for  success,  however, 
and  learning  that  Schwarzenberg  was  again 
on  the  march  for  Paris,  he  left  Rheims  and 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANCE  205 

marched  hurriedly  southwards  to  attack  the 
Austrians  once  more.  On  the  20th  of  March 
the  French  advance  guard  came  into  contact 
with  an  Austrian  column  at  Arcis-sur-Aube. 
Soon  the  whole  of  Napoleon’s  little  army  was 
in  action  but  the  Emperor  discovered,  when  it 
was  too  late  to  disengage  himself,  that  it  was 
not  an  isolated  Austrian  corps  but  the  whole 
of  Schwarzenberg’s  army  that  faced  him.  The 
odds  were  too  great,  and  though  Napoleon 
rode  through  the  fiercest  fire,  apparently  court¬ 
ing  death,  he  could  not  avert  a  crushing  defeat. 
Beaten  by  both  Prussians  and  Austrians,  his 
army  shattered,  all  hope  of  success  now  seemed 
lost;  but  Napoleon  played  one  last  desperate 
card.  Instead  of  retreating  towards  Paris,  he 
issued  orders  for  the  army  to  march  north-east, 
towards  the  Rhine.  His  object  was  to  base 
himself  on  the  frontier  fortresses,  to  sweep 
aside  the  allied  forces  blockading  them,  and  to 
operate  against  Schwarzenberg’s  and  Bluchers 
lines  of  communications.  It  was  a  defensible 
move  from  a  strictly  military  point  of  view, 
but  was  feeble  politically.  For  there  was  now 
a  Bourbon  movement  forming,  and  Napoleon 
had  driven  France  to  such  a  pass  that  peace 
would  have  appeared  a  cheap  blessing  to  nearly 
all  men  at  any  cost.  At  Paris  was  a  weak 


206 


NAPOLEON 


government,  the  Empress,  the  King  of  Rome, 
Joseph  Bonaparte,  with  few  troops,  little  hope, 
and  no  ability.  An  occupation  of  the  city 
would  mean  the  proclamation  of  the  Bourbons 
and  the  downfall  of  Napoleon. 

Detaching  a  large  force  of  cavalry  to  mask  his 
movements,  Schwarzenberg  risked  his  line  of 
communications,  pushed  straight  on  for  Paris, 
effected  his  junction  with  Blucherin  the  neigh¬ 
bourhood  of  Meaux,  and  on  the  29th  of  March 
arrived  under  the  walls  of  the  capital.  One 
day  earlier  Napoleon  at  Doulevent  realized  that 
his  manoeuvre  had  not  drawn  his  opponents  from 
their  objective,  and  that  Paris  was  in  imminent 
danger;  he  decided  to  start  for  the  capital. 
He  travelled  post-haste,  taking  a  southerly 
route  by  the  Seine  valley,  leaving  the  army  to 
follow  him.  On  the  evening  of  the  30th  he 
reached  Fontainebleau  with  a  few  attendants, 
where  he  received  reports  that  heavy  fighting 
had  been  going  on  before  Paris,  and  that  it 
had  capitulated.  \He  continued  his  journey, 
and,  a  few  miles  further  on,  met  the  troops 
that  had  just  left  the  city  by  the  terms  of 
capitulation.  General  Belliard  urged  him  to 
give  up  all  thought  of  proceeding,  and  he 
turned  back  to  Fontainebleau,  where  he  took 
up  his  quarters  in  the  Palace. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANCE  207 

The  game  had  been  played  out  to  the  bitter 
end,  and  Napoleon  had  lost.  He  could  still 
muster  fifty  thousand  men  at  Fontainebleau, 
and  for  a  day  or  two  he  threatened  to  continue 
the  struggle,  but  France  was  fast  turning  from 
him.  A  Provisional  Government,  of  which  the 
chief  member  was  Talleyrand,  had  proclaimed 
the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons,  and  even  the 
marshals  were  anxious  to  put  an  end  to  the 
frightful  eighteen  months’  drama  that  had  cost 
a  million  lives  and  that  had  shaken  their  alle¬ 
giance  to  their  old  comrade  and  EmperoiL  The 
hard  facts  of  the  situation  were  too  great  for 
even  Napoleon  to  conquer,  and  on  the  4th  of ^ 
April  he  signed  a  formal  abdication.  A  week 
later  he  concluded  a  personal  treaty  with  the 
allies  whereby  he  was  granted  the  sovereignty 
of  the  little  island  of  Elba  off  the  coast  of 
Tuscany,  the  title  of  Emperor,  and  an  annual 
revenue  of  two  million  francs,  payable  by  the 
French  government.)  While  these  negotiations., 
were  proceeding  the  new  King,  Louis  XVIII., 
had  made  his  entry  into  Paris  surrounded  by  a 
group  of  marshals  all  wearing  the  white  cock¬ 
ade  of  the  Bourbons.  On  the  20th  of  April 
Napoleon’s  travelling  carriage  was  ready  for 
his  conveyance  as  soon  as  one  last  ceremony 
should  have  been  duly  accomplished.  A  few 


208 


NAPOLEON 


hundred  veterans,  the  remains  of  the  Old  Guard, 
were  drawn  up  in  the  courtyard  of  the  palace 
for  the  last  parade,  for  the  last  farewell.  Then, 
at  last,  emotion  broke  down  the  indomitable 
courage,  the  pitiless  intellect  of  the  great  cap¬ 
tain.  When  in  front  of  that  splendid  setting 
of  presented  bayonets  and  sombre  faces,  grim 
under  the  tall  bearskins,  he  saw  the  tattered  tri¬ 
colour, —  the  flag  of  Lodi,  of  Marengo,  of  Aus 
terfitz, —  lowered  to  him  for  the  last  time,  he 
was  suddenly  overpowered,  and  seizing  the  glo 
rious  symbol  he  buried  his  head  in  its  folds  and 
sobbed.  That  dramatic  scene  portended  much, 
for  it  was  not  only  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
whom  the  Bourbons  were  displacing,  but  also 
Napoleon  the  child  of  the  Revolution;  then 
white  standard  had  displaced  not  only  the  flag 
of  the  Empire  but  that  of  the  Republic. 


27  Jan., 

1814. 

CHRONOLOGY 

St.  Dizier. 

29  “ 

ce 

Brienne. 

1  Feb., 

u 

La  Rothiere. 

10  “ 

(C 

Champaubert. 

13  “ 

(( 

Montmirail.V 

1 7  “ 

(( 

Nangis. 

7  March, 

cc 

Craonne. 

9  “ 

a 

Laon.  «. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANCE  209 


13  March,  1814. 
20  “  “ 

30  “  “ 

4  April,  “ 

11“  “ 


Wellington  enters  Bordeaux. 
Arcis-sur-Aube. 

Paris  capitulates.  ♦ 
Abdication  of  Napoleon.  y 
Treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  t- 


NOTE 

Bibliographical:  General.  —  Seepage  n. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  several  matters  are  treated 
shortly :  the  campaign  of  Prince  Eugene  in  Italy,  for 
which  see  authorities  quoted  in  last  chapter ;  the  opera¬ 
tions  of  Wellington  from  Vittoria  to  Toulouse,  for  which 
see  Napier  or  forthcoming  volumes  of  Oman;  the  Bourbon 
intrigues  for  which  see  the  Memoirs  of  de  Vitrolles  or 
Pasquier,  and  the  negotiations  of  the  allies  and  Napo¬ 
leon,  for  which  see  Fournier,  Dcr  Congress  von  Chatillon , 
Vienna,  1900,  and  among  Memoirs,  Castlereagh’s  dis¬ 
patches.  For  the  Campaign  of  France  see  Fain,  Manu- 
scrit  de  1814,  Paris,  1823;  Houssaye,  1814,  Paris,  1888 
(Weil  covers  the  same  ground  in  more  detailed  fashion). 
For  Maria  Louisa  and  Napoleon  at  Fontainebleau,  see 
Welschinger,  Le  roi  de  Rome,  Paris,  1897. 


14 


CHAPTER  XVI 


ELBA 

Return  of  the  Bourbons — Congress  of  Vienna  —  French  Dis¬ 
satisfaction —  Napoleon  leaves  Elba  —  His  progress  to  Paris 
—  Changed  Situation  —  Attitude  of  the  Powers  —  Champ  de 
Mai. 

THE  return  of  the  Bourbons,  which  few 
men  thought  possible  a  month  before 
it  happened,  changed  the  whole  aspect 
of  the  events  that  had  brought  it  about.  It 
was  now  clearly  perceived  that  the  triumph 
of  the  allies  meant  more  than  the  fall  ol 
Napoleon,  and  that  the  autocratic  system 
challenged  by  the  Revolution,  modified  by  the: 
Empire,  was  to  be  reasserted.  The  Powers 
were  now  intent  on  readjusting  the  territorial 
divisions  of  Europe  on  such  a  footing  as  the 
old  order  of  things  and  their  recent  successes 
appeared  to  make  suitable  ;  but  it  was  soon 
found,  not  unnaturally,  that  it  would  be  a 
difficult  matter  to  settle  satisfactorily  the  nu¬ 
merous  points  at  issue.  It  was  therefore  de¬ 
cided  to  call  a  congress  of  the  great  Powers 
at  which  every  outstanding  European  question 

2  IO 


ELBA 


21  1 


should  be  determined;  this  congress  eventually 
assembled  at  Vienna,  its  first  meeting  taking 
place  on  the  20th  of  September. 

Of  the  different  questions  discussed  by  the 
Powers  two  appeared  likely  to  lead  to  diffi¬ 
culties.  The  first  of  these  concerned  the  par¬ 
celling  out  of  north-eastern  Germany,  especially 
Saxony  and  Poland.  This  question  created 
such  antagonism  that  Austria,  opposing  Russia 
and  Prussia,  finally  entered  into  a  secret  treaty 
of  alliance  with  France  and  Great  Britain; 
there  seemed,  in  fact,  a  strong  prospect  of  a 
new  European  war.  The  question  of  Naples 
also  gave  rise  to  much  difficulty.  Murat’s 
course  of  action  during  the  campaign  of  1814 
on  the  Po  had  been  nearly  as  unsatisfactory 
to  the  allies  as  to  Napoleon,  and  now  the  two 
restored  Bourbon  kings, —  of  France  and  of 
Spain,  —  were  making  every  effort  to  get  their 
kinsman  Ferdinand  reinstated  at  Naples. 
Murat  prepared  for  war,  hoped  to  take  advan¬ 
tage  of  the  apparently  approaching  conflict 
between  Austria  and  Russia,  and  towards  the 
end  of  February  1815  chose  the  bold  course 
of  directly  challenging  the  recognition  of 
France. 

Meanwhile  what  had  become  of  Napoleon? 
The  island  of  Elba  in  which  he  was  cooped  up 


212 


NAPOLEON 


was  far  too  small  to  hold  so  great  a  man; 
This  had  been  generally  felt  immediately  after 
the  signing  of  the  treaty  that  sent  him  there, 
and  proposals  had  been  put  forward  by  Bour¬ 
bon  partisans  for  his  removal  to  the  Azores 
and  even  more  distant  points.  It  is  not 
credible  that  Napoleon  would  have  ever  be¬ 
come  reconciled  to  his  diminutive  domain;  it 
is  not  credible  that  even  without  provocation 
he  would  have  abstained  from  once  more  tak¬ 
ing  part  in  that  great  game  of  politics  that 
every  instinct  prompted  him  to,  yet  he  did 
receive  direct  provocations  that  partly  excuse 
the  course  he  eventually  adopted.  ^He  had 
heavy  expenses  to  meet  in  Elba,  for  no  sooner 
there  than  he  began  to  improve  roads  and 
ports,  to  develop  mines,  to  infuse  such  anima¬ 
tion  in  the  island  as  it  had  never  known  j 
he  had  a  thousand  veterans  in  his  service 
whom  he  had  been  allowed  to  keep  for  his 
personal  protection,  and  these  had  to  be  main¬ 
tained  ;  yet  he  could  get  no  payment  of  the 
revenue  secured  to  him  by  the  treaty  of  Fon¬ 
tainebleau.  There  was  even  a  worse  griev¬ 
ance  than  this :  his  wife  and  his  son  were 
denied  hirrk 

Maria  Louisa  had  left  Paris  with  the  King  of 
Rome  at  the  approach  of  the  allies.  She  had 


ELBA 


213 


retired  to  Blois  and  had  thought  of  joining 
Napoleon  at  Fontainebleau.  But  she  hesitated, 
and  presently  Metternich  persuaded  her  into 
various  steps  that  gradually  drew  her  under 
her  father’s  influence.  Keeping  her  away  from 
Fontainebleau,  Metternich  eventually  per¬ 
suaded  her  to  Vienna.  He  placed  as  special 
diplomatic  representative  near  her  a  dashing, 
amiable,  and  skilful  negotiator,  General  Count 
Neipperg,  who  was  destined  never  to  leave 
her  and  eventually  to  marry  her.  In  the 
first  few  weeks  after  the  abdication  of  the 
Emperor  correspondence  passed  between  him 
and  the  Empress,  and  she  showed  some  sign 
of  attempting  to  join  him  at  Elba,  as  he  de¬ 
sired.  Later,  as  Metternich’s  hold  tightened, 
the  correspondence  was  intercepted  and  at  last 
dropped. 

As  Napoleon  brooded  over  his  disasters,  his 
mistakes,  and  his  wrongs,  he  was  silently  but 
intently  watching  the  proceedings  of  the  Con¬ 
gress  of  Vienna  on  the  one  hand,  the  state 
of  public  opinion  in  France  on  the  other.  In 
France  the  all-important  factor  was  the  army, 
as  it  had  been  for  twenty  years  past.  The 
peace  had  set  free  thousands  of  seasoned  sol¬ 
diers  who  returned  from  every  part  of  Europe 
to  find  their  old  flag  hauled  down,  and  a  new 


214 


NAPOLEON 


government  in  power  little  inclined  to  give 
them  employment  or  help.  It  was  inevitable 
that  Louis  XVIII.  should  reduce  the  strength 

O 

of  the  army,  it  was  equally  inevitable  that  such 
a  step  should  lead  to  discontent. 

I  Thousands  of  officers  were  placed  on  half 
pay  (in  1816  they  numbered  over  sixteen  thou¬ 
sand),  which  meant  a  trifling  allowance  rising 
from  forty-four  francs  a  year  for  lieutenants.') 
Among  these  old  soldiers  the  feeling  against 
the  Bourbons  was  doubly  bitter,  and  not  a  few 
openly  declared  their  hope  that  one  whom 
from  his  favourite  flower  they  called  le  P"ere  la 
Violette  would  soon  come  to  their  rescue. 
There  was  another  active  section  of  the  popula¬ 
tion,  militant  ex-Jacobins,  politicians,  republi¬ 
cans,  also  actively  opposed  to  the  Bourbons  and 
pushing  eagerly  towards  a  change  of  govern¬ 
ment.  Probably  the  great  mass  of  the  people 
was  content  to  be  at  peace  once  more  and  was, 
if  not  loyal  to  the  new  monarch,  at  all  events 
opposed  to  change ;  yet  it  is  the  active  section 
and  not  the  great  mass  that  generally  effects  a 
revolution. 

Towards  the  close  of  February,  then,  it  was 
confidently  expected  in  high  political  quarters 
that  a  war  was  about  to  break  out  in  north¬ 
eastern  Europe,  and  Napoleon  judged  that 


ELBA 


215 


France  was  ripe  to  revolt  against  the  Bour¬ 
bons;  he  determined  to  risk  all  and  turn  that 
revolt  to  his  profit.  On  the  25th  of  February 
he  embarked  his  handful  of  soldiers  in  several 
small  vessels,  set  sail,  happily  escaped  the 
observation  of  the  British  cruisers,  and  on 
the  1st  of  March  disembarked  at  Cannes. 
Turning  away  from  the  royalist  towns  of  the 
coast  of  Provence,  Napoleon  at  once  marched 
north  at  the  head  of  his  little  column,  into  the 
mountains,  towards  Savoy.  On  the  5th,  near¬ 
ing  Grenoble,  the  result  of  his  adventure  was 
settled.  Troops  had  been  sent  to  arrest  him 
and  were  discovered  in  position  barring  the 
road.  Napoleon  took  with  him  forty  grena¬ 
diers,  their  muskets  reversed,  and  advanced 
on  foot.  When  near  to  the  opposing  line,  he  l— 
threw  open  his  long  grey  coat,  showing  his 
well-known  uniform  and  the  red  ribbon  of 
the  Legion  of  Honour.  \When  the  soldiers 
saw  once  more  that  little  stout  man  with  the 
square  head  and  piercing  eye,  their  companion, 
their  leader,  who  had  planted  the  glorious  flag 
that  was  carried  behind  him  in  every  capital 
of  Europe,  they  could  resist  no  longer.  Some 
one  in  the  ranks  shouted  Vive  1' Empereur,  the 
line  broke  out  into  vehement  cheers  and 
the  soldiers  crowded  about  Napoleon  tearing 


2l6 


NAPOLEON 


the  hated  white  cockades  from  their  shakos. 
That  scene  was  repeated  with  variations  at 
every  point  at  which  the  Emperor  met  his 
old  soldiers  between  Grenoble  and  Paris. 
Colonel  Labedoyere,  his  former  aide-de-camp, 
ordered  the  drums  of  his  regiment  to  be  broken 
open  and  drew  from  that  receptacle  where  they 
had  been  sacredly  treasured  the  old  flag  and 
the  tri-colour  cockades.  At  Lyons  a  large 
army  under  Macdonald’s  orders  melted  away 
at  the  first  distant  glimpse  of  the  magician 
attired  in  the  grey  coat  and  little  cocked  hat). 
Louis  XVIII.  in  despair  entrusted  the  Guard  to 
Ney,  and  that  marshal  declared  he  would  cage 
the  usurper;  but  long  before  Napoleon  arrived 
the  contagion  had  outstripped  him,  and  Ney 
and  the  Guard  were  his  long  before  they  met 
him.  The  Emperor  accomplished  the  last 
stages  of  his  journey  in  a  carriage,  attended 
by  nothing  more  than  half  a  dozen  Polish 
lancers.  Louis  XVIII.  fled  from  Paris  on 
the  20th  of  March,  and  a  few  hours  later 
Napoleon  entered  the  capital  unescorted  and 
as  secure  as  though  he  had  never  left  il;  his 
arrival  at  the  palace  of  the  Tuileries  occasioned 
a  remarkable  scene.  It  will  serve  to  explain 
the  peculiar  quality  of  that  demonstration  if 
the  experience  of  one  of  the  eye-witnesses  be 


ELBA 


217 


recalled.  General  Thiebault,  who  had  fought 
through  all  the  wars  of  the  Republic  and 
Empire,  had  never  been  a  zealous  Bonapartist, 
rather  the  reverse ;  he  had  accepted  the  re¬ 
turned  Bourbons,  and  carried  out  his  duty 
in  opposing  Napoleon’s  return.  Deserted  by 
his  troops  he  had  quietly  returned  to  his  house 
in  Paris  with  the  firm  intention  of  taking  no 
further  active  share  in  the  events  of  the  day. 
But  the  arrival,  the  personality  of  Napoleon 
was  in  the  air;  Thiebault  was  restless  and 
decided  after  dining  that  he  would  go  out 
and  indulge  in  a  short  walk.  At  first  he 
resolutely  turned  his  steps  in  the  opposite 
direction  to  the  Tuileries,  but  presently  the 
irresistible  magnet  began  to  draw;  soon  he 
found  himself  one  of  a  great  throng  of  old 
soldiers  and  citizens  hurrying  to  the  palace 
gates.  Presently  a  travelling  carriage  drove 
up  in  the  midst  of  a  hurricane  of  cheers,  a 
wild  dash  was  made  for  it,  and  from  the  midst 
of  the  turmoil  Napoleon  appeared,  was  hoisted 
in  strong  arms  from  one  step  to  another  up  1 
to  his  old  apartments  on  the  first  floor  of  the 
Tuileries;  and  Thiebault  was  one  of  the  crowd 
and  cheering  as  wildly  as  the  others!  That 
night  a  volunteer  guard  of  general  officers  did 
sentry  duty  at  the  Emperor’s  door,  but  within 


2l8 


NAPO  LEON 


a  day  or  two  everything  had  fallen  back  into 
the  old  imperial  routine. 

Superficially  all  was  the  same;  in  reality 
Napoleon’s  position  was  vastly  changed.  ^  Even 
about  his  person  many  familiar  faces  were 
missing.  \  Berth ier,  who  as  chief-of-staff  had 
never  left  his  side  since  1796,  did  not  choose 
to  join  him  now,  and  Soult  was  appointed  to 
that  arduous  post.  Prince  Eugene  who  had 
taken  up  his  residence  in  the  dominions  of  his 
father-in-law,  the  King  of  Bavaria,  showed  no 
desire  to  return  to  Paris.  /  Josephine  the  wife, 
the  friend  of  early  and  of  late  days,  whom  he 
frequently  visited  since  the  divorce  and  still 
preferred  to  all  others,  had  died  at  the  Mal- 
maison  shortly  after  the  abdication,  and  the  old 
home  of  consular  days  was  deserted)  Talley¬ 
rand  was  in  Vienna  upholding  the  Bourbon 
interests,  and  there  helped  to  define  the  position 
of  Napoleon  in  a  proclamation  that  was  less  to 
the  credit  of  the  Powers  than  a  confession  of 
the  genius  of  their  opponent ;  the  assembled 
monarchs  and  diplomatists  of  Europe  solemnly 
proclaimed  that  Napoleon  was  an  outlaw, 
“  outside  the  pale  of  social  and  civil  relations 
and  liable  to  public  vengeance.”  It  was,  in 
plain  words,  an  incitement  to  assassination, 
and  showed  that  the  struggle  was  to  be  of  a 


ELBA 


2 1 9 


new  character,  that  negotiation  was  out  of  the 
question,  and  that  war  must  be  to  the  death. 
Napoleon  on  his  side  declared,  with  more  or 
less  sincerity,  that  he  was  anxious  for  peace, 
that  he  intended  to  abide  by  the  treaties  that 
had  closed  the  war  of  1814,  and  that  his  return 
to  the  throne  was  merely  an  incident  of  in¬ 
ternal  policy  that  concerned  the  French  people 
and  himself ;  at  the  same  time  he  lost  not  an 
hour  in  preparing  for  hostilities. 

But  the  greatest  change  in  the  position  of 
Napoleon  was  that  in  his  relation  to  French 
liberalism.  Before  his  landing  at  Cannes  a 
republican  revolution  was  thought  to  be  im¬ 
minent  by  many,  and  if  he  had  profited  by  the 
agitation  and  converted  it  to  his  own  uses,  he 
was  none  the  less  bound  to  base  his  position 
on  popular  support  and  to  reckon  with  the 
leaders  of  the  liberal  party.  He  was  repeating 
Brumaire,  but  with  a  weaker  case.  How  far 
the  internal  necessities  of  his  position  carried 
him  may  be  judged  from  the  fact  that  one  of 
his  earliest  measures  (March  24)  was  to  remove 
the  restrictions  on  the  press ;  this  was  followed 
by  the  selection  of  two  pronounced  liberals, 
Carnot  and  Constant,  as  ministers,  and  by  the 
announcement  that  the  constitution  would  be 
amended  in  a  popular  direction.  (On  the  2 2d 


220 


NAPOLEON 


of  April  the  constitutional  changes  were  an¬ 
nounced  ;  the  most  important  was  that  the 
legislative  body  or  lower  House  was  to  be 
elected  by  the  direct  vote  of  the  people'. 

In  the  meanwhile  matters  looked  daily  more 
like  war,  and  the  stability  of  the  remarkable 
evolution  of  French  political  institutions  marked 
by  the  return  of  Napoleon  was  felt  to  be  really 
dependent  on  the  event  of  the  approaching 
military  operations. 

If  there  was  one  sovereign  whom  Napoleon 
might  hope  to  detach  from  the  European 
alliance,  it  was  his  father-in-law  the  Emperor 
of  Austria,  but,  as  it  happened,  his  were  the 
first  troops  engaged.  Murat  had  closed  his 
wranglings  with  the  Powers  by  a  stroke  of 
despair,  and  immediately  after  Napoleon’s  de¬ 
parture  from  Elba  had  ordered  his  army  into 
northern  Italy.  He  was  opposed  by  Austria. 
After  a  short  campaign  he  was  completely 
defeated  at  Tolentino,  his  army  disbanded, 
and  the  Austrians  occupied  Naples,  proclaim¬ 
ing  Ferdinand.  Murat  escaped  to  the  south 
of  France,  where  he  arrived  just  as  Napoleon 
was  on  the  point  of  leaving  Paris  to  assume 
command  of  the  French  army  for  the  last  time. 

On  the  ist  of  June  there  was  held  a  great 
ceremony  known,  in  defiance  of  all  chronological 


ELBA 


221 


considerations,  as  the  Champ  de  Mai.  Detach¬ 
ments  from  every  corps  of  the  army  paraded 
and  received  new  flags,  and  Napoleon  solemnly 
pronounced  an  oath  to  maintain  the  new  con¬ 
stitution.  Attired  in  a  theatrical  and  unbe¬ 
coming  costume  he  delivered  a  speech  in  which 
he  appealed  strongly  to  national  and  liberal 
sentiment  and  declared  that  as  Emperor,  as 
Consul,  and  as  soldier,  his  every  act  had  been 
dictated  by  his  devotion  to  France.  But  these 
Napoleonic  apologetics  were  not  of  vital  im¬ 
portance;  an  Anglo-Prussian  army  under  Well¬ 
ington  and  Blucher  was  assembled  close  to 
Brussels,  a  large  Austrian  army  under  Schwar- 
zenberg  was  nearing  the  Rhine,  all  Russia  and 
Germany  were  alive  with  columns  marching 
towards  the  French  frontier,  —  here  was  the 
all-important  problem  to  be  solved:  Could  Na¬ 
poleon  reassert  his  military  superiority?  Were 
the  French  soldiers  and  generals  the  equals  of 
those  of  a  few  years  before  ?  Were  the  soldiers 
and  generals  of  the  allies  no  better  than  their 
predecessors  ? 


I'll 


NAPOLEON 


CHRONOLOGY 


20  Sept.,  1814. 
3  Jan->  i8i5- 

25  Feb.,  “ 

1  March,  “ 

20  “  “ 

3  May>  “ 

1  June,  “ 


Congress  of  Vienna. 

Treaty  of  Alliance,  Austria,  France,  and 
Great  Britain. 

Napoleon  leaves  Elba. 

Disembarks  at  Cannes. 

Arrives  at  Paris. 

Murat  defeated  at  Tolentino. 

Champ  de  Mai. 


NOTE 

Bibliographical:  General.  —  See  page  u. 

For  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  see  Pallain’s  Correspondance 
de  Talleyrand,  Paris,  1881  ;  also  Metternich’s  Memoirs ,  and 
D’Angeberg,  Cong7'fc  de  Vienne,  Paris,  1847.  For  Italian 
affairs,  Helfert  and  Weil  as  already  referred  to.  For  the 
journey  to  Elba  and  subsequent  events,  see  Truchsess  von 
Waldburg,  Bonaparte' s  Reisc  von  Fontainebleau ,  Berlin, 
1815;  Houssaye,  1815,  Paris,  1898;  Gruyer,  Napoleon, 
King  of  Elba,  London,  1906. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


WATERLOO  AND  ST.  HELENA 

Plan  of  Campaign  —  Ligny  —  March  on  Brussels  —  Waterloo  — 
Second  Abdication  —  St.  Helena —  Death  of  Napoleon. 

IT  is  curious  to  find  Napoleon  confronted 
in  his  last  campaign  by  precisely  the 
same  military  problem  as  in  his  first,  ap¬ 
plying  the  same  solution,  but  meeting  with  a 
different  result.  In  1796,  as  now,  his  opponents 
were  superior  in  numbers,  occupied  an  ex¬ 
tended  line  and  belonged  to  two  armies  operat¬ 
ing  from  two  different  bases  ;  in  1815,  as  before, 
he  decided  to  strike  in  full  force  at  the  point 
of  junction  of  his  opponents  and  to  throw  them 
back  in  diverging  directions  on  their  respective 
bases.  The  French  army  numbering  about  one 
hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men  was  rapidly 
concentrated  during  the  first  week  in  June,  and 
on  the  nth  the  Emperor  left  Paris  to  take 
command.)  On  the  14th  he  was  at  Beaumont 
on  the  frontier,  in  the  midst  of  his  troops,  and 
within  a  few  days’  march  of  Brussels. 


224 


NAPOLEON 


So  rapid  was  the  French  advance  that  the 
Prussians  and  English  got  little  warning  of  the 
approaching  storm.  Blucher,  in  command  of 
the  former,  was  operating  on  the  line  of  the 
Sambre  and  Meuse  through  Liege  and  Namur, 
and  his  different  corps  were  distributed  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  last-named  city  and 
Charleroi.  The  British  under  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  had  their  base  at  Antwerp  and  their 
line  of  communications  ran  from  that  city  to 
Brussels,  and  thence  some  twenty-five  miles 
south  where  the  troops  were  quartered  to  the 
west  of  the  Prussians  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Quatre  Bras,  Genappe,  Nivelles  and  further 
to  the  west.  A  road  running  east  and  west 
through  Quatre  Bras  and  Ligny  served  to 
connect  the  Prussian  right  with  the  British 
left.  It  was  at  this  point  that  Napoleon 
aimed. 

On  the  15th  the  armies  were  in  contact,  the 
French  driving  back  such  opposition  as  they 
met  with  and  occupying  Charleroi.  Blucher 
succeeded,  however,  in  concentrating  the  greater 
part  of  his  troops  in  the  course  of  the  night, 
and  determined  to  hold  his  ground  at  St. 
Amand  and  Ligny  the  next  day.  The  British 
were  more  completely  surprised  than  the  Prus¬ 
sians,  yet  the  small  force  occupying  Quatre 


Position  at  nightfall,  June  17,  1815 


IH  in 


WATERLOO  AND  ST.  HELENA  225 

Bras  was  left  there  and  received  such  supports 
as  could  be  pushed  forward.  On  the  16th  Na¬ 
poleon  advanced  to  the  attack  of  the  Prussians, 
detaching  a  corps  under  Ney  to  operate  against 
the  British.:  A  fierce  struggle  took  place  for 
the  possession  of  the  villages  of  St.  Amand  and 
Ligny  that  were  at  last  carried  by  the  French  ; 
Blucher,  although  he  had  lost  heavily,  retired 
slowly  towards  Gembloux  in  fairly  good  order. 
During  the  course  of  the  same  day  Ney  had 
been  engaged  with  the  British  at  Quatre  Bras, 
but  had  not  gained  any  ground.  Yet  on  the 
whole  the  operations  of  the  1 6th  had  been  very 
favourable  to  Napoleon :  he  had  defeated  the 
Prussians,  inspirited  his  soldiers,  and  broken 
through  the  line  of  contact  between  the  two 
allied  armies.  That  night  Napoleon  formed  a 
corps  of  some  thirty  thousand  men  which  he 
placed  under  Grouchy,  ordering  him  to  follow 
Blucher’s  retreat)  The  Prussian  general  might 
withdraw  along  the  line  of  the  Sambre  and 
Meuse ;  this  was  the  obvious  course  for  him  to 
follow  and  the  one  Napoleon  hoped  he  would 
take.  But  he  might  play  a  bolder  game  and 
leaving  his  line  of  operations  move  north  and 
attempt  to  join  hands  with  Wellington  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Brussels;  bolder  yet,  he 
might  retreat  ex-centrically  and  threaten  the 
*5 


Il6 


NAPOLEON 


French  line  of  communications.  ''•During  the 
early  hours  of  the  17th  Napoleon  waited  to  get 
information  £  but  Blucher  moved  fast,  Grouchy 
slowly;  the  French  light  cavalry  was  at  fault 
and  could  get  no  certain  news.  At  last,  hear- 
ing  that  the  British  still  held  Ouatre  Bras, 
Napoleon  put  the  whole  army  in  movement 
towards  that  point. 

Wellington  had  no  intention  of  holding 
Ouatre  Bras  now  that  the  Prussians  had  been 
forced  to  retreat,  and  he  had  only  a  rear  guard 
in  position  when  Napoleon  arrived  on  the 
scene.  The  Duke  got  into  communication 
with  the  Prussians,  and  believed  that  Bluchers 
intention  was  to  move  north  and  to  effect  a 
junction  in  front  of  Brussels  if  possible.  He 
therefore  decided  to  fall  back  some  miles  from 
Ouatre  Bras  to  a  strong  position  at  Mont 
Saint  Jean,  where  he  hoped  for  support.  (  On 
the  morning  of  the  17th  he  had  not  yet  de¬ 
cided  whether  he  would  risk  a  battle  at  that 
point  or  not;  that,  as  he  explained  to  one  of 
Bluchers  staff  officers,  entirely  depended  on 
whether  Blucher  could  undertake  to  support 
him  with  one  of  his  corps.-1 

All  through  the  afternoon  of  the  17th  of 
June  Napoleon  pushed  on  with  cavalry  and 
horse  artillery  after  the  British  rear  guard  from 


WATERLOO  AND  ST.  HELENA  227 

Quatre  Bras  northwards  towards  Brussels.  In 
the  evening  he  had  reached  the  farm  of  La 
Belle  Alliance  and  thence  saw  a  mile  in  front 
the  whole  of  Wellington’s  army  evidently 
prepared  to  give  battle.  The  Emperor  now 
stopped,  and  as  the  evening  passed  into  night 
long  columns  of  soldiers  came  up  and  were 
bivouacked  right  and  left  of  the  road  between 
Genappe  and  La  Belle  Alliance.  On  that 
same  night  Grouchy,  marching  with  painful 
hesitation  and  slowness,  had  only  reached  Gem- 
bloux.  He  had  now,  however,  ascertained  that 
the  Prussians  had  retreated  towards  Wavre,  and 
proposed  marching  in  that  direction  the  fol¬ 
lowing  morning.  Blucher  had,  indeed,  acted 
with  the  boldness,  decision,  and  promptitude 
of  a  good  soldier,  and  on  the  night  of  the  17th 
he  had  his  whole  army  concentrated  near  Wavre. 
Thence  he  dispatched  a  staff  officer  to  inform 
Wellington  that  not  one  corps,  but  three,  under 
his  personal  command,  would  march  to  the 
assistance  of  the  British  early  in  the  morning. 
This  message  reached  the  Duke  about  two 
o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the  1 8th,  and  he 
determined  in  consequence  to  hold  his  ground. 

yOn  the  1 8th  of  June  was  fought  the  battle 
of  Waterloo,  so  called  from  a  village  some  way 
from  the  scene  of  action,  the  last  and  most 


228 


NAPOLEON 


disastrous  field  of  the  greatest  soldier  known 
to  history.;  Napoleon  had  some  seventy  thou¬ 
sand  men  actually  present,  Wellington  rather 
less.  )  Blucher,  who  came  up  late,  engaged  his 
troops  gradually,  and  probably,  at  the  last,  had 
not  more  than  thirty  thousand  in  the  fighting. 
Wellington’s  army  was  of  mixed  composition, 
and  many  of  his  corps,  newly  recruited  in  Hol¬ 
land,  were  of  very  poor  quality  ;  he  relied  chiefly 
on  his  excellent  British  and  German  infantry. 
He  had  disposed  his  line  according  to  his 
favourite  method  some  fifty  or  one  hundred 
yards  back  from  the  summit  of  a  slope  that  the 
French  would  have  to  top  in  their  advance. 
His  infantry  was  in  part  further  protected  by 
a  transversal  sunken  lane  that  acted  as  a  sort  of 
natural  ditch.  Wellington’s  position  stretched 
out  east  and  west  of  the  Brussels  road.  On 
his  right  the  manor  house  and  enclosures  of 
Hougoumont  formed  a  strong  natural  bastion. 
In  the  centre  the  farm  of  la  Haye  Sainte 
formed  another  advanced  position.  The  British 
left  was  more  open,  but  a  move  in  that  direc¬ 
tion  led  over  ground  heavy  and  in  part  impass¬ 
able  for  horses,  while  it  might  also  result  in 
exposing  the  French  to  a  flank  attack  from  the 
Prussians.  Napoleon,  contrary  to  the  opinion 
of  all  those  of  his  generals  who  had  fought  the 


WATERLOO  AND  ST.  HELENA  229 

British  in  Spain,  decided  not  to  manoeuvre  but 
to  attack  frontally.  In  this  it  is  hard  to  be¬ 
lieve  that  he  was  right,  for  the  French  troops 
manoeuvred  more  rapidly  than  any  in  Europe, 
while  the  British  were  equally  pre-eminent  for 
their  unflinching  steadiness  under  attack  and 
their  deadly  musketry. 

NHeavy  rain  since  the  preceding  day  had 
turned  the  roads  into  quagmires;  guns  and 
transport  wagons  could  be  moved  only  with  the 
greatest  difficulty}  Napoleon  could  not  get  his 
army  ready  for  action,  and  the  morning  hours 
slowly  passed.  During  that  time  Grouchy  was 
marching  steadily  towards  Wavre,  while  Blucher 
was  struggling  hard  to  get  his  columns  on 
towards  Mont  Saint  Jean  but  made  hardly  any 
progress  in  the  muddy  lanes  of  the  valley  of 
the  Dyle.  At  last  at  12  o’clock  the  Emperor 
opened  the  battle  by  sending  the  King  of 
Westphalia  to  the  attack  of  Hougouniont. 
This  was  only  a  demonstration,  though  fierce 
fighting  took  place  at  this  point  throughout 
the  day.  The  real  attack  was  to  be  made 
at  the  centre,  where  Napoleon  intended  to 
force  the  British  line  and  establish  himself  at 
the  cross-roads  of  Mont  Saint  Jean.  Heavy 
columns  of  infantry,  twenty  thousand  men  in 
all,  marched  forward  to  the  attack,  faced  the 


230 


NAPOLEON 


fire  of  the  British  artillery,  breasted  the  slope, 
topped  it,  and  then  received  the  volleys  of  the 
British  infantry)  There  was  a  fierce  struggle ; 
Picton  led  forward  his  brigade  with  the  bayonet 
and  was  killed  ;  the  British  cavalry  charged  and 
finally  the  French  rolled  back  from  the  slope 
beaten,  while  the  horsemen  wrought  havoc 
among  them. 

The  British  cavalry  went  too  far  in  pursuit, 
and  was  now  assailed  and  routed  by  the  French 
cavalry;  the  Emperor  supported  the  first  by 
fresh  squadrons,  and  a  great  mass  of  horse  soon 
climbed  the  slope  from  which  the  French  in¬ 
fantry  had  been  so  disastrously  driven.  The 
British  infantry  was  now  thrown  into  squares, 
alternating  on  two  lines  in  chess-board  pattern, 
and  the  cavalry  charged  in  among  them,  but 
with  no  success.  A  new  and  more  determined 
effort  was  made.  Ney  led  the  attack.  iEvery 
available  horseman  was  thrown  in.  Long  lines 
surged  upwards,  steel-breasted  cuirassiers,  tall 
horse  grenadiers  in  bearskins,  carabineers  with 
gilded  armour  and  enormous  curved  helmets, 
Polish  lancers  with  fluttering  pennons,  dragoons, 
hussars.  The  British  gunners  from  the  crest 
line  ploughed  great  holes  in  their  ranks,  then 
at  the  last  moment  ran  back  to  the  infantry 
squares  for  protection.  But  though  the  French 


WATERLOO  AND  ST.  HELENA  231 

cavalry  easily  overran  the  guns  and  swallowed 
the  squares  of  red-coated  soldiers  in  their  midst, 
they  could  make  little  impression  on  the  coolly 
levelled  bayonets,  while  a  destructive  fire  mowed 
them  down  in  hundreds.  Three  times  was  the 
charge  renewed,  but  after  the  fourth  failure  it 
was  no  longer  possible  to  hope  that  the  Em¬ 
peror’s  cavalry  would  turn  the  fortunes  of  the 
day.  \A  great  part  of  it  lay  dead  and  mangled 
along  the  front  of  the  British  position. 

The  battle  had  not  been  long  in  progress 
when  Napoleon  observed  a  dark  column  of 
soldiers  winding  along  a  road  some  miles  away 
to  the  east.  Before  long  it  became  clear  that 
some  Prussian  movement  was  to  be  expected 
from  that  direction,  and  the  French  right  was 
thrown  back  and  reinforced.  The  Prussians 
attacked  as  soon  as  they  could  be  brought  into 
action  fighting  in  a  line  that  may  be  roughly 
described  as  at  right  angles  with  the  British 
left  and  parallel  with  the  Brussels-Quatre  Bras 
road.  This  they  were  beginning  to  threaten 
to  the  rear  of  the  French  right  while  the  great 
cavalry  charges  against  Wellington’s  centre 
were  progressing.  Napoleon,  however,  was  still 
hopeful  of  forcing  the  British  line  before  the 
Prussian  attack  had  developed  sufficient  force. 
He  also  hoped  that  Grouchy  might  come  up 


2J2 


NAPOLEON 


on  his  right,  and  sent  orders  for  that  marshal 
to  march  in  the  direction  of  the  main  army. 
But  Grouchy,  obeying  his  original  orders  in  a 
strict  sense,  was  following  the  Prussian  rear 
guard  which  kept  him  engaged  during  the 
whole  day  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Wavre. 

The  Emperor  now  ordered  Ney  to  resume  the 
attack  and  to  carry  la  Haye  Sainte  at  any  cost. 
Ney  led  his  men  in  person,  and  after  a  fierce 
struggle  drove  the  defenders  from  the  farm. 
He  had  now  obtained  a  foothold  in  the  British 
centre,  and  getting  some  guns  in  position  at 
short  range  opened  a  deadly  fire.)  Several  of 
the  English  brigades  were  now  nearly  shattered, 
some  German  and  Dutch  troops  gave  way,  and 
a  stream  of  fugitives  set  in  from  the  field  towards 
Brussels.  But  Wellington  and  his  splendid 
infantry  remained  firm,  gaps  were  filled  as  best 
they  could  be,  and  Ney  could  get  no  response 
to  his  pressing  call  for  some  fresh  troops  to 
drive  home  the  attack.  Napoleon  had  in  truth 
at  that  moment  no  troops  to  spare ;  all  the  re¬ 
serves  had  been  used  save  a  few  regiments  of  the 
infantry  of  the  Guard,  and  the  Prussians  had 
just  carried  the  village  of  Planchenoit  within 
striking  distance  of  his  line  of  retreat.  The 
position  was  fast  getting  desperate  for  the  Em¬ 
peror.  Two  regiments  of  the  Guard,  however, 


WATERLOO  AND  ST.  HELENA  233 

drove  the  Prussians  out  of  Planchenoit,  and 
taking  advantage  of  this  respite  Napoleon 
aimed  one  last  blow  at  Wellington’s  centre. 
Some  four  thousand  infantry  of  the  Guard  were 
massed  into  column  and  Ney  advanced  at  their 
head  over  the  ground  where  he  had  led  the 
cavalry  earlier  in  the  day.  The  exhausted  com¬ 
batants  to  the  right  and  left,  from  la  Haye  Sainte 
to  Hougoumont,  paused  and  watched  the  slow 
advance  of  that  magnificent  infantry,  the  last 
remnant  of  veterans  of  the  great  armies  of  the 
Republic  and  the  Empire.  From  along  the  crest 
the  English  gunners  poured  down  grape  and 
cannister.  The  commander  of  the  infantry  of 
the  Guard,  Count  Friant,  fell  dead  ;  Ney’s  horse 
was  shot  down,  but  the  marshal  jumped  to  his 
feet,  drew  his  sword,  and  marched  on  through 
the  smoke  dauntlessly.  Once  more  the  crest 
was  won,  once  more  the  British  infantry  behind 
it  poured  in  their  withering  musketry.  The 
Old  Guard  deployed  its  melting  lines  as  best  it 
could,  and  for  five  or  ten  minutes  struggled  to 
hold  its  ground.  But  the  fire  was  too  deadly, 
the  French  began  to  recede,  and  soon  their 
broken  lines  were  flowing  backwards.  At  this 
moment  the  Duke  of  Wellington  rode  forward 
to  the  crest,  his  figure  could  be  seen  for  some 
way  along  the  British  line;  he  raised  his  hat 


234 


NAPOLEON 


high  in  the  air  and  waved  it  towards  the  enemy, 
At  this  victorious  signal  the  British  regiments 
advanced  along  the  whole  line,  fifes  and  drums, 
bugles  and  bagpipes  urging  the  men  forward. 
The  French  army  was  beaten.  The  sight  of 
the  Old  Guard  rolling  back  in  confusion,  of 
fresh  columns  of  Prussians  closing  in  on  the 
right,  told  the  defeated  French  that  all  was 
lost.  On  the  high  road  by  la  Belle  Alliance 
a  few  squares  of  grenadiers  still  held  their 
ground  and  gave  Napoleon  shelter;  but  all 
attempts  to  stay  the  panic  that  had  now  seized 
the  whole  army  was  hopeless.  The  pursuit  was 
taken  up  by  the  Prussians,  and  it  was  not  till 
three  days  later  and  many  miles  within  the 
French  frontiers  that  the  army  could  be  restored 
to  some  semblance  of  order. 

Napoleon  had  appealed  to  the  supreme  po¬ 
litical  test  and  failed,  and  he  now  apparently 
entertained  no  hope  of  being  able  to  recover 
his  position.  He  arrived  in  the  capital  on 
the  night  of  the  20th,  and  on  the  following 
day  the  Chamber,  on  the  motion  of  Lafayette, 
declared  itself  in  permanent  session  and  di¬ 
rected  the  ministers  to  report  to  it.  In  effect 
this  was  a  withdrawal  of  authority  from  the 
hands  of  Napoleon,  and  he  accepted  it  in  that 
sense.  On  the  following  day  he  abdicated  for 


WATERLOO  AND  ST.  HELENA  235 

the  second  time  in  favour  of  his  son.  A  week 
later  the  allies  were  nearing  Paris,  and  the 
provisional  government,  led  by  Fouche,  was 
intriguing  with  the  Bourbons.  There  was 
nothing  Napoleon  could  now  do  but  to  try  to 
leave  France.  He  proceeded  to  Rochefort, 
whence  he  expected  to  be  able  to  find  ship  for 
the  United  States.  But  a  British  cruiser  block-1/ 
aded  the  port,  and  Napoleon  finding  no  other 
course  possible  finally  went  on  board  H.  M.  S. 
Bellcrophon ,  Captain  Maitland,  and  threw  him¬ 
self  on  the  generosity  of  Great  Britain. 

The  arrival  of  the  Bellcrophon  and  her  illus¬ 
trious  passenger  at  Portsmouth  created  great 
excitement  in  England.  It  is  easy  to  see  at 
this  distance  of  time  that  Napoleon’s  career  was 
run,  and  that  a  magnanimous  treatment  would 
not  have  been  dangerous.  But  the  feeling  of 
those  days  was  violent.  Never  had  Great 
Britain  been  so  threatened  and  alarmed  as  she 
had  been  when  the  army  of  Austerlitz  was  en¬ 
camped  along  the  shores  of  the  Channel.  The 
generation  that  had  struggled  with  and  defeated 
Napoleon  could  not  forgive  him,  and  General 
Bonaparte,  as  the  British  Government  child¬ 
ishly  insisted  on  addressing  him,  was  sent  to 
the  island  of  St.  Helena,  in  the  South  Atlantic, 
as  a  State  prisoner. 


236  NAPOLEON 

Of  his  six  years’  residence  in  that  island 
there  is  but  little  that  can  be  said  here  with 
advantage.  Controversy  has  raged  about  the 
trivial  matters  over  which  the  illustrious  pris¬ 
oner  and  his  gaoler,  Sir  Hudson  Lowe,  disputed. 
Englishmen  have  written  to  prove  that  Napo¬ 
leon  was  insulted  and  shabbily  treated,  French¬ 
men  to  prove  that  he  spent  his  whole  time  lying 
and  intriguing  against  Sir  Hudson  Lowe.  It 
is  altogether  fortunate  that  these  matters  are  of 
minor  importance,  and  that  they  need  not  be 
discussed  in  a  work  of  these  dimensions.  It  is 
a  self-evident  proposition  that  under  the  most 
favourable  circumstances  the  coupling  of  Napo¬ 
leon  with  a  British  military  officer  not  remark¬ 
able  for  tact  or  urbanity  on  a  barren  rock  in 
mid  Atlantic  could  hardly  lead  to  agreeable 
results.  For  those  who  have  noted  the  pecul¬ 
iarities  of  Napoleon’s  character  it  will  appear 
natural  that  his  constant  occupation  at  St. 
Helena  was  to  dictate  to  some  of  his  compan¬ 
ions  in  exile  statements  of  a  biassed  and  mis¬ 
leading  character  as  to  his  history.  He  was 
busy  elaborating  the  Napoleonic  legend,  creat¬ 
ing  an  artificial  atmosphere  of  fact  from  which 
he  hoped  would  emerge  in  some  future  time  an 
empire  for  his  son.  Towards  the  little  King 
of  Rome  his  thoughts  frequently  turned,  and 


WATERLOO  AND  ST.  HELENA  237 

when  in  1820  it  became  clear  that  an  illness 
he  had  felt  before  at  intervals  was  now  becom¬ 
ing  dangerously  acute,  he  dictated  long  in¬ 
structions  for  the  future  guidance  of  his  son. 
The  last  sentence  of  his  will  was  of  an  extraor¬ 
dinary  character.  Was  it  hallucination,  or  was 
it  astute  calculation,  that  made  him  write: 
“  My  wish  is  to  be  buried  on  the  banks  of  the 
Seine  in  the  midst  of  the  French  people  whom 
I  so  dearly  loved  ”  ? 

He  died  on  the  5th  of  May  1821,  of  cancer 
in  the  stomach,  and  was  buried  under  a  weep¬ 
ing  willow  near  Longwood,  where  he  had  spent 
six  weary  years  of  exile.  British  soldiers  ac¬ 
companied  him  to  his  rest  with  reversed  arms, 
and  fired  a  parting  salute  over  his  grave. 
Twenty  years  later,  as  if  the  violent  contrasts 
of  his  life  had  not  yet  been  exhausted,  his 
body  was  ceremoniously  transferred  to  Paris 
and  buried  in  the  Invalides  with  every  circum¬ 
stance  of  military  pomp  and  national  mourning 
and  under  the  auspices  of  a  Bourbon  King. 


16  June,  1815.  Ligny. 

18  “  “  Waterloo. 

22  “  “  Napoleon  abdicates. 

5  May,  1821.  Death  of  Napoleon. 


CHRONOLOGY 


t 


238 


NAPOLEON 


NOTE 

Bibliographical:  General.  —  See  page  11. 

For  the  Waterloo  campaign  see  Houssaye,  1815,  Paris, 
1898;  Ropes,  Campaign  of  Waterloo,  London,  1893; 
Siborne,  War  in  Fratice,  London,  1848.  For  St.  Helena, 
Rosebery,  The  Last  Phase,  London,  1901  ;  Las  Cases 
Memorial,  Paris,  1823;  O’Meara,  Napoleon  i?i  Exile, 
London,  1822  ;  Seaton,  Napoleon's  Captivity,  London, 
1903;  Jackson,  Memoirs,  London,  1903;  (Seaton  or 
Jackson  should  be  read  to  check  the  attacks  made  on 
Lowe). 

For  Waterloo  see  also:  Kelly,  The  Battle  of  Wavre, 
London,  1906,  and  various  articles  in  German  reviews 
by  Pflugck-PIarttung  and  Lettow-Vorbeck. 


Charles  Bonaparte  —  Letizia  Ramolino 


APPENDIX  A 


BONAPARTE  FAMILY 


—  Joseph,  King  of  Spain,  d.  1844,  — (no  male  descendants). 

—  Napoleon,  d.  1821. 

| - Duke  of  Reichstadt,  d.  1832. 

Maria  Louisa 

—  Lucien,  d.  1840,  (barred  from  imperial  succession). 

—  Louis,  King  of  Holland,  d.  1S46. 

| - Napoleon  Charles,  d.  1807. 

Hortense  Beau-  — Napoleon  Louis,  d.  1831. 

harnais  — Louis  Napoleon,  Emperor,  d.  1873. 

| -  Napoleon  Louis,  d.  1879. 

Eugenie  Montijo 

—  Jerome,  K.  of  Westphalia,  d.  i860. 

| - Napoleon  Joseph,  d.  1891. 

Catherine  of  |  - J —  Victor  Napoleon 

Wurtemberg  Clotilde  of  Savoy  | —  Louis  Napoleon 

—  Elisa 

I 

Prince  Baciocchi 

—  Pauline 

I 

Prince  Borghese 

—  Caroline 

| - Murat  family. 

Joachim  Murat,  King  of  Naples,  d.  1814. 


INDEX 

OF  NAMES  OF  PLACES  AND  PERSONS 


The  heavy  type  indicates  books  referred  to  in  the  notes. 


Aboukir,  51,  52,  56. 
ABRANTES,  see  Junot. 

Acre,  55. 

ADAMS,  H.,  Hist.  Essays,  117. 
Adda,  32. 

Adige,  35,  36,  38,  39. 

Adriatic,  43. 

Afghanistan,  49. 

Africa,  South,  49. 

Ajaccio,  2,  14. 

Alembert,  d’,  10. 

Alessandria,  28,  30,  83,  85. 
Alexander,  Czar,  124,  125,  140, 
146,  147,  158,  172,  174-181,  200. 
Alexandria,  51 ,  56. 

Alle,  139. 

Alps,  83,  198. 

Alvintzy,  37-39- 

America,  48;  see  also  United 
States. 

Amiens,  1  it. 

ANGEBERG,  D’,  Congrls  de 
Vienne,  222. 

Anna,  Grand  Duchess,  1 72-174. 
Antwerp,  7,  1 14,  224. 
Arcis-sur-Aube,  205. 

Areola,  38,  39. 

Asia  Minor,  54. 

Aspern,  164-167. 

Atlantic,  49. 

Auerstadt,  134. 

Augereau,  27,  32,  45,  99,  137. 

16  2 


Austerlitz,  125. 

Austria,  60,  158,  196,  197. 

Azores,  212. 

Bacciochi,  105;  see  also  Bona¬ 
parte,  Elisa. 

Baden,  108,  120. 

Baltic,  134,  149,  176. 

Bamberg,  133. 

BARING,  Staff  Coll.  Essays,  26. 
Barras,  17,  18,  20,  66,69. 

Basle,  80,  120,  200. 

Bassano,  36. 

BAUSSET,  Mems.,  12,  188. 
Bautzen,  191. 

Bavaria,  123,  143,  144,  193. 

Baylen,  1 53. 

Bayonne,  152. 

Beauharnais,  family,  64. 

“  ,  Eugene,  19,  65,  105, 

106,  no,  178,  189, 
190,  196,  218. 

“  ,  Hortense,  19,  65, 

104,  105. 

“  ,  Josephine,  see  Bona¬ 

parte. 

“  ,  Vicomte  de,  19,  20. 

Beaulieu,  28-31,  34- 
Beaumont,  223. 

Belle  Alliance,  227,  234. 

Belliard,  206. 

BELLIARD,  Mems.,  18S. 

.1 


242 


INDEX 


Beluchistan,  49. 

Bennigsen,  136-139. 

Berezina,  184-186. 

Berlin,  131,  133,  135,  147. 

Berlin  decree,  148,  149. 
Bernadotte,  45,  68,  73,  126,  127, 
134.  i36.  168,  192,  193. 

Berthier,  56,  75,  81,  82,  218. 
Bessieres,  178. 

Black  Forest,  120. 

Blucher,  134,  190,  193,  200-206, 
221,  224-229. 

Bohemia,  123,  193. 

Bologna,  43. 

Bonaparte,  Caroline,  104,  105. 

“  ,  Charles,  2,  105. 

“  ,  Elisa,  105. 

“  ,  Jerome,  105,  178,  229. 

“  ,  Joseph,  64,  66,  104, 

150,  17 1,  206. 

“  ,  Josephine,  19,  20,  43, 

64,  65,  96,  104,  105, 
162,  172,  218. 

“  ,  Louis,  105. 

“  ,  Lucien,  64,  66,  69,  74, 

77.  78,  104. 

“  ,  Napoleon,  passim. 

“  ,  Pauline,  105. 

BONAPARTE,  JOSEPH, 
Correspondence ,  118. 

Borghese,  105. 

Borodino,  180,  182. 

Bosphorus,  2. 

Boulogne,  121. 

Bourbons,  9. 

BOURGOGNE,  Mems.,  188. 
Bourrienne,  14,  75. 
BOURRIENNE,  Mems.,  12, 
13,  26,  58,  102,  1 18. 
BOUVIER,  Bonaparte,  40. 
Brazil,  148. 

Brenta,  37. 

Brest,  114-116. 


Brienne,  3,  200,  201. 

Brittany,  106. 

BROWNING,  England  and 
Napoleon,  118. 

Brueys,  50-52. 

Brunswick,  Duke  of,  132-134. 
Brussels,  223-228 
BURGOYNE,  Naval  and  mili¬ 
tary  operations,  58. 

Cadiz,  115-117. 

Cadoudal,  106-108. 

Cairo,  51,  56. 

Calder,  116. 

Caldiero,  38,  46. 

Cambaceres,  66,  92. 

Campo  Formio,  43,  47,  59,  87. 
Canadian  lakes,  113. 

Cannes,  215. 

Carnot,  219. 

Cartagena,  115. 

Cassel,  121,  132. 

Castiglione,  35. 

CASTLEREAGH,  Dispatches, 
209. 

Caulaincourt,  202. 
CAVAIGNAC,  Mems.,  12. 

Ceva,  28. 

Chalons,  198,  200. 

Champaubert,  202. 

Channel,  the,  48,  114,  116,  130, 
148. 

Chantereine,  rue,  64. 

Charleroi,  224. 

Charles  IV.  of  Spain,  1 50-1 52. 
Charles,  Archduke,  41,  123,  162- 
170. 

Chateaubriand,  8,  109. 

Cherasco,  29,  30. 

CHUQUET,  Jeunesse  de  Napo¬ 
leon,  12. 

Cintra,  153. 

Cisalpine  republic,  43,  no. 


INDEX 


243 


CLAIR,  Hofer  et  Is  Tyrol,  169. 
Coblentz,  121. 

Coburg,  133. 

Colli,  28. 

Constant,  219. 

Constantinople,  2,  53. 
Copenhagen,  147,  148. 

Corfu,  52,  146,  150. 

Cornwallis,  1 1 5,  1 1 6. 

Corsica,  1,  15. 

Corunna,  154,  1 5  5- 
COTTIN,  Toulon  et  les  Anglais , 
26. 

Craonne,  204. 

Crete,  51. 

CROMER,  see  Baring. 
CUGNAC,  DE,  Ca?npagne,  87. 
Cuvier,  96. 

Dalmatia,  192. 

Danube,  121,  123,  163,  167. 
Danzig,  136,  199. 

David,  96. 

Davidowich,  36-38. 

IJavoust,  125-128,  134,  168,  178. 
DAYOT,  Napoleon,  12. 
DEBIDOUR,  L’Eglise  et  r£tat, 
102. 

Deeres,  27. 

Dego,  28. 

DELA ROCHE,  Numismatique, 

12. 

Delavigne,  8. 

Denon,  1 12. 

Desaix,  85,  86. 

DESBRIERE,  Projets  de  de- 
barquement ,  58,  1 1 8. 

Diderot,  10. 

Dieppe,  1 14. 

Dijon,  81. 

Directoire,  17,  45“47,  5°,  59”66. 

69.  72,  74.  92>  98- 
Dnieper,  183. 


Doulevent,  206. 

Dresden,  178,  192,  193,  199. 
Ducos,  Roger,  66,  69,  78,  89. 
Dupont,  1 53. 

DURAND,  Mems.,  12. 

Duroc,  104. 

DU  TEIL,  Napoleon,  26. 

Dyle,  229. 

Ebro,  153. 

Eckmiihl,  163. 

Eguillette,  Fort  of,  15.  * 

Egypt,  5°"55.  79,  I”- 
Elba,  207,  21 1,  213. 

Elbe,  1 31 ,  132,  190,  191,  193. 
Enghien,  Due  d’,  108,  109. 
England,  48,  49,  147,  158,  196,  211. 
Erfurt,  131,  132,  158,  159. 

Essling,  164-167,  170. 

Eylau,  136-138. 

FABRY,  Armee  cf/talie,  40. 
FAIN,  Manuscrit  de  1813,  197; 

Manuserit  de  1814,  209. 
Ferdinand  of  Naples,  21 1. 
Ferdinand  of  Spain,  151,  152. 
Ferrol,  115,  1 16. 

Finland,  146. 

FISHER,  Napoleonic  Statesman¬ 
ship,  Germany,  102,  156. 
Fontainebleau,  206-208,  213. 

FO  U  C  A  R  T,  Campagne  de 

Prnsse,  1 4 1 . 

Fouche,  92,  160,  1 61 ,  235. 
FOURNIER,  Congress  von  Cha- 
tillon,  209;  Napoleon,  11,  102, 
169. 

Francis,  Emperor,  124,  144,  178, 
191,  200,  220. 

Frankfort,  198. 

Frederick  the  Great,  21. 

Frederick  William,  130,  146,  200. 
Frejus,  56. 


244 


INDEX 


Friant,  233. 

Friedland,  139. 

GAFFAREL,  Bonaparte ,  58. 
Galicia,  174. 

Garda,  35. 

Gaudin,  92. 

GAUDIN,  Mans.,  102. 
Gembloux,  225,  227. 

Genappe,  224,  227. 

Geneva,  82. 

Genoa,  28,  43,  79,  Si,  83,  no. 
Genoese,  12. 

GEORGE,  Napoleon's  invasion  of 
Russia,  188. 

German  Empire,  see  Holy  Roman. 
Gibraltar,  2,  1 15,  1 16. 

Godoy,  1 50-1 52. 

Gohier,  69. 

Good  Hope,  Cape  of,  49, 

Great  Britain,  see  England. 
Grenoble,  215. 

Grouchy,  225-232. 

GUILLON,  Complots  viilitaires, 

1 18. 

Gumbinnen,  186. 

Hamburg,  199. 

Hanover,  121,  130. 
HAUSSONVILLE,  D', 

L' Eglise  romaine,  102. 

Haye  Sainte,  228,  232,  233. 
Heilsberg,  138. 

HELFERT,  Konigin  Karolina, 

1 4 1 ;  Marie  Louise,  1 88 ;  Murat, 
197,  222. 

Helvetius,  10. 

Hoche,  63. 

Hof,  133. 

Hohenlinden,  87. 

Ilohenlohe,  134. 

Holland,  60. 

Holy  Roman  Empire,  144. 
Hougoumont,  229,  233. 


HOUSSAYE,  1814,  209;  /8/j, 
222,  238. 

HUFFER,  Quellen fur  Geschicte, 
87. 

Illyria,  169. 

INCONNUE,  see  Cavaignac. 
India,  49,  50,  53,  150. 

Indian  Ocean,  49. 

Indus,  49. 

Invalides,  237. 

Isar,  163. 

Ischia,  166. 

Italy,  20,  149,  195,  196. 

JACKSON,  B.,  Mans.,  12,  238. 
Jackson,  T.  J.,  37. 

Jacobins,  16,  60,  68,  69,  73,  74,  77. 
Jaffa,  54,  55. 

Jena,  133,  134,  151. 

John,  Archduke,  87. 

JOMINI,  Art  of  War,  26. 

Joseph,  see  Bonaparte. 

Joubert,  61-63. 

Jourdan,  45,  63,  73. 

Julian  Alps,  41. 

JUNG,  Bonaparte,  12. 

Junot,  104,  148-153,  178. 

JUNOT,  Mems.,  12,  26,  1 18. 
JURIEN  DE  LA  GRA- 
VIERE,  Guerres  maritimes, 
1 18. 

Kalisch,  189. 

Kalouga,  182. 

KIRCHEISEN,  Bibliographic, 
12. 

Konigsberg,  136,  139,  187. 

Kray,  80,  81. 

Kutusoff,  125-128,  180-185. 

La  Barre,  de,  10. 

Labedoyere,  216. 

Lafayette,  234. 

LA  JONQUIERE,  Expedition 
d’Egypte,  58. 


I  N  D  EX 


245 


Lamartine,  8. 

LANFREY,  Napoleon,  II. 
Lannes,  32,  99,  134,  139,  164,  165. 
Laon,  204. 

Laplace,  96. 

La  Rothiere,  201,  202. 

LARREY,  Mine.  Mire,  13. 

LAS  CASES,  Memorial,  238. 
Lebrun,  92. 

Leclerc,  78,  105. 

I.egnago,  34,  36- 
Leipzig,  131,  190,  193-195- 
LE  NORMAND,  Mems.,  12, 1 18 
Leoben,  42. 

LETTOW-VORBECK,  Der 

Kriegvon  ’06,  141. 

Liege,  224. 

Ligny,  224,  225. 

Ligurian  republic,  43. 

Lisbon,  148  153. 

Lobau,  165-167. 

Lodi,  31,  32. 

Lombardy,  30,  43,  83,  86,  196. 
Lonato,  35. 

Longwood,  237. 

Louis  XVI.,  14. 

Louis  XVIII.,  101,  207,  214. 
Louisa  of  Prussia,  132,  143. 
Louisiana,  112,  113. 

Lowe,  Hudson,  236. 

Lubeck,  134. 

LUCKWALDT,  Oestcrreich 
und  Befreiungskriege,  1 97. 

Luneville,  87,  1 1 1. 

Lutzen,  190. 

Macdonald,  168,  178,  189,  216. 
Mack,  120,  121. 

Madrid,  151-154,  171. 

Magdeburg,  193. 

MAHAN,  Influence  of  Sea  Power, 
58,  1 18,  155. 

Maitland,  235. 


Malmaison,  218. 

Malta,  51,  52,  55,  79,  ill,  1 12. 
Mameluks,  53. 

Mantua,  31-36,  39. 

MARBOT,  Mems.,  12,  169,  188. 
Marchfeld,  167. 

Marengo,  83-86. 

MARGUERON,  Campagne  de 
Russie,  188. 

Maria  Louisa,  163,  164,  173,  176, 
178,  206,  212,  213. 

Marne,  200-204. 

Marseilles,  80. 

Massena,  10,  27,  62,  63,  80,  83, 
123,  164,  168,  175. 

MASSON,  Josephine,  26 ;  Napo¬ 
leon,  1 2. 

Mayence,  120,  121,  131,  132,  193, 
194,  200. 

Meaux,  204,  206. 

Mediterranean,  2,  3,  50,  in,  116, 
150. 

Melas,  80-86. 

MENEVAL,  Mans.,  12. 
Messina,  51,  149. 

Metternich,  6,  159,  172,  173,  191, 
192,  196,  197,  213. 

METTERNICH,  Mems.,  12, 
222. 

Meuse,  224,  225. 

Mexico,  Gulf  of,  113. 

Milan,  30,  31,  33,  34,  83. 

Mincio,  34. 

Mississippi,  113. 

Modena,  43. 

Mollendorf,  124. 

MOLLIEN,  Mans.,  102. 
Mondovi,  28. 

MON  NET,  Hist,  de  /’ adminis¬ 
tration ,  102. 

Mont  Cenis,  83. 

Montebello,  42. 

Montenotte,  28. 


246 


INDEX 


Montereau,  203. 

Montesquieu,  10. 

Montmirail,  202. 

Mont  St.  Jean,  226,  229. 

Moore,  Sir  J.,  154,  160,  161. 
Moravia,  124,  125. 

Moreau,  63,  80,  83,  87,  107,  108, 
192. 

Mortier,  139. 

Moscow,  179-181. 

Moskva,  180. 

Moulins,  69. 

Mount  Tabor,  56. 

Munich,  120. 

Murat,  10,  19,  45,  56,  76,  78,  83, 
120,  124,  134,  137,  139,  151,  152, 
161,  166,  178,  181,  1S6,  189,  192- 
197,  21 1,  220. 

Namur,  204,  224. 

Nangis,  203. 

NAPIER,  Peninsular  war ,  156, 
209. 

Naples,  59,  60,  1 1 2,  150,  195-197, 
21 1,  220. 

NAPOLEON,  Corresp.,  12. 
Napoleon  III.,  105. 

NASICA,  Mems .,  13. 

Naumburg,  133,  134. 

Neipperg,  213. 

Nelson,  50,  51,  115-117. 
NERVO,  Finances  frangaises, 
102. 

Ney,  10,  45,  139,  178,  1S3,  187,  216, 
225,  230,  232,  233. 

Nice,  20,  28,  81. 

Niemen,  140,  178. 

Nivelles,  224. 

Nogent,  201,  202. 

North  Sea,  149. 

Novi,  62. 

Oder,  190. 

OMAN,  Peninsular  war ,  r  56,  209. 


O’MEARA,  Napoleon  in  exile, 
238. 

O  N  C  K  E  N ,  Oesterreich  tend 
Preussen,  197. 

Oporto,  1 66. 

Oudinot,  126,  128,  139,  178,  184, 
185. 

Padua,  39. 

Palestine,  56. 

PALLAIN,  Corresp.  de  Talley¬ 
rand,  222. 

Paoli,  2. 

Papacy,  59,  149. 

Paris,  3,  4,  14,  17,  45,  48,  179,  203. 
204,  205,  237. 

PASQUIER,  Mems.,  12,  102, 
209. 

Paul,  Czar,  79. 

PE  ROUSE,  Arapoleon,  102. 
Persia,  49,  150. 

Peschiera,  34. 

PETRE,  Napoleon's  campaign  in 
Poland,  14 1. 

Piacenza,  31,  83. 

Piave,  37. 

Pichegru,  106,  107. 

Picton,  230. 

Piedmont,  83. 

Pius  VII.,  no,  166,  172. 
Planchenoit,  232,  233. 

Po-  3°'  3L  35-  83- 
Poland,  135,  158,  174,211. 
Poniatowski,  174,  178. 

Portugal,  147,  148,  150. 

Prague,  192. 

Pratzen,  126-128. 

Pressburg,  130,  143,  149. 
Provence,  21 5. 

“  ,  Comte  de,  see  Louis 

XVIII. 

Provera,  39. 

Prussia,  124,  125,  146,  147,  158. 


INDEX 


247 


Pul  tusk,  136. 

Pyrenees,  153,  204. 

Pyramids,  53. 

Quadrilateral,  35,  83. 

Quatre  Bras,  224-227. 
Quosdanowich,  35. 

Red  Sea,  50. 

REMUSAT,  Mems.,  12. 

Kheims,  204. 

Rhine,  43,  60,  80,  198,  200,  205, 
221. 

Rivoli,  38,  39. 

Robespierre,  16,  17. 

Robespierre  Jezme ,  16. 

Rochefort,  1 15,  1 16,  235. 
ROEDERER,  (Euvres,  12,  118. 
Rome,  60. 

“  ,  King  of,  176,  206,  212,  236, 

237  • 

Ronco,  38. 

ROPES,  Waterloo ,  238. 

ROSE,  A'apoleon,  n,  1 1 8,  156. 
ROSEBERY,  The  Last  Phase, 
238. 

Rousseau,  10. 

Roveredo,  37,  39. 

Rudolstadt,  132. 

Russia,  49,  60. 

Saale,  194. 

Saalfeld,  133. 

St.  Amand,  224,  225. 

St.  Bernard,  82,  83. 

St.  Cloud,  68-71. 

St.  Cyr,  178. 

St.  Dizier,  200. 

St.  Gotthard,  83. 

St.  Helena,  235-237. 

Ste.  Nicaise,  rue,  103. 

Sambre,  224,  225. 

Santon,  125. 


Sardinia,  14,  28,  30. 

SASKI,  Campagne  de  ’09,  169. 
Sastchan,  128. 

Savary,  108. 

S  A  VARY,  Mems.,  58. 

Saxony,  174,  178,  191,  211. 
Schonbrunn,  169-171. 
SCHONHALS,  Per  Krieg  ’op, 
129. 

Schwarzenberg,  177,  189,  192-194, 
200-206,  221. 

SEATON,  Napoleon's  Captivity, 
238. 

Sebastiani,  71. 

Segur,  6. 

SEGUR,  Mems.,  12,  188. 

Seine,  200-203,  2°6- 
Serurier,  27,  86. 

Shenandoah,  37. 

SI  BORNE,  War  in  France,  238. 
Sieyes,  61,  62,  66,  67,  69,  73,  88- 
91- 

Silesia,  191. 

SLOANE,  Napoleon,  12. 

Smith,  Sidney,  55. 

Smolensk,  1S0,  1S2-1S4. 

Soult,  126,  127,  134,  155,  166,  203, 
218. 

Souvaroff,  60,  62. 

Spain,  150,  1 51,  154,  1 7 1 . 

Staps,  1 7 1 ,  172. 

Stradella,  83-86. 

Strasbourg,  120. 

STUTTERHEIM,  Bataille 
d’Austerlitz,  129. 

Suchet,  81. 

Sweden,  146,  192. 

Switzerland,  80,  81. 

Syria,  54. 

TAINE,  Origines,  13,  102. 
Talleyrand,  66,  69,  92,  109,  158, 
160,  161,  207,  218. 


248 


INDEX 


TALLEYRAND,  Corresp., 
222;  Mctns.,  12. 

Taranto,  112. 

TARBELL,  Napoleon ,  12. 
Tchitchagoff,  184,  185. 
THIBAUDEAU,  Mails.,  102. 
Thiebault,  iS,  217. 
THIEBAULT,  Mems.,  12. 
Thuringian  forest,  132. 

Tilsit,  140,  146,  150,  157 
Tippoo  Sahib,  53. 

Tolentino,  220. 

Torres  Vedras,  175. 

Toulon,  10,  15,  16,  50,  52,  80,  1 14, 
11 5- 

Trafalgar,  101,  117,  148. 

Trent,  36. 

Trieste,  169,  192. 

Troyes,  203. 

TRUCHSESS VON  WALD- 
BURG,  Bonaparte’ s  reise,  222. 
Tuileries,  14,  67,  68,  103,  216,  217. 
Turin,  28,  30. 

Turkey,  49,  146,  147,  159. 
TURQUAN,  Sceurs  de  Napoleon, 
26,  1 1 8. 

Tyrol,  35. 

Ulm,  120,  121,  124. 

United  States,  48,  112,  113. 

Valenza,  30,  31. 

Valladolid,  154. 

VANDAL,  Avenemcnt  de  Bona¬ 
parte,  70;  NapoUonet  Alexandre, 
155,  1S8. 

Vauchamps,  202. 

Vendee,  106. 

Venetia,  149. 

Venice,  42,  43. 

Verona,  34,  36-39,  42 
Versailles,  48. 


Vicenza,  36,  37,  39. 

Victoire,  rue  de  la,  64,  67,  68. 
Victor,  45,  139,  178,  184,  185. 
Victor  Napoleon,  105. 

Vienna,  42,  123,  124,  163-167. 

“  ,  Congress  of,  210,  21 1, 

213,  218. 

Villeneuve,  115-117. 

Vimiero,  153. 

Vincennes,  108. 

Vistula,  135,  190. 

VITROLLES,  DE,  Mans.,  209. 
Vitry,  200. 

Vittoria,  191. 

Voltaire,  10. 

Wagram,  167,  170. 

Warsaw,  135,  174,  191. 
WARTENBURG,  see  York. 
Washington,  too. 

Waterloo,  227-234. 

Wavre,  227,  229,  232. 

Wellington,  156,  166,  175,  19  i, 
203,  221,  224-228,  231-234. 
WELSCHINGER,  La  censure, 
102;  le  divorce  de  ATapoleoi', 
188  ;  le  roi  de  Rome,  209. 
WEIL,  le  Prince  Engine,  19;', 
222. 

WERTHEIMER,  169. 

West  Indies,  1 1 5,  116. 
Westphalia,  144. 

Wilna,  179,  180,  187. 

WILSON,  Mans.,  12,  188. 
Wittgenstein,  184,  185,  190. 
Wurmser,  35-39. 

Wurtemberg,  144. 

YORK  VON  WARTEN¬ 
BURG,  Napoleon,  40. 

Zurich,  62. 


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bination  of  clearness  with  brevity  and  of  definiteness  with  generaliza¬ 
tion  that  is  not  always  found  in  such  a  book.  It  is  a  pleasure  to  have  it 
at  last  done  into  English,  and  by  competent  hands.” 

PROF.  GEORGE  L.  BURR,  of  Cornell: 

“The  book  of  B£mont  and  Monod  I  have  long  regarded  as  the  very 
best  text-book  known  to  me  in  its  field.” 

PROF.  DANA  C.  MUNRO,  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin: 

“I  am  very  glad  to  see  the  translation.  This  is  one  of  the  best  books 
we  have  ever  had  for  Medieval  history.” 

PROF.  MERRICK  WHITCOMB,  of  the  University  of  Cincinnati  : 

“The  most  comprehensive  and  accurate  presentation  we  have  yet  had 
of  the  period,  and  the  best  adapted  for  class  purposes.” 

PROF.  A.  B.  SHOW,  of  Leland  Stanford  Junior  University* 

“I  regard  the  work  as  the  verv  best  general  history  of  the  Middle  Ages 
now  available  in  English.” 


HENRY  HOLT  &  COMPANY, 

NEK'  TORK.  (x,’°3).  CHICAGO. 


( 


V1(/  1  9  1910 
M  23  WQ 


^EC  R  1911 


